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DEDICATION
For the Water Protectors, the Black Snake Killaz, the Land Defenders, the Treaty
Councils, the Old Ones, the Good People of the Earth. The Fire of the Seventh
Generation is lit and it cannot be put out. We are our ancestors from the before and before
and the already forthcoming. We are the ones they prayed for.

iii

OUR HISTORY IS THE FUTURE: MNI WICONI AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
NATIVE LIBERATION
by
Nick Estes
B.A., HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 2008
M.A., HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 2013
PHD, AMERICAN, UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO, 2017
ABSTRACT
From April 2016 to February 2017, Indigenous women and youth led a historic struggle
to halt the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline from crossing Mni Sose, the
Missouri River, and threatening the drinking water of the Standing Rock Indian
Reservation and millions downstream. Rallied under the banner Mni Wiconi, a Lakota
assertion meaning “water is life,” centuries of history converged during the protests. It
was about more than an oil pipeline. It was struggle over the meaning of history, the
defense of land and water, and the rights of Indigenous peoples to determine their own
future. When land and water are taken or destroyed, the past is lost with them and so too
is the possibility of a livable future. In this dissertation, I situate multiple archival sources
and oral histories to document two centuries of Indigenous resistance against the trespass
of settlers, dams, and oil pipelines across the Mni Sose. I develop an alternative
intellectual history of the Oceti Sakowin, the Nation of the Seven Council Fires, the
Lakota-, Dakota-, and Nakota-speaking peoples, from the nineteenth century to the
present. This story begins with the trespass of Lewis and Clark in 1804 and the arrival of
the US on the Missouri. I document the drastic changes brought to the land, the water,
and the people during mid-nineteenth century Indian wars and the mid-twentieth century
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damming of the Missouri by the Army Corps of Engineers. I also tell the story of
Indigenous resistance, Red Power, the rise of Indigenous internationalism, and the
creation of the International Indian Treaty Council at Standing Rock in 1974 to bring
world attention to these issues. It was at Standing Rock where histories of resistance
converged against the Dakota Access Pipeline and gained international appeal. Clearly,
Oceti Sakowin history resonates with the international community today. Such resonance,
I argue, has broader implications than what could be considered just “Indigenous” issues
and has universal appeal, while also remaining firmly grounded in history and place.
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Chapter 1: The Siege
Our water is our single last property that we have for our people. Water is life.
Mni Wiconi… We will do whatever we have to do to stop this pipeline [the
Dakota Access Pipeline] … North Dakota? Miye, ma Dakota. I am Dakota.
Dakota means ‘friend’ and ‘ally.’ This is Dakota Territory. This is treaty territory.
This is where you agreed not to come into my territory. We signed the treaty of
peace that you would not come here… We will put our best warriors in the front.
We are the vanguard. We are Hunkpapa Lakota. That means the horn of the
buffalo. That’s who we are. We are protectors of our nation of Oceti Sakowin, the
Seven Council Fires. Know who we are. We will put forward our young people,
our young lawyers who understand the weasel words of the English language,
who know one word can mean seven things. We understand the forked tongue
that our grandfathers talked about. We know about talking out both sides of your
mouth, smiling with one side of your face. We know all about the tricks of the
wasicu [the fat-taker, the capitalist] world. Our young people have mastered it. I
have mastered your language. I can speak eloquently in the English language. My
grandmother taught me. But I also know the genetic psyche, and I also have the
collective memory of the damages that have occurred to my people. I will never
submit to any pipeline to go through my homeland. Mitakuye Oyasin.
— Phyllis Young (Dakota), “Sept 30th DAPL Meeting with SRST,” 20141
This story has a beginning but no end. Phyllis Young, a Hunkpapa elder, longtime member of the American Indian Movement, and Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
Councilwoman, spoke the above words at a September 30, 2014 Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe council meeting with representatives of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL). It was
a full year before the pipeline permitting process began. She moved skillfully from the
long histories of treaty-making, trespass, and the ongoing betrayal of the Oceti Sakowin.
Young, other Standing Rock citizens, and elected leadership made their case clear: DAPL
shall not pass: not without Standing Rock’s consent, and especially not without the
consent of the nations of the Oceti Sakowin, the Lakota, Nakota, and Dakota people.
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Quote from “Sept 30th DAPL Meeting with SRST,” filmed September 2014, YouTube video,
1:08:17, posted by “Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, December 6, 2016,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GiFNVgsX77s.
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Indigenous peoples claim the river. More importantly, the river claims them. The Oceti
Sakowin call DAPL Zuzeca Sapa, the Black Snake, which came from a prophecy that a
monstrous Black Snake would extend across the land threatening all life bringing difficult
times that would ultimately unite Indigenous nations. Some of those who came to halt its
construction called themselves Black Snake Killaz.
The pipeline trespasses through unceded treaty lands and sacred sites, such as
burial grounds, and threatens Indigenous water rights. Like many, Phillis Young also
recognized the profound cruelty in appropriating the name of her nation, Dakota, for a
pipeline, Dakota Access, that imperils the existence of the very people it takes its name
from. A rupture from the Dakota Access could contaminate the clean drinking water of
the Dakota nation with heavy crude oil. The pipeline crosses the Missouri River just
under a mile north of the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation boundary and within
treaty territory.
DAPL representatives seemed unmoved, or possibly annoyed that they had met
such strident opposition. Before DAPL representatives were allowed to make their case,
Standing Rock Chairman Dave Archambault II calmly reminded them, “Before you get
started on the project, we want you to know and understand, we recognize our treaty
boundaries [of the] Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 and 1868... Because of that, we oppose a
pipeline. We have a standing resolution that was passed in 2012 that opposes any pipeline
within that treaty boundary.”2 Billionaire CEO Kelcy Warren of Energy Transfer
Partners, the owners of DAPL, would later deny this “discussion,” or any “discussion”
with Standing Rock, ever took place. Two years after this first consultation with Standing
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Ibid.
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Rock, Warren told The Wallstreet Journal, “I really wish for the Standing Rock Sioux
that they had engaged in discussions way before they did. I don’t think we would have
been having this discussion if they did… We could have changed the route. It could have
been done, but it’s too late.”3 Indigenous sovereignty, treaties, and the invariable threat
the pipeline posed to the river, a fresh water source for millions not just Indigenous
peoples, mattered little to them. Underneath DAPL’s feigned ambivalence about consent
simmered outright contempt that would explode into horrific violence. What stood before
them were not the last vestiges of a dying race. What stood before them was a nation that
had survived genocide, a nation that was valiantly rejecting the second coming of a failed
genocide — the ongoing planetary holocaust we call climate change.
Today these words sound like prophecy: “We are protectors of our nation of Oceti
Sakowin, the Seven Council Fires. Know who we are.” It was a bold refusal to die. Less
than two years later a Native-led movement was born under the rallying cry Mni Wiconi
— water is life!
History would be made. The Oceti Sakowin would unite to spearhead an historic
struggle that drew support from around the world. The struggle at Standing Rock spread
across North America and was different from previous movements in important ways. It
became about more than Standing Rock, a pipeline, or climate justice. This new
movement made critical links between protecting Indigenous peoples and their treaty
rights to the protection of the earth and nonhuman relations, such as water. While these
concerns may be “new” to some, for Indigenous peoples they are “old” wars that draw

3

Quoted in Kris Maher, “Dakota Pipeline’s Builder Says Obstacles Will Disappear Under Donald
Trump,” The Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/dakota-pipelinesbuilder-says-obstacles-will-disappear-under-donald-trump-1479327104.
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deep from traditions of Indigenous resistance. The struggle popularized by the hashtag
#NoDAPL was a continuation of the nineteenth century Indian wars. In the same manner,
it was a war of self-defense and a people fighting for their lives. From the first defensive
battles against the invaders to present-day fights against oil pipelines, the Oceti Sakowin
have dreamed of peace and freedom. Above all, they have fought and died to live the
dignified life in the lands of their ancestors, a life continually denied to them. This was
not a return to a pre-colonial past, however real or imagined, or a parochial struggle.
Instead, liberation — for human and nonhuman relations such as the land and water —
has been a future-oriented project drawing from histories of resistance and the stubborn
refusal to just go away.4
On April 1, 2016, as pipeline construction began, Sacred Stone erected the first
camp. In the summer of 2016, tens of thousands answered the call and set up camp at the
confluence of the Cannon Ball and Missouri rivers on Oceti Sakowin treaty lands now
claimed by the US Army Corps of Engineer. Founded by Ihanktonwan and Hunkpapa
Standing Rock historian LaDonna Bravebull Allard, Sacred Stone took its name from the
Lakota name for the Cannon Ball area, Inyan Wakangapi Oti.5 The names “Cannon Ball”
and “Sacred Stone” describe the spherical stones that were once carved by whirlpools at
the confluence of the two rivers. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Corps constructed a series of
massive earthen-rolled dams on the main stem of the Missouri River flooding Native
lands and forcefully relocating more than a thousand Native families. Bravebull Allard
reflects on the history of the water,

4

See Kyle Whyte, “Indigenous Climate Studies: Indigenizing Futures, Decolonizing the
Anthropocene,” English Language Notes 55 no. 1-2 (Fall 2017): 153-62.
5
“Sacred Stone Camp: About,” Sacred Stone Camp, http://sacredstonecamp.org/about/.
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The [Cannonball] river’s true name is Inyan Wakangapi Wakpa, River that Makes
the Sacred Stones, and we have named the site of our resistance on my family’s
land the Sacred Stone Camp. The stones are not created anymore, ever since the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers dredged the mouth of the Cannonball River and
flooded the area in the late 1950s as they finished the Oahe dam. They killed a
portion of our sacred river. I was a young girl when the floods came and
desecrated our burial sites and Sundance grounds. Our people are in that water.
This river holds the story of my entire life.6
The history of Sacred Stone evokes the essence of the struggle. It was here that water
shaped earth, and here that the earth and water were used by state institutions to shape
history. Land and water are not only about narrating the past of what was or what
continues to be. Land and water are also about what should be — a viable future. When
land and water are taken or destroyed, the past is lost with them and so too is the
possibility of a livable future. To enact violence against the land and water is to also
enact violence against those who depend on it for life — namely, all of us.
Like most Indigenous movements, Indigenous women and youth were the core
organizers and leaders.7 From Sacred Stone, Native youth organizers Jasilyn Charger
(Cheyenne River Sioux), Bobbi Jean Three Legs (Standing Rock Sioux), Joseph White
Eyes (Cheyenne River Sioux), and many more led relay runs across country and to
various reservations to raise awareness about DAPL and to stir Native nations to action.
The longest run was a grueling 2,000-mile relay from North Dakota to Washington, D.C.8
6

Ladonna Bravebull Allard, “Why the Founder of Standing Rock Sioux Camp Can’t Forget the
Whitestone Massacre,” Yes! Magazine, September 3, 2016, http://www.yesmagazine.org/peoplepower/why-the-founder-of-standing-rock-sioux-camp-cant-forget-the-whitestone-massacre-20160903.
7
See Kim Tallbear, "Badass (Indigenous) Women Caretake Relations: #NoDAPL, #IdleNoMore,
#BlackLivesMatter," Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology website, December 22, 2016,
https://culanth.org/fieldsights/1019-badass-indigenous-women-caretake-relations-nodapl-idlenomoreblacklivesmatter; Jaskiran Dhillon, “Indigenous Youth are Building a Climate Justice Movement by
Targeting Colonialism,” Truthout, June 20, 2016, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/36482-indigenousyouth-are-building-a-climate-justice-movement-by-targeting-colonialism.
8
Jaskiran Dhillon, “‘This Fight Has Become My Life and It’s Not Over’: An Interview with
Zaysha Grinell,” Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology website, December 22, 2016,
https://culanth.org/fieldsights/1017-this-fight-has-become-my-life-and-it-s-not-over-an-interview-withzaysha-grinnell; Tara Houska, “Native American Youth to Obama: ‘Rezpect’ Our Water,” Indian Country
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Standing Rock youth leader Tokata Iron Eyes explained the role that youth and women
fill, “even if the men aren’t fighting for us and our land, then we as young women have
an obligation to fight for ourselves and our people.”9
More than 300 Native nations responded to the youth’s media and publicity
campaign, and planted their flags in solidarity at Oceti Sakowin Camp, the largest of
several camps that also included Sacred Stone Camp, the International Indigenous Youth
Council, Red Warrior Camp, Two-Spirit Camp, and various allied Indigenous and nonIndigenous camps. The gathering was one of the largest gatherings of Indigenous nations
and allied movements in history. At its peak, the camps swelled with solidarity from all
corners of the globe. A steady stream of cars and delegations, delivering supplies and
campers, trickled in day and night. Walking from one end of camp to the other, one could
hear different Indigenous languages spoken; a rainbow tapestry of banners, flags, and
screen-print signs showed the diversity of the campers and the communities and
movements they represented; honor songs were sung; stories were shared; delegations
from around the world arrived bearing gifts; new relations were made; warm embraces
and tears of joy were shed; meals were cooked; food was shared; families were re-united;
lives were forever changed; and, most importantly, Indigenous life was being remade.
The movement, widely dubbed with the hashtag #NoDAPL, was the catalyst for the
resurgence of a twenty-first Indigenous resistance movement.

Today, August 11, 2016, https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/native-news/native-americanyouth-to-obama-rezpect-our-water/.
9
Quoted in Jaskiran Dhillon, “Indigenous Youth are Building a Climate Justice Movement by
Targeting Colonialism,” Truthout, June 20, 2016, http://www.truth-out.org/op-ed/item/36482-indigenousyouth-are-building-a-climate-justice-movement-by-targeting-colonialism.

6

Added to the mix, an intensification of military and police surveillance and
mobilization attempted to divide, expel, and ultimately crush the Indigenous-led uprising.
Rampant police brutality and harassment, constant surveillance, the arrest of more than
800, the forceful evictions from the land by federal, state, and tribal officials, and the
desecration of Indigenous bodies, lands, and cultural patrimony soon defined the
militarized response. Yet, in stark contrast to what looked and felt like a warzone with
24-hour floodlights, concrete barricades, and miles of concertina wire, dreams of freedom
seemed more real and more possible here than anywhere else and now more so than just a
year before. Political possibility abounds in times of war. Whereas one side waged a
punitive and acquisitive war to shore up access to Indigenous lands, the other waged a
nonviolent war of protection and defense. This is also a war story. #NoDAPL was larger
than Standing Rock.
They called themselves Water Protectors, a name that departed from the
conventional label of “protester” and spoke to values the new movement put forward.
The act of protest means to be against something — for example, to be against a pipeline.
This was different. Although they opposed DAPL, Water Protectors also stood for
something — the continuation of life on a planet so thoroughly ravaged by industrial
civilization and capitalism. They also vowed to protect the 1851 and 1868 Fort Laramie
Treaties, agreements signed between the Oceti Sakowin and the US. The land chosen for
the larger Oceti Sakowin camp was, after all, unceded treaty territory — and so, too, were
the waters and the rivers protected by those treaties. Such are the stakes for the Lakota
and Dakota philosophy, Mitakuye Oyasin, all my relations or we are all related. This isn’t
the anthropocentric (or solely a human) we, but a we that centers maintaining correct and

7

balanced relationships with the nonhuman world that the human we depends on for life.
The rallying cry of Mni Wiconi is an affirmation that water is life, or, more accurately,
water is alive. Hunkpapa historian Josephine Waggoner offers a possible linguistic origin
of Mni and Wiconi. She writes,
wičhóni, means life. In analyzing the word mni (water), mi being I and ni being
life, the two syllables put together means — ‘I live.’ That is what mni or water is
called. The word and its origin — wi, the sun, čho, the germ or center, ni is life,
the understanding of this would be that the sun centered on a germ and gave life
to it, so wi čhó ni the word came… This word, wi čhó ni, is the best explanation
or description of the origin of life.10
For the Oceti Sakowin, Mni Sose, the Missouri River, is a relative. She is of the Mni
Oyate, the Water Nation. She, too, is alive. Nothing owns her. She cannot be sold or
alienated like a piece of property. How do you sell a relative? To enact kinship to both
the human and nonhuman relations is called Wotakuye, to be a good relative.11 This
requires protecting a relative, Mni Sose, the Mni Oyate, from DAPL’s inevitable
contamination. For the Oceti Sakowin, it’s not if the pipeline breaks, but when it breaks.
Time and place are important. Protecting kinship relations secures a future life on the
land, for, as many say, the seven generations to come. The death of the water also means
death for the Oceti Sakowin and nonhuman relations. This is not an esoteric tradition that
plumbs the depths of an ossified, sage-like cultural knowledge. It is an active fight to live,
a powerful declaration that Indigenous peoples have the right to defend themselves and
their relatives against existential threats such as oil pipelines and the state institutions that
protect them. In this way, Water Protectors connect the defense of the earth and

10

Italics in original. Josephine Waggoner, Witness: A Húnkpapha Historian’s Strong-Heart Song
of the Lakotas, edited by Emily Levine (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 57.
11
Jaskiran Dhillon and Nick Estes, “Introduction: Standing Rock, #NoDAPL, and Mni Wiconi,”
Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology website, December 22, 2016, https://culanth.org/fieldsights/1007introduction-standing-rock-nodapl-and-mni-wiconi.
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nonhuman relations (such as water) to the defense of Indigenous peoples and treaty
rights.
Spirits were high in the face of the impending backlash that was to follow. In the
course of several months, battles raged. One side was armed with spirit. The other side
was armed with the full weight of the police state. In the early days, the police met
nonviolent actions led by Wocekiye, honoring relations, and ceremony with disinterest or
disdain. Lakota linguist and scholar Albert White Hat, Sr. notes that Wocekiye was
purposely mistranslated to “praying” by Christian missionaries to describe “bowing and
kneeling to a supreme power, which is much different from the original meaning of
acknowledging or meeting a relative.” There was no equivalent to “praying” in the
Lakota language, although the word has taken on that meaning because of Christian
influence. Wocekiye, White Hat continues, “means [to] acknowledge or embrace a
relative with honor and respect.”12 What was seen as prayer during the pipeline actions
may have indeed prayer, but it was also acknowledgment and honoring of human and
nonhuman relations. In this way, Water Protectors attempted to speak to officers’
humanity, shaking hands with them, reminding them they were there to protect the water
the officers drank, too, and asking them why they were there in the first place. As the
struggle intensified, acts of humanity were met with brutal repression. Police and military
shattered any vision of a shared, common humanity, if it had existed in the first place. In
the end, it was the military and the police who ultimately denied the humanity of the
Water Protectors, who were shot in the face with rubber bullets and bean bag rounds,
sprayed with chemical weapons such as CS gas and teargas, and sprayed with water

12

Albert White Hat, Sr., Life’s Journey – Zuya: Oral Teachings from Rosebud, edited by John
Cunningham (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2012), 44.
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cannons in below freezing temperatures. Police took some Water Protectors’ body
parts, flesh, and eyesight.
#NoDAPL evolved into something more than an effort to stop a pipeline. An
emancipatory Indigenous uprising long in the making was met with pure violence as it
had been in previous generations. Put simply, Standing Rock, the Oceti Sakowin, and the
millions who depended on the Missouri River would be forced by gunpoint to accept the
fatal consequences of a 1,172-mile long, $3.8 billion pipeline that would transport half a
million barrels of heavy crude oil a day under across four states and the Missouri River
twice and under Mississippi River once. What began as a local struggle of ordinary
Native people to protect their water and land is part of a global movement of frontline
Indigenous communities fighting against the fossil fuel industry and the highly
militarized police state protecting its profits.13
While Water Protectors vowed to stop DAPL, often with frequent marches,
rallies, or high-risk, non-violent direct actions such as putting bodies between
earthmovers and the earth, they also expressed something deeper. Perhaps it could not be
called just another protest movement. The contamination of fundamental elements for life
make vulnerable those already most precarious — the original caretakers of the land. This
place-based struggle stood for stopping the pipeline, and, therefore, it also stood for
stopping climate change and the continued sacrifice of Indigenous lands and communities

13

Although widely used in movement circles, I borrow the notion of “frontline communities”
made vulnerable by catastrophic climate change and the extractivist industry from Naomi Klein, This
Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014).
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who continue to bear the major brunt of state and private economic development
projects.14
#NoDAPL was not the brainchild of big green NGOs. It did not arise from the
large UN summits or the closed-door policy meetings that typically characterize
mainstream Indigenous and environmental organizing. Like its people, it grew from the
earth and was a direct response to the specific material conditions confronting Indigenous
life. It sprang into action in an isolated rural environment with minimal resources. It took
to the streets in major cities and the dirt backroads of rural geographies. It was alive,
sometimes (frustratingly) unpredictable, and in constant motion. In times of intense
struggle and crisis, the sharp contradictions between the haves and have-nots bring into
clearer focus the values of society and competing visions for justice. The camps also
could be considered part of what Naomi Klein terms “Blockadia,” which is not a place,
but “a roving transnational conflict zone that is cropping up with increased frequency and
intensity wherever projects are attempting to dig and drill, whether for open-pit mines, or
gas fracking, or tar sands pipelines.”15
In our current epoch of irreversible, catastrophic climate change, it should come
as no surprise affirmative slogans such as Mni Wiconi and “water is life” mobilize
Indigenous communities to action. DAPL is one part of a complex global supply chain of
carbon extraction, consumption, and emission, the principal causes of global warming
accelerating the earth’s sixth mass extinction event. This is — without a doubt — a
human-driven extinction and, more specifically, a system-driven extinction. Global

14

For contemporary examples on Indigenous resistance to resource extraction, see Katie Mazer,
Mapping a Many Headed Hydra: The Struggle Over the Dakota Access Pipeline, Infrastructure Otherwise
Report no. 1, October 2017, http://www.infrastructureotherwise.org/DAPL_Report_20170921_FINAL.pdf.
15
Ibid., Everything, 294-5.
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warming cannot be uncoupled from the continuing legacies of colonialism,
imperialism, and capitalism that invariably target Indigenous peoples and their lands.
Across the globe, Indigenous peoples number around 370 million, about five percent of
the world’s population; they compose fifteen percent of the world’s poor and one-third of
the world’s 900 million extremely poor rural people; and they live in some of the world’s
most resource rich areas and are often subject to corporate and state-led development
projects that disproportionately affect their lands, waters, and lives.16
The state of Indigenous peoples in the US is different in important ways but
nonetheless reflects global processes. Although less than one percent of the US
population, Natives are subject to the most extreme forms of state repression that includes
poverty, unemployment and underemployment, houselessness, lack of educational
opportunities, and lack of access to quality healthcare. In the US, twenty-three percent of
Native families live below the poverty line compared to the national average of fifteen
percent. Poverty rates vary by location and are often higher in rural locations and smaller
cities. In South Dakota, nearly half of Natives families live below the poverty line. In
North Dakota, about forty percent live below the poverty line. According to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, more than fifty percent of Natives living in or near federally recognized
tribal reservations are unemployed in the states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Maine,
Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota and Utah.17
Despite popular belief, most Natives in the US don’t live in Indian reservations.
According to census numbers, nearly four of every five Natives in the US live off-

16

See State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, 21,
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/SOWIP/en/SOWIP_web.pdf.
17
US Department of the Interior, Office of the Secretary, Office of the Assistant Secretary –
Indian Affairs, 2013 American Indian Population and Labor Force Report, issued January 16, 2014, 10-1.
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reservation.18 The increased migration off-reservation is due to a number of social,
political, and economic factors including lack of employment opportunities onreservation, displacement for state and corporate development projects, removal,
termination, and relocation policies, diminishment of reservation land bases, internal
social violence, etc. Leaving the reservation, however, provides little relief and security.
In contrast to the dominant thinking that Natives live in rural, isolated pockets of poverty
and violence, Natives off-reservation, too, face rampant poverty and state violence. For
example, in Rapid City, South Dakota — a city located in the cosmological and political
center of the Lakota universe, He Sapa, or the Black Hills — Natives (mostly Lakotas)
are twelve percent of the urban population. Yet, more than half of the Native population
lives below the poverty line at a rate higher than most reservations.19 Three-fourths of the
city’s homeless are Native. Natives also make up half the city’s jail population and are
five times more likely to get arrested and receive traffic citations.20 These statistics reveal
a general pattern of police violence against Natives in the US. According to the
Guardian’s “The Counted,” an online database of police killings, 2016 was a deadly year
for Natives. Police killed 24 Natives, higher than the previous year and at a rate higher
than any group. Almost all the killings were at the hands of non-reservation law

18

US Census Bureau, Department of Commerce, The American Indian and Alaskan Native
Population, 2010, by Tina Norris, Paula L. Vines, and Elizabeth M. Hoeffel, issued January 2012.
19
US Census Bureau, Department of Commerce, Poverty Rates for Selected Detailed Race and
Hispanic Groups by State and Place: 2007-2011, by Suzanne Macartney and Kayla Fontenot, issued
February 2013.
20
Pennington County Sheriff’s Office, Annual Report, 2012, issued 2013; Nick Estes, “Off the
Reservation: Lakota Life and Death in Rapid City, South Dakota,” The Funambulist Magazine No. 5, MayJune 2016, https://thefunambulist.net/history/off-the-reservation-lakota-life-and-death-in-rapid-city-southdakota-by-nick-estes; Nick Estes, “Racist City, SD: Life is Violent, and Often Deadly in Rapid City,”
Indian Country Today, September 5, 2014, https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/politics/racistcity-sd-life-is-violent-and-often-deadly-in-rapid-city/.
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enforcement.21 Police are the instrument to manage the political, social, and economic
crisis that is Indigenous life, especially off-reservation. In this sense, the intense police
violence against the #NoDAPL movement at Standing Rock was not aberration, since
most if not all arrests of Water Protectors protesting the pipeline were at the hands of
non-Native, off-reservation law enforcement agencies.
It was not by accident that the #NoDAPL movement arose during the
administration of the US’s first Black President, Barack Obama. Promising sweeping
Indian policy reforms and renewed “nation-to-nation” relationships, Indigenous
communities, like many marginalized communities, overwhelmingly supported the
Obama administration. His pledged commitments to Indian Country culminated in his
2014 visit to community of Cannon Ball in the Standing Rock reservation, ground-zero
for the #NoDAPL struggle. Only eight sitting presidents have ever visited Indian
Country, the last was Bill Clinton. Giving the opening remarks at Cannon Ball’s annual
Flag Day Powwow, Obama played off the often quoted speech from Hunkpapa Chief and
medicine man Tatanka Iyotake, Sitting Bull, who said to US officials during the
reservation period, “Let’s put our minds together to see what we build for our children.”
“Let’s put our minds together to build more economic opportunity in Indian Country…
Let’s put our minds together to advance justice — because like every American, you
deserve to be safe in your communities and treated equally under the law,” Obama told a
crowd of thousands of cheering Lakotas and Dakotas. Sioux County, North Dakota,
where Cannon Ball is located, is eighty-five percent Native and consistently ranks among
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the poorest counties in the US. In 2007 and 2011, Sioux County residents voted for the
first Black President in the eightieth percentile. Yet, Native communities, especially
Lakota and Dakota nations in South Dakota and North Dakota, faced some of the most
challenging years during the Obama administration.
Obama’s rhetoric of inclusion, economic opportunities, and renewed
commitments to Native communities must be placed in the context of the Great
Recession. In 2008, President George W. Bush signed into law the Troubled Assets
Relief Program (TARP), which bailed out the big Wall Street banks responsible for the
mortgage crisis that crashed the global economy. In 2015, Forbes debunked the common
conception of a $700 billion TARP bailout estimating instead a total federal commitment
in the coming years of $16.8 trillion with $4.6 trillion already paid out.22 Many of the
banks bankrolling DAPL initially received tens of billions of dollars in TARP money,
major banks such as Citigroup ($45 billion), Bank or America ($45 billion), Wells Fargo
($25 billion), JPMorgan Chase ($25 billion), Goldman Sachs ($10 billion), and Morgan
Stanley ($10 billion). In comparison, Obama committed a meager $831 billion for
economic recovery in the areas of infrastructure, education, health, and renewable
energy. This relief program included even smaller funding allocations for already
underfunded Native services such as health, education, and general welfare guaranteed
under federal trust responsibilities to Native communities as part of treaty obligations and
agreements. Obama’s 2010 “new energy security plan” incentivized and dramatically
increased domestic oil and gas production, opening up previously protected federal lands
managed under the Department of Interior (the departmental home of the Bureau of
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Indian Affairs) for oil and gas exploration and hydraulic fracturing, also known as
fracking. While Alaskan Arctic Native communities’ faced displacement due to rising sea
levels and the softening of permafrost caused by warming temperatures, Obama
expanded Arctic offshore oil and gas exploration that was only possible because of
permanently retreating polar ice caps. Since 2008, domestic oil production has increased
by 70 percent.
The rapid increase of oil pipelines has kept apace of domestic oil production,
often imperiling Indigenous and other frontline communities. Since 2010, the equivalent
of ten Keystone XL (KXL) size pipelines have been built. Although Obama denied the
permit for Phase 4 of KXL, which would have trespassed through Oceti Sakowin treaty
territory, he approved the first three phases of the pipeline in accordance with his
domestic energy policy. The crude oil for DAPL is fracked in the oil-rich Bakken region
in western North Dakota. Since 2008, Bakken oil production has sharply increased,
peaking in 2012 and since then steadily plateauing.
The domestic energy boom received tremendous support under the Obama
administration and was part of the overall national economic recovery plan. Many viewed
Obama’s opposition to Phase 4 of the KXL as a recommitment to uphold Indigenous
sovereignty. Yet, his administration’s decision to deny its permit had less to do with
Indigenous sovereignty and more to do with the fact that this leg of KXL transported
Canadian-produced oil. Therefore, it fell outside the domestic energy production plan. In
contrast, DAPL would only transport domestically-produced oil. Despite massive
opposition, Obama refused to oppose its construction. DAPL is part of massive carbon
energy infrastructure built to drill the US out of Great Recession, with or without
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Indigenous consent. While the US bailed out the banks and created the policy necessary
to fast-track oil production, it flatly ignored Indigenous concerns and the quality of
Indigenous life hardly improved. Obama’s grandiose “nation-to-nation” rhetoric,
placement of key Native leaders in his administration, and regular consultation with
Indigenous nations over policy decisions could not halt DAPL or save the water. It was
simply too much of a radical departure from business as usual. The sacrifice of
Indigenous lands, waters, and lives have always been the salvation for the soul of a settler
nation.
The #NoDAPL camps, and the everyday people they represented, aspired for a
more genuine form of governance, autonomy, and self-determination. Most understood
that protecting the elements most critical for bare survival — such as healthy water, air,
and land — also requires the protection and regeneration of a genuinely democratic
Indigenous political authority built from the ground-up. Disrupting business as usual
entails identifying and studying the systems dispossessing and destroying the land and
immiserating its people. Capitalist development and colonial state-making go hand in
hand, largely at the expense of Indigenous peoples and the earth. At the heart of the
conflict is an interpretation of history and politics. It is impossible to fully appreciate
#NoDAPL, its stakes and deeper meanings, without first properly understanding US
history. To paraphrase historian Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, sympathetic explanations often
refer to anti-Indigenous US policies, laws, and actions and the corporate plunder as
“racist” or “discriminatory.” Seldom are they described precisely for what they are:
imperialism, settler colonialism, and genocide.23 Racism, genocide, imperialism, and
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settler colonialism, however, are not mutually exclusive. White supremacy is the
foundational US ideology. Combined with capitalist development and US state
formation, white supremacy was the impetus not only for Indigenous dispossession and
genocide but also for Black slavery and global imperialism.
Recognizing settler colonialism offers only a diagnosis of the disease and not its
cure. The argument put forward in this dissertation contends that to properly understand
#NoDAPL and the practice of Mni Wiconi we must first place the movement in historical
context. Traditions of Indigenous resistance must inform how we study history and, in
turn, practice politics. Modern Indigenous nations, such as the Oceti Sakowin, are shaped
by their resistance to settler colonialism. Modern practices of settler colonialism are, too,
shaped by Indigenous resistance. As a result, Indigenous nations carry with them their
own knowledges and histories about the land and their relationship with the occupying
power that calls itself the United States.

The Land
There are no two sides to the history of the United States and its relationship to
people who have lived here for thousands of years. There are no two sides to that
story. You have no right to displace people, to steal their resources, and steal their
lives… What America has done is criminal. And they’re still doing it.
— Elizabeth Cook-Lynn (Dakota), “There Are No Two Sides to This Story,”
201624
Why do Indigenous peoples resist, refuse, and contest US rule? The simple
answer is: it’s about the land. In US history land is everything. From the perspective of
the land, we can think of change occurring not only in terms of the passage of time but
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also as a spatial process. The history of the US is fundamentally driven by territorial
expansion, the elimination of Indigenous peoples, and white settlement. From its original
1784 boundaries of the original thirteen colonies, the US rapidly expanded westward
from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific coast, annexing nearly two billion acres of
Indigenous territory in less than a century. The majority of lands acquired were west of
the Mississippi River. This was not a benign process. Countless Indigenous societies
were decimated, destroyed, and radically transformed. When the first Europeans and
Euro-Americans “discovered” and “settled,” they found no “empty spaces.” During their
voyages west and up the Missouri River in the early 1800s, for instance, US explorers
Meriwether Lewis and William Clark encountered dozens of Indigenous nations and the
remnants of French, English, and Spanish colonies. In other words, they entered lands
fully inhabited by people.
Despite this historical fact, terra nullius, a land without people, was applied
wholesale to Indigenous lands, and the rights of European discovery were codified in
federal law. In the 1823 Supreme Court decision Johnson v. M’Intosh, Chief Justice John
Marshall spelled out the US’s rights to Indigenous lands citing the “Doctrine of
Discovery.” According to this ruling, Indigenous peoples subject to US law only
possessed “occupancy” rights, meaning their lands could be alienated or taken by a
discovering European power. The US derived its discovery rights from prior European
colonizers, such as the French, English, and Spanish. Marshall’s interpretation derived
from a fifteenth century Papal Bull known as the “Doctrine of Christian Discovery” that
divided the planet according to Christian and non-Christian nations. Non-Christians
possessed little or no legal, political character and were regarded as little more than
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“savage” peoples awaiting the gift of European civilization. According to Lenape
scholar Steven Newcomb, the US interpreted the Doctrine as describing Indigenous
peoples as “politically non-existent, partially or entirely.”25 Therefore, Indigenous title to
the land could not be extinguished where it did not exist. Commenting on the Johnson
decision, Onondaga international jurist Tonya Gonnella Frichner observes, “The newly
formed United States needed to manufacture an American Indian political identity and
concept of Indian land that would open the way for the United States in its westward
colonial expansion.”26 Such is the legacy of terra nullius, the self-fulfilling prophecy or
anticipatory geography that these lands were destined to become the US, a founding myth
that became known as Manifest Destiny. But the US did not manifest itself atop lands
empty of people and without a history. And it did not come into existence unchallenged.
From its inception, the US enacted policy that justified genocidal wars against
Indigenous peoples and criminalized their resistance. Although genocidal violence
against Indigenous peoples in the Americas occurred long before the creation of the US,
historian Jeffrey Ostler identifies the 1787 Northwest Ordinance as a seemingly
“unlikely” but nevertheless “foundational location for genocide in US Indian Policy.”27
First enacted by the Continental Congress at New York and later reaffirmed in 1789 by
the first session of the US Congress, the ordinance is commonly understood as creating
the first organized territory north of the Ohio River and in the Great Lakes Region and
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opening up the area for settlement. The British Crown previously set aside the region as
the Province of Quebec following the conclusion of the French and Indian War. The 1763
Royal Proclamation further forbade Anglo-American settlement west of the Appalachian
Mountains. The Northwest Ordinance’s provisions created territories that became the
states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, granting them “equal footing”
with existing states.
Largely ignored, however, is Article 3 of the ordinance, which laid the foundation
of US policy towards Indigenous peoples. It reads:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands
and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and, in their
property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in
just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and
humanity, shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs being done to
them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.
Essential is the relationship between the declarations of “the utmost good faith” and “just
and lawful wars.” This was not an abstract idea confined to a specific geography or time,
but became a foundational, concrete practice of US Indian policy and westward
expansion, revealing the fledgling republic’s true motives. US Indian wars were often
waged with genocidal intent to facilitate indiscriminate slaughter of Indigenous
combatants and noncombatants (such as elders, women, and children) when treaty
negotiations broke down and land cessions could not be achieved by “peaceful” means.
Wars of extermination often did not achieve their full purpose because of successful
Indigenous resistance; and when they did accomplish massacre, it was not an anomaly.
As Ostler observes, the Northwest Ordinance “did not call for genocide in the first
instance,” preferring Indigenous peoples submit to US authority and cede their lands.
“Should Indians reject this display of ‘utmost good faith’, however, US policy legalized
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genocidal war against them.”28 Put simply, the US made criminal and waged war upon
those who refused to sell or cede their lands. Labeling Indigenous resistance “criminal”
allowed the US to ignore its own criminal behavior. Such is the paradigm of US Indian
policy: acquiesce to US rule or suffer the brutal consequences.29
Buttressing genocidal violence, or the constant threat of it, was also the specific
targeting of Indigenous women’s political authority. US colonization of the Oceti
Sakowin best illustrates this process. First came armed white men with flags. On their
journey up the Upper Missouri, Lewis and Clark spoke only to Indigenous men to
establish diplomatic relations and US supremacy over the fur trade. By this time, the fur
trade had enveloped Northern Plains life. The selling and trading of hides at European or
US forts along the Missouri River was a completely male-dominated enterprise,
undermining Indigenous systems of trading, exchange, and sharing material wealth that
emphasized kinship relations rather than a market economy and private ownership. The
fur trade was a highly-privatized business privileging men as trappers, hunters, owners,
and traders.30 This should be no surprise, since European and Euro-American explorers
and traders came from societies where women held little to no economic or political
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authority and were treated (much like their children) as little more than domestic
servants.
Second came treaties. Treaty-making became an externally imposed means to
recognize Indigenous men’s political authority and entirely barred Indigenous women
from this specific realm of diplomacy.31 From 1805 to 1873, the US made 35 treaties and
agreements with various political divisions of the Oceti Sakowin — or as they became
known in treaty parlance: “the Sioux Nation of Indians.” Not one woman was allowed to
“touch-the-pen,” place an “x-mark,” or formally consent to any land cessions, peace
agreements, or political relationships with the US.32
Third came military occupation. By the time Oceti Sakowin had been forcefully
confined to reservations in the 1890s and their lands invaded by white settlers,
Indigenous women’s political authority had been seriously undermined. The reservation
political economy privileged the roles of Indigenous men as reservation police, political
leaders, and traders, whereas Indigenous women were confined to the domain of the
domestic, the home. 33 Gender divisions were sometimes enforced by military rule. The
military-style boarding school system further entrenched these divisions, ripping children
from their families and educating young girls and boys on their proper places in a
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“civilized Christian society.” For girls, it was the industry of homemaking. For boys, it
was wage labor.34
Last came annexation. After it was determined Indigenous peoples had achieved a
relative degree of “civilization,” in 1924 they were granted US citizenship. Citizenship
was the final, if not symbolic, annexation of Indigenous lands and lives into the US
nation-state. In effect, Indigenous women’s political authority had been domesticated,
both in terms of within the home and within the settler nation.
The colonial state arrived as an armed white man intent on staying.35 To gain
access to Indigenous lands, white men often used Indigenous men as interlocutors to
break communal land practices and undermine Indigenous women’s political authority.
Indigenous women are largely absent from these early historical narratives, mostly
because the male-dominated universe of hunting, trapping, trade, war, and diplomacy
viewed Indigenous men as lawless savages easily manipulated and coopted for political
and economic purposes.36 The strength of Indigenous women’s political authority,
however, represented yet another obstacle to unrestricted access to the land. These early
practices labored on both the land and Indigenous societies to civilize and conquer them,
to make way for capitalist development and colonial state-making. It followed the classic
formula of modern colonization: economic penetration (the fur trade), integration into a
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sphere of influence (the creation of trade and military forts), protectorate status and
indirect rule (treaty-making), military subjugation (the reservation system), and lastly
annexation (political domestication and absorption such as citizenship). The intent had
always been to clear the land. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that #NoDAPL
was primarily led with Indigenous women.
US history is a history of settler colonialism. Settler colonialism is the specific
form of colonialism whereby an imperial power seizes Native territory, eliminates the
original people by force, removal, and political liquidation, and resettles the land with a
foreign, invading population. Land dispossession is often achieved with violence in order
to deter its opposition. Unlike other forms of colonialism where the colonizers rule from
afar and sometimes leave, settler colonialism attempts to permanently and completely
replace Natives with a settler population. Put simply, settlers come to stay.37 This is not
an even development, a thing of the past, or ever a complete process. In time the means
change by which the colonial state eliminates Natives to gain access to their territories
and resources. Elimination targets not just human life but also the nonhuman (such as the
decimation of buffalo and wild game or the destruction of water). The two go hand in
hand undermining kinship relations to the nonhuman world. Tactics can range from
outright genocide, such as wars of extermination, to accommodation and assimilation,
such as enforced absorption into dominant society, or some combination of both. Even if
elimination strategies evolve and at different times appear more humane or ethical, “the
question of genocide,” writes anthropologist Patrick Wolfe, “is never far from
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discussions of settler colonialism.”38 Indigenous elimination, in all its orientations, is
the organizing principle of settler society. Unlike the European Holocaust, which had a
beginning and an end and targeted humans alone, Indigenous elimination, as a practice
and formal policy, has not ended and also entails the wholesale destruction of nonhuman
relations. As an ongoing process, Yellowknives Dene scholar Glen Coulthard asserts,
elimination’s “ends have always remained the same: to shore up continued access to
Indigenous peoples’ territories for the purposes of state formation, settlement, and
capitalist development.”39
While it is almost never appropriate to compare eras, we can trace the history of
the police and military violence against Indigenous peoples from the nineteenth century
to open lands for settlement to our present moment to allow for the trespass of oil
pipelines. The rampant state violence and surveillance against Water Protectors is a
continuation of the Indian wars. Natives impede the progress of settler society and
therefore they must be moved out of the way or wiped out. It is not coincidence that the
law enforcement agency, Morton County Sheriff’s Department, who led the siege against
the #NoDAPL camps to protect DAPL construction, descends from the infamous Indian
fighter and Seventh Calvary general George Armstrong Custer. The connections are
clear.
Present-day Mandan, North Dakota, a white-dominated border town to Standing
Rock and the county seat of Morton County, is seven miles north of Fort Abraham
Lincoln where Custer was stationed to secure the passage of the North Pacific Railroad
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across the Missouri River and through Oceti Sakowin territory. The primary function of
the fort was to prevent Indians from going off the reservation. Fort Abraham Lincoln
took its name from the “Great Emancipator” who also ordered the hanging the of 38
Dakota men as punishment for the 1862 US-Dakota War. The survivors of that war,
banished from their homelands in Minnesota Territory and hounded by the US military,
fled to present-day Standing Rock or north to Canada. As a form of collective
punishment for the uprising in Minnesota Territory, in 1863 the military massacred more
than 300 fleeing Dakota men, women, and children at Whitestone Hill, more than one
hundred miles east of present-day Standing Rock.40 In the 1870s, from Fort Lincoln
Custer led several military expeditions deep into Yellowstone country and He Sapa, the
Black Hills, surveying the land for railroads and in search of gold. The expeditions met
heavy Indigenous resistance because they violated prior agreements that barred their
entry into the Black Hills.41 The police and military, whether in the past or present-day,
serve the interests of capital to remove and expropriate Indigenous peoples from their
lands, whether for railroads, gold, or oil. In other words, the police and military are the
chief instruments of rule over Indigenous lands and lives; they often arrive as colonial
state power in the first instance of conflict to regulate the irreconcilable antagonism of
Native-settler. Violence is their primary instrument for social control.
Understanding settler colonialism also requires the study of those who challenge
it, those who it seeks to depose and dispose of. From the perspective of the settler project,
Indigenous peoples embody the land. To take the land, its people must first be viewed as
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conquered. “[T]he primary motive for elimination,” writes Wolfe, “is not race (or
religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. Territoriality is
settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.”42 Indigenous peoples are who they are
because of where they are: on desired land. Because of where they are, they block,
restrict, and thwart capitalist development and colonial expansion. Indigenous peoples are
in the way and are made a race when they are targeted for elimination. In this instance,
race is an expression of colonialism. Race is externally imposed onto Indigenous
societies, not internally derived. Natives are racialized according to their existence on and
counterclaims to the land, while other colonized populations were racialized according to
their service, albeit often unwilling, to the colonial project. An enslaved African
population, for example, brought to Indigenous lands by force, were their bodies valued
as property of a white elite for the production of cotton in the South. More importantly,
race in the US is made according to its relationship to the land — who works it, who
owns it and who does not, who stole it, and who claims it.
Indigenous resistance is premised on a simple fact: people do not hand over their
lands, water, lives, histories, or futures without a fight. The assumption that Indigenoussettler struggles are inevitable, the result of a clash of civilizations or cultures, or that
atrocities were committed equally by all parties ignores fundamental historical processes.
According to this view, history is a series of tragic events where Indigenous peoples are
simply on the losing end, either by their own doing or the doing of progress. History is
not tragic nor without a culprit. Beginning in the early colonial period prior to the US’s
founding and continuing to the colonial present, Indigenous peoples have been subject to
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war, genocide, occupation, removal, rape, torture, legalized and extra-judicial killings,
forced assimilation, incarceration, and ongoing criminalization. Violence has always been
the means by which the US has asserted itself over to Indigenous lands and lives. The
colonial present, whether at Standing Rock or elsewhere, is no different.

Mni Wiconi: An Indigenous Paradigm
I am not afraid; I have relatives.
— Ella Deloria (Dakota), Waterlily, 198843
—
This dissertation places #NoDAPL and Mni Wiconi into context within the longer
histories of Indigenous resistance against the trespass of settlers, dams, and pipelines
across the Mni Sose, the Missouri River. This dissertation is not so much a history about
things, individuals, or ideas as it is a history about relationships: how the relationship
between the Oceti Sakowin and Mni Sose, the Missouri River, and the US as an
occupying power has changed and how this change is a product of settler society’s
relationship with the river, the land, and Indigenous peoples. This approach employs
what Seminole historian Susan Miller calls a “global Indigenous paradigm” — global
because Indigenous history is neither parochial nor a subfield of US history. An
Indigenous paradigm’s ultimate purpose is “to place Indigenous peoples and communities
at the center of historical narratives.”44 This approach asserts US history cannot be told
without Indigenous peoples and neither can the history of planetary enterprises such as
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capitalism and imperialism, processes often benignly called globalization. Indigenous
peoples were, and still are, very much part of these processes, too, and cannot be
considered just “local cultures.” From this perspective, we can understand Indigenous
resistance as a future-oriented politics that centers relations, which has far-reaching
implications that extend beyond politics and processes that might be construed as only
“Indigenous.” The goal is to establish or re-establish correct relations with the human and
nonhuman world for there to be a viable future. For the Oceti Sakowin, the affirmation
Mni Wiconi, water is life, relates to the practice of Wotakuye, to be a good relative.
Indigenous resistance against the trespass of settlers, pipelines, and dams is to be a good
relative to the water, land, and animals most harmed by these incursions. It is also to be a
good relative to the human world. “Fundamentally,” Miller writes, “Indigenousness is a
way of relating.”45
This way of relating allows us to think with water. Under US law corporations,
such as Energy Transfer Partners, the financial backers of DAPL, are granted
personhood, but not Mni Sose, the river, or Mni Oyate, the water. Under the current
system, it is not absurd to ask: What does capital want from Indigenous peoples? Or,
what does the state want? Those questions have been posed and answered in various
ways in the last two centuries with resounding clarity: it wants them to give up their
water and land. What is impossible to ask is: What does water want from us, its relatives,
the Water Protectors, the Oceti Sakowin? Indigenous modes of relationality — of making
kin with the human and nonhuman — are anti-capitalist because they exist outside the
logic of capital and the social relations centered on the profit motive. Relationality in this
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way is not premised on ownership or commodification; it is premised on reciprocity
and protection. “Kinship with all creatures of the earth, sky, and water was a real and
active principle,” Lakota writer Luther Standing Bear explains. Kinship granted
protection and rights:
The animal had rights — the right of man’s [sic] protection, the right to live, the
right to multiply, the right to freedom, and the right to man’s indebtedness — and
in recognition of these rights the Lakota never enslaved the animal, and spared all
life that was not needed for food and clothing. This concept of life and its
relations was humanizing and gave to the Lakota an abiding love. It filled his
being with the joy and mystery of living; it gave him reverence for all life; it made
a place for all things in the scheme of existence with equal importance to all.46
This is not to suggest that Indigenous societies possess an inherent utopic model
or solution for irreversible, catastrophic climate change. Nor is it to suggest we can turn
back time to “return” to a more egalitarian way of life. In fact, many Indigenous nations
do actively participate in highly exploitative forms of resource extraction and capitalist
economies as a form of nation-building. These approaches, however, fundamentally
depart from the mode of relationality expressed by Mni Wiconi. They are top-down
strategies. Indigenous politicians and leaders (often with a strong backing from external
state and corporate institutions) generally reproduce capitalist development models,
uncritically labeling them as forms of “sovereignty” or “self-determination” and
completely ignoring the colonial structure in which tribal governments are allowed to
exist and operate within. This approach simply reproduces colonial state-making and
designates Indigenous nations as minor “partners” with no real power or autonomy
beyond their relationship to the US. Although a very old concept, Mni Wiconi takes on a
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new and potentially revolutionary meaning because it is practiced outside the logic
capital and in lateral (not top-down) relation between human and nonhuman.
At its best moments, #NoDAPL has showed us a future of what could be when
everyday Native people take control of their own destinies and lands while also drawing
from the past. This is the starting point for this history and its end: liberation. To get to
that future place, we first have to know our present moment. To know our present, we
must know our past. The stakes are high to openly challenge colonization. To do so
creates an uncomfortable space of overwhelming saturation and tension. History, after all,
is the past’s saturation of our present moment. It cannot be ignored. To bring it up is to
bring it into existence as something to be dealt with.
This brings about another relationship to be dealt with in this dissertation, a
relationship to a radical Indigenous past that trespasses into the present. What I refer to as
traditions of Indigenous resistance differs from how “tradition” is understood as a static,
unchanging practice, a view that aligns itself with the idea of authentic, essentialist, or
apolitical notions of Indigenous identity. This conservative view often works in favor of
the trope of the “vanishing Indian” and reckons with history and the present as some wish
it to be, not as it is.47 Traditions of Indigenous resistance can best be described as what
scholar Raymond Williams calls a selective tradition.48 A selective tradition chooses prior
experiences and one’s ancestors as forbearers (and sometimes as active participants —
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hence the American Indian Movement’s popular phrase, “In the spirit of Crazy
Horse!”) to inform current resistance movements, while sustaining them as part of a
living tradition under constant formation. In this sense, traditions of Indigenous resistance
are not entirely new, nor are they necessarily a checklist of people or concepts. Traditions
of Indigenous resistance are an accumulation of ways knowing, experiencing, and
practicing relationality to humans and nonhumans, a radical consciousness, deeply
embedded in history and place, that expresses the ultimate desire for freedom and
liberation. To know and trust one’s history is to not be defeated by it. From these
traditions arise Indigenous radicals and Indigenous radicalism. To be radical, means to
get at the root of something. To get at the root of settler colonialism — and how to get
free from it — we must turn to those who have challenged it. To return to the source, as
African revolutionary Amilcar Cabral reminds us, is to always ask what came before it.49
More importantly, it is to ask what proliferates in its absence.
This dissertation explores why the movement to protect the Missouri River
marching under the banner of Mni Wiconi has emerged. Settler colonialism is not a new
phenomenon; it has existed since the founding of the US — and even before that. How
does settler colonialism continue to inform our present moment? And how does this fit
into the larger history of the Oceti Sakowin and Mni Sose and opposition to settler
trespass? Our History is the Future: Mni Wiconi and the Struggle for Native Liberation
takes the Oceti Sakowin, its relationship to Mni Sose, and its historic struggle for
liberation as a call to take seriously the prior experiences of Indigenous nationhood and
political authority that informs present and future political possibilities. The dissertation
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moves through four definitive “episodes”: the emergence of the Oceti Sakowin
nationalism in relation to the US and the river in the nineteenth century, the nineteenth
century war of conquest, the flood of Lakota and Dakota lands in the mid-twentieth
century, and Indigenous internationalism that reframed Native politics in the latter half of
the twentieth century. The documented history is by no means exhaustive, but instead
focuses on these particular cases to make the argument that they inform our present
moment and provide an historical roadmap for collective liberation.
Chapter 2 looks at how the Oceti Sakowin had emerged as a nation and had first
come to know the US as a predator nation in the nineteenth century. Indigenous-US
relations began on the Missouri River in 1803 when the fledgling US “bought” 827
million acres from the French Crown in the Louisiana Purchase and sent a military
expedition under the command of Lewis and Clark to claim and map the newly acquired
territory. This initial encounter of hostage-taking, trespass, and diplomacy structured
Indigenous-US relations on the river and radically transformed the Oceti Sakowin’s
relationship to Mni Sose.
Chapter 3 examines nineteenth century Indian wars that raged across the Northern
Plains to repel settlers and US encroachment. This chapter looks at how the
counterinsurgency tactics informed the “peace” and war policies used against the Oceti
Sakowin. These wars, for the Oceti Sakowin, were entirely defensive. The Oceti Sakowin
signed peace treaties with the invading settler government. The 1851 and 1868 Fort
Laramie treaties provided temporary reprieve and defined the vast 32-million-acre
territory of what became the Great Sioux Reservation and outlying, unceded treaty
territory, which stretched from the eastern shore of the Missouri River to the Bighorn
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Mountains. The rest of the chapter examines the ways in which the Oceti Sakowin
resisted and negotiated US colonization.
Chapter 4 examines mid-twentieth century river development schemes that led to
new rounds of Indigenous dispossession, in the form of dams and termination legislation.
After unseasonal mass flooding, Congress passed the Flood Control Act in 1944 — or
what became known as the Pick-Sloan Plan authorizing the Army Corps of Engineers and
the Bureau of Reclamation to erect five dams on the main stem of the river. All of which
targeted and disproportionately destroyed Native lands and lives. Of the five Pick-Sloan
dams, four flooded the lands of seven nations of the Oceti Sakowin: the Santee Sioux
Tribe, the Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Sicangu Oyate, the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, the
Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe. Of the 611,642 condemned acres through eminent domain in what was called the
“taking area,” these nations lost 309,584 acres of vital bottomlands. Inundation also
forced more than a thousand Native families, in patent violation of treaties and without
prior consent, to relocate. A third of these reservations populations were removed to
marginal reservation lands, and many were forced to leave the reservation entirely. The
dams, which promised and delivered wholesale destruction by harnessing the forces of
the river, coincided and worked in tandem with the federal policies of termination and
relocation. The Oceti Sakowin unified to thwart the state of South Dakota and North
Dakota’s attempts to implement termination to essentially overthrow Native governments
and assume control over their lands. But the legacies of the dams endure.
Chapter 5 begins when Natives on relocation also began to organize. Groups such
as the American Indian Movement (AIM) formed in the urban centers to combat the
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wholesale destruction of Native life on- and off-reservation. In 1973, AIM occupied
Wounded Knee in the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, which was a culmination of more
than a decade of Red Power organizing.
The occupation was the catalyst for a mass gathering of thousands at Standing
Rock in 1974, which resulted in the founding of the International Indian Treaty Council.
Chapter 6 traces the history of twentieth century Oceti Sakowin internationalism, and
Indigenous international, in general. At Standing Rock, more than 90 Native nations from
around the world built the foundations of what would become four decades of work at the
United Nations and the basis for the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples. Indeed, the Red Power Movement also provided the catalyst for the
contemporary #NoDAPL movement at Standing Rock.
Chapter 7 provides concluding insights on how Mni Wiconi and #NoDAPL
practiced an unsettling counter-sovereignty. This final chapter examines the relationship
between the past and present struggles and the potential for a broader anti-colonial and
anti-capitalist movement that seeks not only to transform Indigenous relations with the
US, but also how Indigenous liberation in North America is indelibly connected to the
liberation of human and nonhuman relations everywhere.
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Chapter 2: Emergence
In 1803, an incredible burst of stars fell out of the eastern indigo sky; hundreds,
maybe thousands blazed spectacularly bright, leaving behind glowing trails.
Native star-gazers considered this to be a sign. Something in the universe warned
of a great disaster approaching, something that would begin in the east at the
Mnisose, the river. It would bring sickness, starvation, and death. To the Lakota,
the Mnisose is Grandfather River. This immense artery is the source of life to the
northern lands.
— Lydia Whirlwind Soldier (Lakota), “The Renaming of a Nation,” 20061

Water possesses a power and sovereignty that defy human-made borders and
political territories. The Missouri Basin is a massive circulatory system of streams, rivers,
creeks, and tributaries that empties into its main artery, Mni Sose, the Missouri River. In
this system, Mni Sose begins everywhere the water falls from the sky to touch the earth
and trickle into one of these waterways. The river is 2,466 miles-long with a drainage
basin encompassing a massive 529,000 square miles, a landmass one-sixth the size of the
continental US. The Oceti Sakowin and the Indigenous nations it shared territory with,
and has sometimes fought, are as much defined by Mni Sose as they are by their own
political, cultural, and social relationship to its life-giving waters.
In this world, water is life, and so too is the buffalo nation, the Pte Oyate. Vast
buffalo herds once migrated according to the river’s seasonal ebbs and flows, and were
followed by the hunting nations of the Northern Plains. At the center of this world is He
Sapa, the Black Hills, the heart of everything that is. If He Sapa, the Black Hills, is the
heart of the earth, then Mni Sose, the Missouri River, is its aorta. It is from this country
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that the Oceti Sakowin emerged as a nation, a people, and gained its humanity. From
the life-giving river also came agents of change who sought to turn its waters into a
passage for conquest and a source of profit, and, as “the original highway West” for
settlers, the river was turned into a passage of death. Told from the perspective of the
Oceti Sakowin, this chapter examines how and why these changes took place and how
they were resisted from Lewis and Clark initial trespass to the so-called closing of the
Western frontier in 1890. Like their forbearer Christopher Columbus who crossed an
ocean in search of a western passage, the US invaders, too, first arrived by water
uninvited to Oceti Sakowin territory.
Much has been written about Missouri River history. Yet, few histories have
focused on the river’s role in the colonial project. Book titles, such as Unruly River and
River of Promise, River of Peril, or The Dark Missouri, and the settler nickname for the
Missouri as “Old Misery” for its frequent flooding and property damage, depict the river
as a deadly, treacherous, and inhospitable landscape.2 Early settlers often described the
Missouri Basin as an irrational and violent country, which was, by their accounts, also
plagued by endless inter-Indigenous warfare. Settlers saw Indigenous peoples as equally
irrational and violent, more committed to fighting each other than committed to peace.
“This is a delightful country,” wrote British trader Alexander Henry about the Northern
Plains in 1800, “and were it not for perpetual wars, the natives might be the happiest
people on earth.”3 According to this view, Indigenous nations of the Northern Plains were
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incapable of achieving peace, happiness, and appreciation for the land’s natural beauty.
The arrival of European and US explorers, traders, and settlers would bring order and
civilization to the land and the river. Indigenous nations were a people without a history
that lacked a sensibility to confront the inevitable transformations of their lands and lives.
Therefore, because they lacked awareness and could not adequately adapt and make
peace amongst themselves, they are partly, if not entirely, to blame for their own demise.
From the beginning, Indigenous peoples were a culture of poverty. These are the stories
US empire likes to tell itself.
In this fiction “the Sioux” play a major role. They are everything in the history of
the West and its mythology — the most hated, the most feared, and the most violent.
They are also a noble warrior society who symbolize the violent hyper-masculinity of the
frontier; and they represent the standard image of every Indigenous culture as equestrians
who lived in tipis, wore headdresses, and aimlessly wandered the land like the wild game
they called kin. Nomadic, wandering, and roaming are the words often used to describe
these Indigenous nations as unbounded transients who could not truly appreciate the
land’s “real” value. Such stereotypes, however, are not confined to the realm of popular
culture. Prominent US historians, such as Richard White, portray the Sioux as a pillaging
band of expansionists who violently expelled their Indigenous neighbors and never
crossed west of the Missouri River — with no small irony — until the signing of the
Declaration of Independence in 1776.4 In this sense, US empire can conveniently classify
the Sioux as little better than itself: imperialist newcomers. Marking the Sioux as
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nomadic, rootless, unsettled, and malicious expansionists makes their removal,
genocide, and colonization more palatable. By criminalizing the Sioux, US explorers,
soldiers, traders, settlers, and historians attempt to conceal or vindicate the US’s own
criminal behavior.5
The Dakota, Nakota, and Lakota nations never called themselves “Sioux,” nor
were they “late arrivals,” imperialists, or irrational, pillaging, and disorganized marauders
aimlessly wandering the plains. Sioux derives from an abbreviation of “Nadouessioux,” a
French adoption of the Ojibwe word for “Little Snakes” to denote the Ojibwe’s enemies
to its west in contrast to its foes of the east, the “Nadowe” or “Big Snakes,” the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy. Among their own, they simply called themselves the
Oyate, the Nation or the People, and sometimes the Oyate Luta, the Red Nation. The
Oyate practice a tight political and social order based on kinship amongst themselves in
direct relation to the land and their nonhuman kin.
The Dakota, Nakota, and Lakota nations derive their names from the Dakota word
“Koda,” meaning friend or ally. As a political confederacy, they called themselves the
Oceti Sakowin Oyate, the Nation of the Seven Council Fires. The oldest Dakota-speaking
nation derives names from their immediate geography in the western Great Lakes forests,
glacial lakes, and rivers: Mdewakantonwan or Bdewakantonwan, the Sacred Nation that
Lives by the Water; the Sissintonwan, the Medicine Nation that Lives by the Water;
Wahpentonwan, the Nation that Lives in the Forest; and Wahpekute, the Nation that
Shoots Among the Leaves.6 The Nakota-speaking nation are the caretakers of the middle
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territory that began on the eastern banks of the Missouri River and took their names
from their position location within overall political structure, arranged in a large Ushaped camp layout with Nakota-speakers at the end: Ihanktonwan, the Nation that
Camps on the End; and Ihanktonwanna, the Nation of the Little Camp on the End. The
youngest and largest, the Lakota-speaking nation, acquires its name from the vast
expanse of the Northern Plains west of the Missouri River: Tintonwan, the Nation of the
Plains. Among the Tintonwans, there are also seven divisions: the Oglala, the Nation that
Scatters their Own; the Sicangu, the Nation of the Burnt Thighs (or Brulés); the
Hunkpapa, the Nation at the Head of the Circle; the Mniconjou, the Nation that Plants by
the Water; Itazipco, the Nation without Bows (or Sans Arc); the Sihasapa, the Blackfeet
Nation; and the Oohenupa, the Nation of Two Kettles.7
Like most human societies, the origins of the Oceti Sakowin are as diverse as its
people and the lands they continue to live with and protect. To name but a few examples,
origin histories range from: the emergence from the earth, from the wase, the red clay;
emergence from He Sapa; emergence from Bde Wakan, Spirit Lake or Milles Lacs;
descent from the Wicahpi Oyate, the Star Nation of the Milky Way; descent from the Pte
Oyate, the Buffalo Nation; or westward and southern migrations from the Atlantic
seaboard and from Central America.8 None of these origin stories are more or less true
than others. What they have in common, however, is their collective significance in
defining a whole of historical experience within a specific geography and the moral
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universe of how one relates to others and the land. Origin stories contradict settler
narratives that describe the Oceti Sakowin as “late arrivals” west of the Missouri River, at
best, or as expansionists, at worst — who, like their US counterpart, were driven purely
by economic motives to control river trade by violently displacing other Indigenous
nations. Oral histories and careful Indigenous record-keeping profoundly challenge such
myths. Dakota and Lakota winter counts, for instance, meticulously documented
Indigenous histories, marking each year or winter by recording a significant event with a
pictograph on hide or sometimes paper which was accompanied by an oral recounting of
the event. Winter counts recorded family, individual, or larger national histories.9
Historians, however, have misinterpreted winter counts to wrongly claim the Lakotas
crossed the Missouri River and subsequently “discovered” the Black Hills sometime
around 1776.10
When winter counts are cross-referenced with Lakota oral histories and star
knowledge, a much longer connection to the lands west of the Missouri comes into
clearer focus. For example, Lakota sky-gazers methodically tracked the sun, moon, and
stars and recognized their shifting positions (and sometimes disappearance) over the
course of days, weeks, months, seasons, years, and countless generations — since time
immemorial. The meticulous tracking of celestial bodies corresponds to earthly territories
and seasonal journeys to and from He Sapa and winter and summer camps. Star maps, as
they were known, are literal maps that correspond to earth maps, sometimes drawn on
9
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hide or paper and recounted by historical memory and oral histories. In one such star
map, the arc of the sun across the sky traveled through certain constellations that
corresponds with significant sites in the Black Hills. In particular, the sacred site Mato
Tipila, Bear’s Lodge (what settlers renamed Devil’s Tower to demonize Indigenous
relationships to the place), corresponds with the sun’s passage through the constellation
by the same name, marking the summer solstice and the start of the sun dance ceremony.
Some sources date this ceremony at this particular site as beginning sometime in 1000
BCE, or possibly earlier.11 While star maps possess significant ceremonial meaning, they
also assert a long-standing relation to He Sapa and its surrounding geography. “What is
on earth is in the stars, and what is in the stars is on earth” is the common Lakota
assertion when talking about the delineation of ancestral territory of the Wicahpi Oyate,
the Star Nation.12
The Lakotas were by no means the only Indigenous nation with connections to the
Black Hills, nor were such histories exclusive among themselves. Different Indigenous
nations incorporated aspects and histories of others often when different peoples
combined through alliance, making relatives, or pure survival. Some shared the same
origin histories but were different branches of the same people. More than fifty
Indigenous nations possessed similar, often overlapping, relationships and claims to the
Black Hills. They included the Arikaras, Osages, Shoshones, Assiniboines, Gros Ventres,
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Pawnees, Mandans, Hidatsas, Kiowas, Poncas, Crows, Omahas, Winnebagos,
Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Blackfeet.13
Although the Oceti Sakowin possessed a strong sense of history and grounded
political authority in the land, it didn’t preclude them from warring with other Indigenous
nations. Luther Standing Bear, commenting on Lakota warfare in 1931, admits as much.
He notes how the US criminalized the assertion of Indigenous political authority, the
right to make war and defend territory. “We kept our lands to ourselves,” he writes, “by
making all other tribes stay away from us… Therefore, [we] were feared by all other
tribes. The white people… began to fear us too, so they called us Sioux.”14 In this
instance, the US marked the Oceti Sakowin as criminal and enemy by calling them
“Sioux.” As Oceti Sakowin scholars and intellectuals have contended for the last two
centuries, war, diplomacy, and sovereignty are just a few of the many aspects of
grounded Indigenous authority in the land and water. Nonetheless, “Sioux” warfare,
diplomacy, and sovereignty have dominated the way settler histories have framed
nineteenth century Indigenous life on the Missouri River and in the Northern Plains. This
is not because Indigenous nations are inherently militaristic, a common view set forth by
many US historians. Rather, the Oceti Sakowin defended their human and nonhuman kin
against a land-hungry, violent, and militaristic empire. Recognizing its warlike nature
Lakotas call the United States Milahanskan, the nation of the long knives (referring to the
sabers soldiers carried), because they had come to know the US best through its military.
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What follows in this chapter and the next chapter is not revisionism of nineteenth
century Northern Plains Indigenous history. Evidence introduced here isn’t particularly
new, nor does it provide a re-interpretation of those events. Instead, what follows is a
history of what Indigenous peoples — and specifically the Oceti Sakowin — have always
known: the US is a predator nation. Studying US expansion from this standpoint reveals
how Indigenous elimination is this settler nation’s emergence story. The US creation
story is one of land theft and the genocide of Indigenous peoples and their nonhuman kin.
This history didn’t always require Indigenous consent or labor, or the recognition of
Indigenous peoples as equal economic or political partners. But it did require the violent
seizure of the land. The taking of the land began with the river.

Late Arrivals
The first Indigenous-US interactions on the Missouri River were military
encounters that shaped Indigenous diplomacy, warfare, and dispossession in the centuries
to come. In 1803 President Thomas Jefferson finalized the Louisiana Purchase from the
French Republic. It was less a “purchase” than it was an annexation of 827 million acres.
Louisiana Territory encompassed the entire Missouri River Basin and more than doubled
the territory of the fledgling United States. Shortly thereafter, Jefferson sent Meriwether
Lewis and William Clark to lead a military expedition up the Missouri River bearing
arms, flags, and “gifts” to claim the “new” land and its people. “[B]eing now become
sovereigns of this country, without however any diminution of the Indian rights of
occupancy,” Jefferson wrote to Lewis, “we are authorised to propose to them in direct
terms the institution of commerce with them. [I]t will now be proper you should inform
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those whose country you will pass, whom you may meet… that they have surrendered
to us all their subjects.”15 Lewis and Clark were to proclaim the sovereignty of the US
over the land and its people for the purposes of bringing them into trade relations. Of all
the Indigenous nations he anticipated the explorers meeting, Jefferson mentioned only
“the Sioux” by name. “[O]n that nation,” Jefferson ordered Lewis, “we wish most
particularly to make a friendly impression, because of their immense power, and because
we learn they are very desirous of being on the most friendly terms with us.”16 It is
uncertain how Jefferson obtained his information or whether or not the expedition had
any prior knowledge of the Sioux, except for what white traders or other Indigenous
nations told them.
The Corps of Discovery, as it became known, met several divisions of the Oceti
Sakowin as they traveled upriver. After navigating the Big Bend of the Missouri (presentday Crow Creek and Lower Brule reservations) in late September of 1804, the expedition
was intercepted by a camp of Sicangus, a political subdivision of the Lakotas. As per
custom, the Lakotas hailed the Corps with a plume of smoke that rose in the northwest
signaling the expedition had been spotted. The Lakotas sought council and some form of
payment to pass through their territory.17 Although they accepted council, Lewis and
Clark rebuffed the Lakotas’ assertion to determine who shall pass and at what cost,
clearly disobeying Jefferson’s instructions “to make a friendly impression.”
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Lewis and Clark believed — or at least behaved as if — they had entered a
lawless land and encountered a lawless people.18 The Lakotas, however, clearly possessed
a notion of trespass and subjected the expedition to that charge when Lewis and Clark
rejected their authority. After eight days of failing to negotiate their passage without
paying a toll, Lewis and Clark resorted to violence. First they threatened genocide.
According to John Ordway, an expedition volunteer, Clark told the intransigent Lakota
headman, Black Buffalo, and his followers that they were sent by Thomas Jefferson, the
US President. If the expedition was not allowed to pass, Clark “or Capt. Lewis could by
writing to him have them all distroyed [sic] as it were in a moment.”19 Obviously
surrounded and overwhelmed, the arrogant threats were worthless. So the expedition took
hostage on their keelboat the headman, Buffalo Medicine (and possibly others), to
prevent the Lakotas from attacking the expedition and to secure their further trespass
north. Buffalo Medicine was later released once the expedition was free from Lakota
country. Indigenous hostage-taking was common practice. Jefferson previously advised
Lewis that “taking influential chiefs” or their children “would give some security to your
party.” 20 Reflecting on this encounter, Clark later wrote, the Lakotas
are the vilest miscreants of the savage race, and must ever remain the pirates of
the Missouri, until such measures are pursued, by our government, as will make
them feel dependence on its will for their supply of merchandise. Unless these
people are reduced to order, by coercive measures, I am ready to pronounce that
the citizens of the United States can never enjoy but partially the advantages
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which the Missouri presents… [The Sioux] view with contempt the merchants of
the Missouri, whom they never fail to plunder, when in their power.21
In this instance, Clark labeled the Lakotas criminal to conceal his expedition’s own
trespass and criminal actions. He also spelled out the course US Indian policy should
take, placing himself at the center of the policy he recommended. Jefferson later
appointed Clark brigadier general and Indian agent for Louisiana Territory in 1807, and
he served as an Indian Affairs agent under the War Department until his death in 1838.
Historians have uncritically taken Lewis and Clark’s testimony of that first
encounter at face value — that they were waylaid by a band of river pirates straight from
the pages of a Robin Crusoe fantasy novel. The Lewis and Clark story makes for a great
white national myth and has been widely consumed, repeated, and retold in popular
accounts like US historian Stephen Ambrose’s 1997 bestselling book Undaunted
Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson, and the Opening of the American West
and documentarian Ken Burns’ popular 2001 PBS film Lewis & Clark: The Journey of
the Corps of Discovery.22
In retrospect, the Lakotas didn’t make much of the encounter. Lewis and Clark
came and left, and the Lakotas continued living as they had before these late arrivals. To
the US, however, this first interaction held great significance and profoundly shaped their
feelings towards a nation they viewed as the criminal “pirates of the Missouri.” More
importantly, as Oglala historian Craig Howe observes, this initial engagement “gave rise
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to storm clouds of deceit that have in some sense darkened two centuries” of LakotaUS relations.23
The Louisiana Purchase was a landmark achievement. For one, it provided the
means by which southern plantation capitalists could expand their “cotton kingdom” to
new markets. The westward expansion of the plantation system promised the creation of
a new social order, one defined by the reproduction of slavery in new territory and the
control over trade in the Mississippi Valley for the global export of cotton. Without
expansion, the plantation system was doomed to fail.24 Jefferson envisioned an “Empire
of Liberty” for the lands west of the Mississippi. The Empire of Liberty was principally a
racial theory of space that required the expansion of Black slavery and the transformation
of Indigenous land into private property for advancing a yeoman farming empire. In this
way, the expansion of the plantation system coincided with Indigenous dispossession and
removal. The mythologized frontiersmen, the arbiters of capital and the advance guard
for western expansion, descended on the plains west of the Mississippi to make
themselves and their settler nation anew.
Jefferson himself saw the Louisiana Territory as a partial solution to the “Indian
Problem” in the East and the West. For example, Section 15 of the 1804 Louisiana
Territorial Act afforded that “The President of the United States is hereby authorized to
stipulate with any Indian tribes owning lands on the east side of the Mississippi, and
residing thereon, for an exchange of lands, the property of the United States, on the west
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side of the Mississippi, in case the said tribes shall remove and settle thereon.”25
Jefferson wanted to further concentrate eastern Indigenous nations into ever-diminishing
territories, which forced them to either “incorporate” or “remove beyond the Mississippi”
as game, land, and resources were made scarce. The intention was to breakup and
ultimately dissolve communal land practices among eastern nations to prepare them for
eventual removal. The so-called “Five Civilized Tribes” — the Cherokee, Choctaw,
Chickasaw, Muscogee, and Seminole — were removal’s primary targets. Weakening
eastern Indigenous nations by circumscribing them and by cutting off their access to
resources such as wild game was a way to coerce them into removal west of the
Mississippi. Put differently, the annihilation of Indigenous ways of life such as
agriculture, hunting, and gathering — its basis of reproduction grounded in the land
— would jumpstart removal. Deprived of the ability to eat and reproduce themselves in
such a precarious state, as Jefferson put it, would only require the US to “shut our hands
to crush them” if Indigenous peoples resisted.26 The new availability of space in the West
provided eastern Indigenous removal “a feasibility it had not possessed before.”27 This
became the dominant strategy to solve the so-called “Indian Problem” — kill the game
and Indigenous ways of life to force them either to flee, fight, or assimilate with the
primary goal of securing possession of the land.
The criminalization of Indigenous political authority and resistance in the East
was a frontline tactic deployed against Indigenous nations of the West. The US targeted
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Indigenous nations such as the Oceti Sakowin by enforcing dependence on the
emerging US fur trade. The trade complemented outright military endeavors as well as
the self-conceived diplomatic missions like Lewis and Clark’s expedition, to usurp
powerful nations like the Oceti Sakowin of their lands and political standing. To
accomplish this feat, it not only required a military defeat but also the extermination of
their animal kin and primary food source — the buffalo. Annihilation by starvation
proved the most effective tactic in dealing with the Plains nations. Extermination of the
Pte Oyate, the Buffalo Nation, equaled the extermination of the Oceti Sakowin and
occurred through two successive stages: the fur trade and military-backed massacres.
Lewis and Clark were a small part of this grand design, the precursors of this imperial
mission. Standing in the way was the Oceti Sakowin of the Upper Missouri.
However, what was for the Lewis and Clark expedition a terrifying encounter
with a “new” and defiant Indigenous nation was for Lakotas a fairly routine engagement
with a different flavor of whites travelling through their territory bearing flags and guns.
It was hardly exceptional, even the criminal behavior by the expedition. According to
Clark, even the downriver and more “peaceful” Ihanktonwan “invariably arrested the
progress” of all traders traversing the river exacting tolls and demanding more
accommodating trade prices.28 To achieve their diplomatic mission of bringing
Indigenous nations into trade relations, Lewis and Clark needed Indigenous peoples more
than Indigenous peoples needed them, their flags, or their useless peace medals. An
expanding trade empire would only be possible at first with Indigenous peoples and later
would require the removal, dispossession, or extermination.
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The Arrival of Capital
Lakotas had for decades traded with the French and British by the time the
expedition arrived. By the early 1800s, the fur trade had enveloped Northern Plains life.
With them, they brought the Bible, the gun, and death. Mdewakantonwan scholar and
activist Charles Eastman declared, “The fur-traders, the ‘Black Robe’ priests, the
military, and finally the Protestant missionaries, were the men who began the
disintegration of the Indian nations and the overthrow of their religion, seventy-five to a
hundred years before they were forced to enter upon reservation life.”29 By the time the
US arrived, the Lakotas most likely wanted to maintain a foothold in the river trade and
didn’t consent to a claim to the land and waterway by a sovereign they neither recognized
nor viewed as superior.30 But the Lakotas didn’t own the river, they belonged to it. Many
centuries spent living in relationship to the land and water reinforced this understanding.
By 1804 they also belonged to the river trade, both economically and politically. The
river, in this way, became a new source of livelihood and survival. At first the new
arrivals of traders were tolerated. Later, some among the Oceti Sakowin felt they had
overstayed that welcome.
By asserting control over river trade, the US would ensure economic dominance
over Indigenous nations in the Upper Missouri. It would also bring Indigenous peoples
into closer relation through dependence on trade. While early settlers and traders heavily
relied on Indigenous labor and patronage for trapping and hunting, Indigenous societies
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in turn relied on trade goods such as cloth, guns, ammunition, knives, iron cooking
utensils, and food items.31 The fur trade was not so much a trade of furs for Indigenous
peoples; it was more the gun and cloth trade, two highly sought after European-made
commodities. From the early colonial times through the end of nineteenth century Indian
wars, prices for guns, ammunition, and cloth dictated much of the economic relationship
between white traders and Indigenous peoples. Indigenous interest in useful commodities
such as guns and cloth, however, differed profoundly from the profit motive of white
traders. Fixing prices, withholding trade goods and annuities, and introducing alcohol
were all means by which traders attempted to assert control over Indigenous patrons.
Price fluctuations also fueled sporadic inter-Indigenous trade wars that were often
encouraged by rival trading firms or rival European colonizers. The hit-and-run battles,
however, were not long, drawn-out military campaigns where victory, surrender, or
defeat resulted in a wholesale transfer of political sovereignty or territory. With the
introduction of the US factory system of trade houses, US Indian policy from 1806 to
1835 was supposed to curb and control the coercive practices of traders. In other words,
early Indian policy in the Upper Missouri was not to regulate Indigenous nations but
rather the criminal behavior of whites.32 The policy had little effect, since the US and
traders participated in the same criminal enterprise of trespass and theft.
A US-backed fur trade was slow to grow in the Northern Plains and didn’t make
significant headway until after the War of 1812. After the defeat of the British, the US
tried to assert dominance in the region and over the Indigenous nations by undercutting
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British and French traders and expelling them from the region. After the Panic of 1819,
US trade steadily increased as several companies established trading forts on the Missouri
that allowed them to transport more goods and cover a larger geography. By 1827, the
American Fur Company monopolized the river trade and maintained supremacy for the
next three decades. At first these companies were in the business of trading beaver pelts,
meeting demands for the European and US markets. By the 1830s, however, beaver
populations had been all but exterminated and their demand decreased.
Indigenous peoples are largely seen as responsible for the decline of furbearing
animals in the Northern Plains, but the decline was largely due to several factors linked to
the fur industry and the US military. The adoption of horse culture increased the ability of
Indigenous peoples to hunt buffalo and greatly changed the landscape of the Northern
Plains, but it never compared to the killing efficiency of white trappers and hunters. The
“Rocky Mountain system” of beaver trapping, dominant in the early nineteenth century,
for example, completely bypassed Indigenous peoples’ political authority. Made up of
heavily armed company employees, these units knowingly trespassed into Lakota and
Arikara territories fortifying their positions and trade routes as they advanced.33
According to Indigenous custom, no one was barred from hunting for subsistence and
survival. But restrictions were placed on whites hunting for profit, making these highlyromanticized frontiersmen little more than poachers. As beaver populations declined and
demand for their pelts decreased, buffalo robes were quick to fill their place. Yet, like the
beaver, when US companies dominated the trade and bypassed Indigenous peoples, the
buffalo herds were all but exterminated in the course of two decades, from the 1870s to
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the 1880s. This went hand in hand with military-sponsored extermination campaigns
that began in 1865.34 Taking only the hides, the carcasses were left to rot on the plains.
But the white hunters went a step further, because killing off the buffalo only took care of
one part of the overall “Indian problem.” They poisoned the carcasses with strychnine to
also kill off coyotes, wolves, and other scavengers — and sometimes starving Native
people.35 Estimates place the pre-contact North American buffalo population at 25-30
million. It took settlers nearly a century to exterminate the herds in the East, removing
them, much like their human kin, west of the Mississippi River. Annihilating the
remaining 10-15 million in the Great Plains took just two decades.36 Buffalo removal and
extermination followed a similar pattern of Indigenous elimination and removal east and
west of the Mississippi.37
The fur trade marked the first round of enclosures along the Missouri River,
which violently undermined Indigenous women’s political authority. Through her family
history Sicangu scholar Virginia Driving Hawk Sneve recounts the well-known abuses,
not part of the official record, against Lakota women at Fort Platte, which was in
operation from 1840 to 1846.38 The fort’s short history reveals the often violent
transformation of Indigenous gender relations during the fur trade. The institution of
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marriage was foundational in changing gender roles. Lakota women who married white
traders sometimes found the practice of coverture, the placing of women and children
under the protection and control of a patriarch, a harrowing experience. Lakota society
was polygamous, didn’t adhere to monogamous sexual values, and possessed nothing on
par with the puritanical Christian views of sexual conduct or marriage. So the idea of
marriage and union as a social contract concentrating all property ownership to a single
patriarch was an alien concept. Descending from a society where women owned all the
property in the home, losing control of their property, their bodies, and their children, and
being placed under the dominion of a white patriarch was a completely foreign
experience.39
This should come as no surprise. In white society women and children held little
or no political authority and were relegated to service in the private sphere of the home.
Diplomacy, trade, and war — the public sphere — were the sole privilege of men.
Although Indigenous women labored to prepare the buffalo hides for trade, the hunt and
sale of those hides was a male-dominated business. Capturing Indigenous woman secured
access to her kinship network and increased the political status of the trader. Marriage
into Indigenous societies, however, rarely resulted in the same reciprocity of marrying
into white society. Only in rare instances did Indigenous men marry white women during
the fur trade. Those that did were often the male offspring of an Indigenous-white trade
union, granting the traders’ boys a level of male privilege and class mobility denied to
their kinsfolk. In these unions, boys were usually sent east to receive an education and
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were later taken on as partners in the trading business. Whereas girls were often sent
back to live with their Indigenous relatives, if they were accepted. Indigenous women
were expected to forfeit their bodies, labor, and children to the control of white traders. A
single white trader could own or “marry” multiple Indigenous women increasing his
access to their relatives or selling them, alienating them like a piece of property. Marriage
to Indigenous women guaranteed increased access to trade markets, and therefore
increased access to capital. In this sense, the subordination of Indigenous women was
lucrative for a trader and increased his social position.40
Departing white traders, engagés (low-level laborers), and soldiers would often
stop-off at the river forts for a drunken “frolic.” To fulfill their predatory desires, they
demanded the sexual services of Indigenous women’s bodies — with or without their
consent. Rape and sex work combined with freely flowing alcohol were commonplace at
Fort Platte and other military outposts. Access to whiskey, treaty annuities, and trade
goods sometimes came with the expectation that Indigenous men should forfeit their
daughters’, sisters’, and wives’ bodies to white men, even though Indigenous women’s
bodies were not theirs to give, to say the least. Soldiers frequently raped Indigenous
women taken prisoner during or after a military engagement. “To celebrate victory,”
Driving Hawk recounts, “troopers often rounded up the prettiest girls to be passed around
among the officers, leaving the enlisted men with the less attractive, older women.”41
Many Indigenous activists today have identified “man camps,” the transient allmen communities of oil and gas workers, as exploiting Indigenous women through
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trafficking and sex work.42 In some ways, trading forts were the first man camps — the
vanguards of capital that marked their presence not just by extracting wealth from the
land but also through the conquest of Indigenous women’s bodies. Those trade forts, or
man camps, later would become the border towns, the white-dominated settlements that
ring Indigenous reservations.
Such practices were not exceptional and were well in place by the time the US
arrived late to the scene. French-Canadian Toussaint Charbonneau’s life as a trapper and
fur trader is worth highlighting simply because he participated in nearly every major
enterprise on the Upper Missouri and was a man of ill repute for his treatment of
Indigenous women. Charbonneau is most famous for joining Lewis and Clark in
November 1804 when the expedition camped among the Mandans at Fort Mandan. He
offered up the labor of his “wife,” a Shoshone woman by the name of Sacagawea, and
both his and her services as interlocutors and interpreters for Indigenous peoples they
would encounter upriver. Although Sacagawea has surpassed Charbonneau in fame for
her aid to the expedition, little is known about her other than her services to white men.
Captured by Hidatsas at the age of thirteen, Sacagawea was one of many Charbonneau
purchased throughout his life.43 It was common practice for white traders to take
Indigenous women as “wives,” earning them the reputation as “squaw men,” a
disparaging term not for traders but for Indigenous women. Although she bore him
children, Sacagawea was little more than chattel to Charbonneau, a piece of property he
sometimes resented.
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In August 1805 Clark recorded an incident in his journal which required the
expedition’s intervention. “I checked our interpreter [Charbonneau],” Clark wrote,
“Striking his woman [Sacagawea] at their Dinner.44 Prior to his employment with Lewis
and Clark, Charbonneau had earned a reputation as a rapist and predator of Indigenous
women. In May 1795, in the employment of the Montreal-based fur trading firm the
North West Company, a major rival to the Hudson’s Bay Company, Charbonneau was
sent to pick up supplies at a trading post near Lake Manitou. According to the journal of
John Macdonnel, a North West Company clerk, an elder Ojibwe woman caught
Charbonneau “in the act of committing Rape upon her Daughter.” Furious, the woman
stabbed Charbonneau with a canoe awl, “a fate he highly deserved for his brutality,”
wrote Macdonnel.45 Like Charbonneau, white traders, explorers, soldiers, and settlers
believed they possessed the right to freely trespass across Indigenous territory, so, too,
did they believe they possessed unrestricted access to Indigenous women’s bodies and
their children.
Extreme violence against Native women was not random or without reason.
Sexual violence and rape are often seen as one-off events. Muscogee jurist Sarah Deer
argues that rape “can be employed as a metaphor for the entire concept of colonialism”
because it is not just individually experienced but part of an ongoing structure of
domination with a beginning but no end.46 More so than Indigenous men, the
subordination of Indigenous women was about realizing profits in the fur trade. In this
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sense, violence against Native women was productive violence because it undermined
their customary political authority and used their bodies to create profit. Unlike their
white counterparts, whose bodies were used for sexual reproduction, Indigenous
women’s bodies increased access to the land and capital by increasing a white traders’
access to new markets through her kin. While Indigenous women did produce children
for white men, the ultimate goal was not to grow a population in service of the river
trade. In fact, Indigenous women were highly disposable yet also needed to enlarge a
white traders’ political and economic influence, and therefore securing the future of white
settlement. Diminishing Indigenous women’s political authority produced wealth at the
expense of the land and Indigenous nations. Whereas rape and gender violence are seen
as a tactics for colonization by decreasing Indigenous women’s social and political status,
it was also about creating value through the realization of increased profits by accessing
the land through their bodies. As Athabascan scholar Dian Million puts it, “gender
violence marks… the evisceration of Indigenous nations.”47 Wrenching them away from
their political authority in the land, Indigenous women were seen as a natural source of
wealth to be freely appropriated by white men. White traders and trappers appropriated
Indigenous women’s bodies as much as they had appropriated the wealth of the land by
harvesting and selling the skins of animals. The two practices went hand in hand.

Pustulis Correptus
As the first entry of capitalism in the Upper Missouri, the fur trade also brought
apocalypse in the form of smallpox. The trade spread through existing Indigenous trade
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networks, and with it came European diseases. By the time Lewis and Clark arrived,
smallpox had devastated the Missouri River Indigenous peoples several times, most
likely being introduced by French and British traders. The advent of steamboats greatly
increased the spread of smallpox. In 1824 Congress authorized the Army Corps of
Engineers, a construction branch of the military, to regulate the navigation of rivers and
harbors. By 1838 Congress assigned the Army Corps to pull snags and clear the river for
steamboat traffic coming from Saint Louis. The federal government assumed its authority
over navigable waterways under the Constitution’s commerce clause, the same clause
that also regulated trade with Indigenous nations.48 Indian affairs, under the supervision
of the War Department, was tasked with the creation and management of federally
subsidized trading posts to undercut British, Spanish, and French trade and bolster US
influence over Indigenous nations.49 The increase in steamboat traffic intensified the fur
trade. The fur trade intensified commerce and therefore US authority over the river. And,
as R. G. Robertson points out, the fur trade “was the primary means by which smallpox
reached the Indians in the interior.”50 In other words, the spread of smallpox and other
diseases coincided with an intensification of colonial invasion tied to the introduction and
growth of capitalist trade markets.
Steamships transported treaty annuities, ammunition, Indian agents, traders, and
soldiers to Missouri River forts and trading posts. Boats also carried death and the
consequences of their passage brought pure horror to Indigenous nations. In the summer
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of 1837, an American Fur Company steamboat, the St. Peter’s, traveled from Saint
Louis transporting trade goods and Indigenous treaty annuities. The ship was also sent to
collect Indigenous-harvested buffalo hides. It also knowingly carried in its human cargo
smallpox. As a result, the St. Peter’s voyage triggered a massive smallpox epidemic
among the Upper Missouri Indigenous nations. The outbreak most devastated the
Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara villages along the river. Engulfed at least twice before, this
outbreak decimated these tightly-knit village communities and in some cases killed over
ninety percent of their populations. The Lakotas and Dakotas largely escaped the
outbreak because of prior inoculation and by avoiding trading posts after learning of the
epidemic.51
At Fort Clark, where the Mandans lived along the Missouri River, the violence of
the disease was beyond appalling. On April 28, 1837, the St. Peter’s crew observed the
first symptoms of smallpox among its human payload. Yet, the steamship pushed forward
and arrived at Fort Clark on June 19. Buffalo robes were loaded onto the ship and treaty
annuities were unloaded. Smallpox, too, was knowingly unloaded as the infected crew
departed that night for a drunken “frolic” among the Mandans. Within twenty-five days
of the Mandans showed the first signs of infections. The only ones spared were the elders
who had built up an immunity and whose bodies were already scarred from surviving
previous outbreaks. Children and adults writhed and stung from intense fevers. Putrid,
hideous sores filled with puss corrupted their bodies forever scarring them for life if they
survived. At first only several died each day. As days passed, the numbers quickly rose to
a dozen and then became impossible to tally. Francis A. Chardon, a fur trader at the fort,
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stopped counting the dead, “as they die so fast it is impossible.”52 Mothers and fathers
killed their children to save them from suffering. Some committed suicide and friends,
relatives, and lovers killed each other. The raging inferno killed so many there was no
one to bury the dead and the smell of decaying bodies could be smelled from miles
away.53
Many have speculated that Indigenous peoples were incapable of understanding
infection and the spread of disease. What is clear in Chardon’s journals is that Indigenous
peoples correctly identified the source of their affliction — the fur trade and the trading
forts — and sought retribution against the traders and the fur trade itself. “We are badly
situated,” wrote Chardon, “as we are threatened to be Murdered by the Indians every
instant.”54 The suspicions were well placed, since the threat of smallpox was used to
control Indigenous behavior. Indigenous peoples knew traders and explorers sometimes
carried smallpox or cowpox with them in vials for inoculations. George Catlin recounts a
story he heard among the Pawnees that a trader threatened unleashing smallpox upon
them if they didn’t submit to his will — “he would let the small-pox out of a bottle and
destroy the whole of them.”55 When Lewis and Clark wintered with the Mandans in 1804
and 1805, they threatened to spread smallpox among the Dakotas and Lakotas raiding the
Mandan villages. “[T]he Sioux had it in contemplation… to murder us in the spring,”
Lewis wrote, “but were prevented from making the attack, by our threatening to spread
the small pox, with all its horrors among them. Knowing that it first originated among the
white people, and having heard of inoculation, and the mode of keeping the infection in
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phials [vials]…, a bare threat filled them with horror, and was sufficient to deter them
from their resolute bloody purpose.”56 The mere threat of genocidal violence through the
spread of disease demonstrates the willingness of explorers and traders to use smallpox
for social control. Indigenous nations knew that white traders and explorers possessed the
ability to spread smallpox and to stop it. Disease did the work of colonialism and was a
weapon that was not oftentimes used deliberately. But when it was used (deliberate or
not), it served a murderous purpose. Regardless, the intention of annihilation was there,
even it was not always explicit.
Although accurate Indigenous population data does not exist, some studies
suggest that Indigenous nations that had more contact with whites had increased exposure
to diseases. These nations had positioned themselves as brokers in the fur trade like the
Mandans at Fort Clark, often settling near trading forts or allowing trade posts in or near
their villages. Diseases were quick to spread in these intimate river communities making
the quarantine or flight nearly impossible. Some calculations estimate from 1780 to 1877
Indigenous river nations lost nearly eighty percent of their populations or possibly more,
with the Mandans, Caddo, Wichita, and Pawnees experiencing almost ninety percent
population losses.57 Buffalo hunting nations on the Northern Plains from 1780 to 1877
experienced a forty-percent population decline, with the Assiniboine, Atsina, and
Comanche experiencing nearly eighty percent population losses.58 By the time the first
population censuses counted Indigenous nations, the Plains nations experienced at least
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one major smallpox epidemic in 1778. Smallpox epidemics swept through the region
again in 1781 and 1801. The 1837 smallpox outbreak, however, was the most devastating
for the Missouri River village nations, nearly wiping out the Mandans and forcing them
to join together with the Hidatsas and Arikaras. In 1849 Cholera killed about one-fourth
of the Pawnees and many Lakotas. The last major smallpox epidemic in the region
occurred in 1871, and killed thousands of Assiniboines and Blackfeet.59 In each case, the
introduction of deadly diseases always coincided with intensified invasion and increased
trade traffic.
The introduction of smallpox and European-borne diseases was devastating to
Indigenous peoples; it was knowingly spread along trade routes and could have been
prevented. While American Fur Company didn’t deliberately spread smallpox in 1837, it
consciously did and faced little consequences. It placed the realization of profit over
Indigenous lives and made it simpler for future white settlement by eliminating
Indigenous competition and cutting out intermediaries such as the Mandans, allowing the
fur trade to spread and become more concentrated in the hands of white traders.60

No Middle Ground
Turning the river into profit required little capital investment in Indigenous lives
as long as the trade goods and annuities continued to flow. But it did require the continual
extraction of furs. The employment of Indigenous societies as trappers, hunters, and
patrons was the first effort at turning the river into a source of wealth.
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The Missouri River wasn’t a “middle ground” scenario where all parties were
equals, even when the British and French dominated trade. A popular convention in US
history, the middle ground thesis posits that in some cases, such as the fur trade,
Indigenous and white people found common ground through trade where one group was
not allowed to assert too much control or influence over the other.61 Lost in these
imaginary and ahistorical situations, however, is the simple fact that early European and
US colonization, in all its forms, was fundamentally extractive and imperial.62 For
example, the Lakotas, while welcoming and benefitting from the river trade, didn’t intend
to usurp, dispossess, and ultimately conquer white settlers; nor did they marry into
wealthy white families to acquire their wealth, as white traders frequently married into
Indigenous families to increase trade ties and dependency; nor did they set out to
eliminate entire Indigenous communities, although that was the intention of the US. The
so-called universal law of commerce, that governed most Western societies’ colonial
relations, never created equal trading partners among Indigenous peoples. If the
reciprocity of “free trade” or laissez-faire existed during the early fur trade, then it would
have permitted Indigenous peoples to open up Indigenous-dominated markets on foreign
soil and to marry into wealthy white family across the Atlantic or in US settlements. That
simply never happened. Lakotas did actively compete with other Indigenous nations for
control over the river trade, but such conflict never equaled the holocaust brought by
disease and the calculated violence of the US military and traders.
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The Oceti Sakowin had good reason to despise the imposition of white traders
and US forts. As the fur trade peaked, the Oceti Sakowin east and west of the Missouri
began to wage defensive wars to expel the invaders who they rightfully blamed for the
disappearing buffalo and other animal kin. Foremost among their grievances was the
devastation inflicted by white traders, emigrants traversing the land, and the increasing
US military presence. Each was a foreboding sign of white encroachment. Instead of
justice, what they got instead was “peace” through war.
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Chapter 3: War
If money comes into the world with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek, capital
comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt.
—Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, 18671
If the lands of the white man are taken, civilization justifies him in resisting the
invader. Civilization does more than this; it brands him as coward and a slave if
he submits to the wrong… If the savage resists, civilization, with the ten
commandments in one hand and the sword in the other, demands his [sic]
immediate extermination.
— Report of the Indian Peace Commissioners, 18682
Bloody wars of conquest defined the period following the US’s assertion of
control over the river trade. These were not regular conflicts where two armies fought on
equal footing and engaged only combatants. They were asymmetric and irregular wars
waged against the entirety of Indigenous society. Indigenous men, women, and children
— and their buffalo kin, a major food supply — all became legitimate targets. The goal
was not just military defeat but total domination to force the surrender of lands. Although
the US never formally declared war on Indigenous peoples or the Oceti Sakowin,
Indigenous peoples have well understood how overt militarism coincides with the taking
of land. As we shall see, a state of war existed for nearly half a century in the nineteenth
century. Its first goal was to exert control of the river. As time went on, it expanded to
include the entire Missouri River basin, especially the fertile buffalo hunting grounds in
the western Powder River country. Following the Civil War, the Oceti Sakowin’s
relationship with the Missouri River was increasingly defined by avoidance. The
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escalation of the river trade brought unwanted changes such as an increased US
presence through the construction of military and trade forts and intensifying the assault
on rapidly thinning buffalo herds.
The taking of territory often coincides with attacks on Indigenous economies.
Indigenous subsistence hunting, gathering, and agriculture initially provided the means to
effectively resist settler encroachment. By destroying subsistence economies, by
separating Indigenous producers from the land and attempting to make them dependent
on treaty annuities or cash economies, the accumulation process is relaunched (again and
again) by waging total war on the whole of Indigenous life. The Oceti Sakowin were not
the first to confront US total war. Haudenosaunees, for instance, call every US
commander-in-chief “town destroyer.” The title was bestowed on the first US president
George Washington, who ordered a bloody, punitive campaign that burned forty
Haudenosaunee towns in New York during the Revolutionary War. Haudenosaunee
cornfields were also burned to thwart reclaiming the land and impose starvation. To
consummate possession by mixing blood and soil, the troops responsible for razing the
Haudenosaunee towns were afterwards rewarded with title to Indigenous lands.3
In a very real sense, the founding of the US was a declaration of war against
Indigenous peoples. But to formally declare war would have been to acknowledge
Indigenous peoples’ status among the “civilized” or “Christian” nations. International
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jurist Antony Anghie maintains that from European contact in the Americas onwards,
the normal principles of waging “just war” never applied to Indigenous peoples. But the
principles of just war and sovereignty were not imported from Europe. They were
invented to deal with the novel “Indian Problem” of the so-called “New World.” The
invented rules applied only to those who possessed civilization. The “uncivilized” have
been forever excluded. Anti-Indigenous warfare was, consequently, “perpetual” because
Indigenous peoples, living in an uncultivated state of nature, would ever remain “the
unredeemable Indian.”4
Undeclared war, however, never made endless war making against Indigenous
peoples any less real. Waging “savage war” simply suspended the rules of “civilized
war.” US army historian Andrew Birtle confirms this line of thinking. He reports that the
military academy at West Point studies US Indian wars only in its course on the law:
International law as taught at West Point approached the subject of Indian warfare
in somewhat the same manner as it did the treatment of guerrillas and actively
hostile civilian populations in civilized warfare. On the one hand, it maintained
that the laws of war did not apply to aboriginal peoples — just as they did not
apply to guerrillas — for the simple reason that “savages” did not abide by those
laws. This meant that soldiers were free to employ the harshest measures
necessary to subdue them.5
In other words, the US Indian wars developed the tactics and strategies that would inform
US counterinsurgency operations against any all who could be deemed a threat to its
expanding empire — put another way, any and all who can be made “Indian.” As
Chickasaw scholar Jodi Byrd argues, “the United States propagates empire not through
frontiers but through the production of a paradigmatic Indianness.” Enemies of empire
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who cannot be formally brought into the realm “civilization” are dealt with as
“savages,” who possess no rights and can be wantonly destroyed or indefinitely detained.
But it is the US who deems who and who is not “savage.” And the definition of
“savagery” stems directly from the Indian wars, where the US began to master and refine
its counterinsurgency tools and professionalize its military against any and all who could
be made “Indian.”
With the increased professionalization of the US military following the Civil War,
the lessons gained from fighting irregular and highly mobile Indigenous guerilla armies
were passed down informally from generation to generation and most never became
written doctrine. As scholar Laleh Khalili argues:
What was learned in the Indian Wars became the necessary, if unwritten, manual
for subsequent overseas asymmetric warfare, in the Philippines, the Caribbean,
and Latin America. Techniques deployed in the Indian Wars — some in long use
before and continually perfected — included theories of collective responsibility,
an impulse to “civilize” in order to pacify, the use of native and settler scouts and
auxiliaries, the use of reservations as militarily useful spaces for concentrating
and monitoring native fighters and civilians, timing battles at night or winter to
ensure lack of preparedness among Native Americans, and surprise attacks
against villages to undermine socioeconomic bases and independence of Native
American communities.6
Unlike other forms of war, the defeat or surrender of Indigenous peoples often
meant extermination, removal, or the resettling of their lands by an invading settler
population, or all three. While everyday settlers didn’t always participate in waging war
against Indigenous peoples — but frequently did — they certainly benefitted from
Indigenous defeat. Although war could not be made with “savages,” it didn’t preclude the
US from taking lands and making war through a policy of “peace” whether through
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treaty, confinement to reservations, or the “civilizing” mission. As its primary
authority, a sovereign possesses the right to wage war, which the US has done with great
frequency, and the right to define the conditions of peace. Indigenous peoples waged
wars of self-defense against US invaders and resisted conversion to its civilizing project.
Sovereigns wage wars, more or less, for three reasons: to acquire or conquer
lands, resources, or populations; to seek revenge or punish enemies; or for self-defense
against an aggressor. Self-defense has been denied as a fundamental right of Indigenous
peoples to resist their oppressors making Indigenous resistance an unlawful act. Since
Indigenous peoples are not seen as full sovereigns under US or international law,
Indigenous resistance to colonialism — even if for self-defense — is criminalized.7 The
criminalization of Indigenous resistance by the US is not an anomaly but part of the
global colonial enterprise of European empire-building. The war on the Northern Plains
Indigenous nations must be seen in this global context, as an imperialist and expansionist
project.
Libraries have been filled with countless volumes written by armchair historians,
colonial apologists, and scholars of all stripes — too many to name here — on Northern
Plains Indigenous warfare. Very few researchers, however, have actually questioned the
premises of waging just wars on part of Indigenous nations against US empire. A
question that many historians have entertained — did the Oceti Sakowin have a right to
defend itself with armed force? — is not entertained here. The simple truth is: Indigenous
nations, like all nations, possess the right to defend themselves. Asking whether or not
Indigenous peoples had a right to self-defense makes for bad history and bad politics.

7

I draw my definition of sovereignty and the colonial encounter from Anghie, Imperialism.

72

Also, how a people choose to defend themselves, how they choose to survive, or how
they choose to resist the onslaught of colonialism cannot be neatly placed into “right” or
“wrong” categories. Survival by any means necessary is an act of resistance.
It was through war and self-defense that the Oceti Sakowin made its most historic
agreements with the US: the 1851 and 1868 treaties of peace. The promise of peace,
however, was as much about continuation of war by other means such as the civilizing
mission and the continued criminalization the Indigenous culture of resistance. Endless
peace through perpetual war has been US Indian policy from its inception, and that
vicious war for peace has not ended — so long as Indigenous political collectivities
continue to exist and continue exercise prior counterclaims to the land.

The 1851 Peace Treaty
In 1849 Congress transferred the Bureau of Indian Affairs from the Department of
War to the Department of Interior, a newly created federal bureaucracy dedicated to the
management of wildlife, public lands, and the conservation of natural resources. Indian
affairs have remained there ever since. More importantly, the shift marked a new
direction in Indian policy that emphasized “peace,” while explicitly promoting the
“civilizing mission.” Prior to a formal peace policy, the US entered into international
relations with the various divisions of the Oceti Sakowin by signing “peace and
friendship” treaties that placed them exclusively “under the protection of the United
States of America, and of no other nation, power, or sovereign.”8 The first was in 1805
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with the Dakotas to build Fort Snelling at the confluence of the Minnesota and
Mississippi rivers — the future site where the Dakotas would be imprisoned in a
concentration camp for their part, real or imagined, in the 1862 Dakota-US War. Other
treaties followed in 1815 and 1825 but never ceded large amounts of territory or
drastically diminished Oceti Sakowin political authority.
During the signing the of those treaties the Oceti Sakowin possessed significant
military and political power, so it is unlikely they viewed them as acquiescing to a
superior sovereign power. This began to change after decades of the fur trade and
diseases exacted their toll on the Northern Plains ecology and Indigenous nations. By the
time of the peace policy, thousands of Lakotas had already withdrawn west of the
Missouri into the Powder River country to avoid the unfolding apocalypse brought on by
the river trade. In the east traders had swindled the Dakotas out of land and treaty
annuities, reducing them to starving conditions and creating the conditions for an uprising
to expel the invaders. The once-numerous buffalo nations that blackened the Missouri
River valley had been all but wiped out or chased off. Near the Mississippi in Dakota
country, they had been exterminated. The pressures from increasing overland white
emigration westward further taxed rapidly diminishing buffalo herds. What followed was
not peace, but three decades of military campaigns to crush and punish the Oceti Sakowin
who were reduced to bare survival — a nation fighting for their lives.
The trail west to Oregon Territory intruded through Pawnee, Crow, Cheyenne,
Lakota, and Arapaho hunting grounds causing cholera, measles, and smallpox outbreaks
among the Sicangus, killing 500. The devastating spread of infectious disease always
coincided with intensified invasion. To safeguard emigration on the Oregon Trail from
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Indigenous retaliation, in 1845 colonel Stephen W. Kearny led 250 dragoons, units that
became the mounted cavalry, from Fort Leavenworth in St. Louis up the Platte River.
The military expedition was a show of force, a warning that Indigenous peoples had no
authority to close the road. As Kearney told them, “the white people traveling upon it
must not be disturbed, either in their persons or their property.”9 It is doubtful the show of
force had any effect other than provoking resentment. When settlers brought disease,
chased off the game, and trespassed through their territory, Indigenous peoples were
punished.10
In 1847 Brigham Young led an exodus of Mormons to settle Indigenous lands in
Utah. News of the discovery of gold in California in 1849 and later in Montana in 1853
further exacerbated the situation by increasing westward emigration. The lands were
flooded with whites: Mormons traveling to Utah, settlers emigrating to Oregon, and
miners headed to California goldmines. In 1846 a group of Sicangus and Oglalas
demanded payment for the damages increased overland travel inflicted on the land: the
depletion of game, the clearing of scarce timber, and the spreading of disease.11 Instead of
compensation, they got escalated military occupation. The US military found it
impossible to control the waves of white settlers and mounting Indigenous indignation.
The year the peace policy was declared, the US established a fort at the confluence of the
North Platte and Laramie rivers to address the problem. Fort Laramie became the site to
pursue “peace” by increased military occupation in Powder River country. Strategically
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positioned at the point where the overland trail trespassed through the territory of the
last remaining buffalo large herds, the fort was a symbol of increasing US presence and
authority.
The vision for the military outpost came from the Upper Platte Indian agent
Thomas Fitzpatrick, a leading advocate of peace by military occupation.12 As part of his
vision for peace, Fitzpatrick hoped to advance US interests by securing a large, interIndigenous peace treaty to definitively establish Indigenous territory, guarantee safe
passage for overland travelers, and secure land cessions. A mass council of Plains nations
was called. In September 1851, tens of thousands from the Arikara, Mandan, Hidatsa,
Crow, Gros Ventre, Blackfeet, Assiniboine, Shoshone, Arapaho, Cheyenne, Lakota, and
Dakota nations met for three weeks with US treaty commissioners at Horse Creek, thirtysix miles downriver of Fort Laramie. The first Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 was signed
by all parties, ensuring the US’s right to build wagon roads and railroads and payment of
$50,000 for fifty years for damages caused by the overland emigrations.13 Perhaps
demonstrating the US’s commitment to this “peace” policy, the Senate limited the treaty
annuities to ten years with the possibility of a five-year renewal. The amendment was
sent back to the Plains nations for approval and then back to the Senate, where it was
never ratified. Regardless, the US paid the $50,000 in annuities for the next fifteen
years.14 The spirit of peace, however, was short lived and the treaty was deeply flawed.
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Six headmen of the Oceti Sakowin signed the treaty, presumably with the
understanding that the emigrant depredations would cease and that the US would live up
to its commitments to peace. The Oceti Sakowin representatives, however, protested over
having to select a single “head chief” to represent them in the treaty negotiations versus
the more familiar decentralized political structure that allowed each division to select its
own representatives. A single leader or central organization for the entire Oceti Sakowin
offended the autonomy each political division possessed. Mato Wayuhi, Conquering
Bear, a Sicangu, was arbitrarily chosen as a representative of the 1851 Fort Laramie, but
protested his appointment because of his own young age and lack of experience.15
Selecting “treaty chiefs” to represent entire Indigenous nations was an age-old tactic to
exert influence and concentrate leadership. Although in this case it was resisted, the tactic
attempted cleaved political factions. Strategies of Indigenous resistance, however, were
as uneven and diverse as strategies of settler colonialism. Most Indigenous leaders were
committed to diplomacy than armed resistance, though the two sometimes worked in
tandem. Managing these divisions was key. Some wanted to give up the Powder River
country and remove to reservations to start a new life. “The hostiles,” as the Indian agents
called them, wished to end treaty making altogether and keep their lands without
reservations and restrictions. Although the two divisions agreed with the premises of the
1851 Treaty, the western divisions demanded that the reservation groups not take any
more annuities and remove themselves from the negative influence of the trading forts,
where the annuities were distributed.16
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In 1853 Fitzpatrick criticized the outcome of the 1851 Treaty, calling it a
temporary fix to coming war. “The [peace] policy must be either an army or an annuity,”
he argued. “Either an inducement must be offered to them greater than the gains of
plunder, or a force must be at hand able to restrain them and check their depredations.
Any compromise between the systems will only be liable to all the miseries of failure.”17
Failure was in the hands of Indigenous peoples, according to Fitzpatrick, who could only
be persuaded to peace by dependency on US annuities or force. Neither was agreeable to
the Oceti Sakowin. Annuities meant submission and land cessions, and an increased
military presence meant violence. To the Oceti Sakowin, treaty-making became more and
more a zero sum game where all roads led to increasing relations with the US and not
fostering and maintaining their independence.
Three years after the treaty signing, in August a lame calf belonging to an
emigrant Mormon wandered into a camp of near starving Sicangus. Believing the calf
was abandoned, it was killed, butchered, and almost immediately consumed. The
Mormon owner called for retribution and John L. Grattan, a young West Point graduate
stationed at the nearby Fort Laramie, answered. Although Indigenous peoples at first
allowed the overland emigrants to travel through and hunt freely within their territories,
under US law the killing or theft of a domestic animal, such as a lame calf, was
considered a property crime. Private property held more sanctity than the Indigenous
treaties or lives. Grattan descended on the camp demanding that Conquering Bear
relinquish the guilty party. As the “treaty chief” of the 1851 Treaty committed to
maintaining peace, Conquering Bear offered restitution to the Mormon and pled for a
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peaceful resolution. Grattan’s men responded to the peace offer by shooting
Conquering Bear. The Sicangus descended on Grattan and his soldiers, killing him and
all 28 of his men. Six days later, Conquering Bear died from his wounds. With him died
the spirit of the 1851 peace treaty. The Sicangus were quick to seek revenge and robbed a
mail coach near Fort Laramie making off with a large amount of money and killing three
white men.18
Tensions were high. While treaty annuities continued to arrive on time, white
traders continued to prey on the Lakotas and Dakotas who received their annuities at
Missouri River trading posts. In the winter 1853-1854, Sihasapas and Hunkpapas refused
treaty annuities and began to wage war on white traders. Traders (and even contemporary
historians) have mistakenly called treaty annuities “gifts.” Annuities were not gifts but
contractual treaty obligations. Although their intended purpose was to guarantee peace,
they were often withheld to pay trade “debts” or used to coerce “hostile” groups into
submitting a trader’s will. White traders were first welcomed because they brought
highly-prized commodities such as guns and cloth. The Oceti Sakowin called them
Wasichun, or people who possess a mysterious power. That power was access to what
seemed like endless goods. After years of living among Indigenous nations, it soon
became clear those goods and that power came at a deadly cost. When the traders
demanded more and exploited Native patrons, they earned their second name, a play on
the first: Wasicu, the fat-taker, the settler, the colonizer, the capitalist. To be called
Wasicu was the highest insult. It meant that a person behaved as if they had no relatives.
Extremely selfish and individualistic behavior as if having no accountability to others
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was essentially death because it was punished by alienation or banishment. When the
Oceti Sakowin spoke of the invaders, Wasicu became synonymous with the United
States, a nation that behaved as if it had no relatives.19
At one time all groups of the Oceti Sakowin eagerly sought trade goods such as
guns and cloth. But traders also represented a growing dependence and a permanent
nuisance. For this reason, Little Bear, a leader of the Hunkpapa, waged a bitter campaign
against the white traders on the Upper Missouri. According to American Fur Company
employee Edwin Thompson Denig, in 1853 when the fur company attempted to construct
a trade fort in Hunkpapa territory without their consent, Little Bear’s Akicitas (soldiers)
“cut up the carts, killed the horses, and flogged the traders and sent them home.” Little
Bear first earned his status as a leader when he killed a despised white trader from the
American Fur Company in the trader’s own home. As a result, Denig characterized Little
Bear as seeking no more than the “destruction of all traders in the country.” The
Sihasapas and Hunkpapas under Little Bear’s command, Dening recounted: “cut off
every white man they meet and pillage or destroy all property outside the forts at the
Yellowstone. They declare war to the knife with the Government of the United States and
all whites in the country, threaten to burn up the forts, make no buffalo robes except what
they want for their own use[,] and wish to return to their primitive mode of life.”20 Some
Missouri River Lakotas and Dakotas revolted against the fur trade and the profit motive it
encouraged by returning to subsistence practices of buffalo hunting, eschewing the
drinking of alcohol, boycotting the river trade, and boycotting and actively sabotaging the
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trading forts — the primary source of their affliction. Returning to subsistence buffalo
hunting and the refusal to participate in the fur trade allowed Indigenous nations to resist
the encroachment of capitalist relations.
Later that year Indian agent Alfred J. Vaughn traveled the Missouri River meeting
with various divisions of the Oceti Sakowin to distribute annuities and to gather reports
on the recent hostilities against traders. When he arrived at the Sihasapas and Hunkpapas
camp, they firmly refused Vaughn’s annuities. Among the Ihanktonwannas, the headman
Red Leaf cut open all the bags of the Indian agent’s provisions and scattered the contents
across the prairie. The Akicitas then threw the remaining gunpowder keg in the river,
shooting it until it exploded.21 The more militant divisions among the Oceti Sakowin
resented what the trading posts and the treaty annuities symbolized: nonconsensual
occupation and an attack on the land. The refusal to participate in the market economy
and by seeking its violent eviction puts to rest certain claims that the Oceti Sakowin had
become helplessly dependent and devastatingly transformed by the fur trade, thus leading
to their inevitable defeat and collapse. However, the strident refusal to become dependent
on the occupier’s economy was only possible by maintaining access to buffalo herds.
Like a good relative, the Pte Oyate provided the means to resist and refuse early stages of
invasion. That strength through animal kinship may have prevented dependence on the
river trade, but it soon became an exploited weakness when the military targeted the
buffalo nations for extermination. An attack on the land and the buffalo was an attack on
Indigenous subsistence practices and the ability to resist encroachment.
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The military and traders were quick to claim victimhood after Grattan’s defeat
and the war on the Missouri River trade.22 In response the War Department sent 600
soldiers under the command of General William S. Harney up the Platte River. On
September 5, 1855, Harney engaged 250 Sicangus camped at Blue Water Creek. The
leaders, Tukiha Maza, Iron Shell, and Wakinyan Cikala, Little Thunder, sued for peace,
telling Harney their camp was peaceful and mostly women and children. Harney ordered
his men to raze the camp, killing 86 — half were women and children. They took 70
women and children as prisoners and held them at Fort Laramie. According to one
account, the soldiers seized an infant from her wounded mother and used the child as
target practice.23 At Fort Laramie, the officers picked over the Sicangu women who,
according to the testimony of Susan Bettelyoun Bordeaux, “became the property of their
captors.” In a letter accompanying Bordeaux’s testimony, Hunkpapa historian Josephine
Waggoner writes, “there were many war babies born after Harney left Laramie.”24 That
day Harney earned his Lakota name — Woman Killer.25
Woman Killer intended to terrorize the Lakotas into submission. Terror had the
opposite effect. Out hunting while Harney’s men razed, murdered, raped, and tortured
Little Thunder’s camp, a young man who later earned the name Tasunka Witko, Crazy
Horse, returned to find his relatives’ mutilated bodies scattered across the prairie. That
day Crazy Horse committed his life to fighting the Woman Killer’s nation. Also there
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that day, Crazy Horse’s uncle, Sinte Gleska, Spotted Tail, attempted to stop the
massacre. Although unarmed and surrounded by soldiers, Spotted Tail grabbed a
soldier’s knife and killed ten of Woman Killer’s men before being taken down by two
bullet wounds.26 Crazy Horse and Spotted Tail came to represent two traditions of
Indigenous resistance. One would follow a path of armed struggle and the other the path
of diplomacy. Despite these divergences, the two remained good relatives to each other in
the trying years to come, a testament to the strong bonds of kinship that held the nation
together as their world was taken from them. While Crazy Horse and Spotted Tail were
accomplished warriors and leaders, their highest virtue was their commitment to the
defense of their human and nonhuman relations. The events of that day forever shaped
their resolve for self-defense and survival, which didn’t always mean picking up the gun
but sometimes it did. For both Crazy Horse and the Spotted Tail, however, at that
moment preserving a grounded authority in the land was the theory and the gun was the
practice. Both were necessary for the survival of human and nonhuman relations. It was
from settler colonialism’s nightmarish scenario of fight, flight, or accommodate that
Indigenous heroes were made and immortalized — some known and many more
unknown. Heroes of Indigenous resistance didn’t just make history. History made them.
While in the West the Lakotas confronted the punitive campaigns of the US’s
peace policy, in the East the Dakotas faced increased settler encroachment. White
settlements depleted nearly all the game and the delivery of treaty annuities were slow,
never enough, and sometimes never came. Starvation set in. To make matters worse,
Minnesota Territory organized in 1849 and began its path toward statehood which would
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mean the expulsion of Indigenous peoples. In 1857 Inkpaduta, a Wahpekute leader, led
a retaliatory campaign against white settlers at Spirit Lake and Springfield, after settlers
wantonly murdered his brother and forcefully exiled the Wahpekutes from their
homelands in 1856. In total the Wahpekutes killed 28 settlers and sustained minimal
casualties. Inkpaduta, whose body was badly scarred having survived the 1837 smallpox
scourge as a child, became a veteran of many major engagements with the US military
and died in exile Canada in the 1880s. The attacks on settlements earned him the
reputation as a frontier bogeyman. So hated and feared by whites, his name was never
translated into English unlike his more celebrated and well-known contemporaries.27
Nevertheless, Inkpaduta’s legacy is now widely celebrated for having evaded capture and
death, never surrendering, and refusing reservation life.
The Wahpekute’s attacks were also partly in response to the Treaty of Traverse de
Sioux and the Treaty of Mendota. Both of these treaties were signed in 1851 by all four
Dakota nations and ceded all Dakota land claims except for a narrow 20-mile strip. There
is no doubt that the Dakota leaders were coerced into making such disastrous
concessions. To force signatures, treaty commissioners threatened military force and the
withholding of rations. White traders got first access to any treaty moneys to pay
outstanding debts the Dakotas had allegedly accrued. When the treaties went through the
Senate for approval, amendments were attached that left the Dakotas without any legal
title to the land essentially making the homeless or trespassers in their own homelands.28
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In August 1862, when Taoyateduta, He Loves his Red Nation, also known as
Kangi Cistinna, Little Crow, and his warriors began to expel white settlers from their
Dakota homelands, most of the Dakota communities were starving, horseless, unarmed,
and living on reservations. With the outbreak of the Civil War, treaty annuities arrived
late or not at all — and were sometimes intentionally withheld by traders. Andrew
Myrick, a notorious white trader responsible for distributing treaty annuities and rations
at the Lower Agency, put it bluntly, “So far as I’m concerned, if they are hungry, let them
eat grass or dung.” The Dakotas faced the real possibility of starving to death. So they
turned on the ones who preached the value of a penny while turning Natives into starving
paupers. When the Dakotas came to the Lower Agency, some stories say Myrick was
killed while running away and his body was found with grass stuffed in his mouth.29 It
was the criminal acts of the traders and agency officials that led to the uprising. But it
would be the legalized killing and punishment of all Dakotas that would make the US’s
criminal behavior of intentional starvation and theft appear as “lawful.”
The Dakotas waged deadly battles killing more than 800 white settlers, traders,
and soldiers. By late September most Dakotas surrendered, ending the brief 37-day war.
The captured Dakotas were not treated as prisoners of war but instead faced a military
tribunal created by the Henry Sibley, Minnesota’s first governor and colonel of the state
militia. Military officers who had just fought Dakotas were appointed to oversee the
trials. By November the military tribunal tried 392 Dakotas for “murder and outrages,”
convicting 323 and condemning 303 to death. More than two thousand Dakotas were also
imprisoned at Fort Snelling in a large concentration camp, where many died. Whether or
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not they participated in the war mattered little. All Dakotas became targets for
collective punishment. President Lincoln commuted most of the Dakota death sentences,
but maintained an iron fist to crush Indigenous resistance not just against the Dakotas but
elsewhere, too. In 1864 in the Southwest a similar policy of collective punishment and
removal targeted Navajo and Apache resistance resulting in the Hwéeldi, or the Long
Walk. The removal, force march, and imprisonment at Bosque Redondo in New Mexico
killed more than 2,000 Navajos.30
On December 26, 1862, a week before signing the Emancipation Proclamation,
Lincoln and ordered the hanging of the 38 Dakota men at Maka To, Blue Earth or
Mankato, as retribution for the 1862 US-Dakota War. The execution of the Dakota 38
remains the largest mass execution in US history. Minnesota Governor Alexander
Ramsey, who helped negotiate the 1851 treaties with the Dakotas, then ordered the
extermination or complete banishment of remaining Dakotas from the state. Settlers were
encouraged and rewarded to take their own revenge with government-issued $25 scalp
bounties, which later increased to $200. When the Civil War came to an end, very few
confederate officials and soldiers were sent to prison, and only one was hanged for war
crimes. After surrender, many confederates went back to holding public office. General
Sibley ordered that the Dakotas were to be treated as criminals and not prisoners of war.31
A war to maintain the institution of slavery that cost half a million lives was profoundly
different from the Dakota uprising — and rarely are the stories and aftermaths of the two
wars told side-by-side.
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For his part in the uprising, in 1863 Minnesotan settlers murdered Little Crow
and collected $500 for his scalp and decapitated head. Little Crow’s scalp, severed head,
and the rest of his body were collected and put on public display by the Minnesota
Historical Society until 1915, a grim trophy to remind settlers exactly how they “won”
the land. Little Crow’s remains were only returned to his family in 1971. Nearly a
thousand Dakotas fled to Canada and 2,500 remained at large fleeing into Dakota
Territory to join their relatives on the Missouri River. In 1863 in Minnesota general John
Pope organized “columns of vengeance” to punish and capture fugitive Dakotas.32 Instead
of recognizing their own criminality for outright land theft and state-imposed starvation,
the Dakotas would pay with their lives. Facing scalp bounties and the harsh imprisonment
of their relatives, surrender usually meant death and was simply not an option. To survive
— to resist — meant to flee.
Pope sent two columns, led by brigadier generals Sibley and Alfred Sully, to halt
the fleeing Dakotas from crossing the Missouri River and joining their western relatives.
The campaign had three goals: crush the fleeing Dakotas, secure the Missouri River for
steamboat travel, and eliminate remaining Indigenous opposition to settling eastern
Dakota Territory. By 1863, overland travel on the Oregon Trail had greatly subsided. But
the 1862 Montana gold rush drew throngs of miners and settlers who traveled overland
on the Bozeman Trail, which cut through 1851 Treaty territory, and up the Missouri
River via steamship. Sibley’s mounted cavalry headed south and traveled north up the
eastern shoreline of the Missouri, encountering little opposition. Sully commanded more
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than two thousand soldiers engaging in minor skirmishes that inflicted minimal
casualties, except for one.
On September 3, 1863, Sibley’s men attacked 4,000 peaceful Dakotas and
Lakotas in a summer camp after a buffalo hunt at Inyan Ska, Whitestone Hill. Standing
Rock historian and founder of the Sacred Stone Camp LaDonna Bravebull Allard
recounts the events of that day through the oral history of her ancestor Mary Big
Moccasin:
It was a time of celebration and ceremony — a time to pray for the coming year,
meet relatives, arrange marriages, and make plans for winter camps. Many
refugees from the 1862 uprising in Minnesota, mostly women and children, had
been taken in as family. Mary’s father, Oyate Tawa, was one of the 38 Dah’kotah
hanged in Mankato, Minnesota, less than a year earlier, in the largest mass
execution in the country’s history… As my great-great-grandmother Mary Big
Moccasin told the story, the attack came the day after the big hunt, when spirits
were high. The sun was setting and everyone was sharing an evening meal when
Sully’s soldiers surrounded the camp on Whitestone Hill. In the chaos that
ensued, people tied their children to their horses and dogs and fled. Mary was 9
years old. As she ran, she was shot in the hip and went down. She laid there until
morning, when a soldier found her. As he loaded her into the wagon, she heard
her relatives moaning and crying on the battlefield. She was taken to a prisoner of
war camp in Crow Creek where she stayed until her release in 1870.33
The dogs returned to camp with babies still tied to them. Unable to catch them, the
soldiers shot and killed the dogs, and their precious cargo. In all, the soldiers slaughtered
more than 300 Lakotas and Dakotas. Most were women and children. Half a million
pounds of dried buffalo meat and more than 300 hundred lodges were razed. Thirty-two
men and 124 women were taken prisoner and transported to Fort Pierre to be shipped to
Crow Creek with the remaining survivors of the US-Dakota War.34
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The massacre had a profound psychological impact on the Dakotas and Lakotas.
The scorched-earth campaign against the Dakotas and the “columns of vengeance”
intended to deter a military alliance among the Oceti Sakowin. Although the campaign
may have deterred some from taking up arms, it encouraged others to risk everything to
repel the invaders. The success of armed resistance, however, would not be measured in
the annihilation of the US as an enemy nation. Instead, success could be measured in the
alliances that formed, the grounded political authority that stayed intact despite the
incessant onslaught, and the concessions, though short-lived, won through treaties.
Immediately following the punitive campaigns waged against the Dakotas, in
November 1863 Colonel John M. Chivington and his soldiers massacred more than 200
peaceful Cheyennes at Sand Creek in Colorado Territory, taking scalps and severed
genitals as souvenirs. Enraged the at the growing brutality, the Cheyennes, Lakotas,
Arapahos, and some Dakotas formed a political alliance under the leadership of Mahpiya
Luta, Red Cloud. The historic alliance vowed to expel the US to from the buffalo hunting
grounds. It was believed the US had violated the spirit of the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty
with the construction of the Bozeman Trail.35 The alliance successfully defeated the US
military in hit-and-run battles from 1866 to 1868. In December 1866, most famously,
Crazy Horse, a rising military leader, drew 100 soldiers under the command of Colonel
William J. Fetterman from Fort Kearney into a trap, killing Fetterman and all his men.
The fort had been established along the Bozeman Trail to protect white miners heading to
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the Montana goldmines.36 Facing an undefeatable, highly mobile guerrilla force, in
1868 the US sued for peace once again.

The 1868 Peace Treaty
In the summer of 1868, a mass council was called at Bear Butte to discuss a treaty
of peace, and Red Cloud was selected to lead any negotiations with the US. Since 1857
most of the Oceti Sakowin had been gathering annually at Mato Paha, Bear Butte, at the
northeast fringes of the Black Hills to discuss the peace treaties and mounting resistance.
Some historians and scholars have challenged the idea that the “Sioux Nation” or the
Oceti Sakowin ever existed in the first place and whether or not such gatherings took
place in the Black Hills prior to US invasion. What is known is that all seven political
divisions met at these annual summer councils and sometimes were all represented at
some of the most famous battles. It is true the Oceti Sakowin had not gathered the way it
had before 1857. The Bear Butte councils, which sometimes included allied nations such
as the Arapahos and Cheyennes, concerned concentrated military and diplomatic efforts
against a common enemy — US imperialism. Sicangu historian Edward Valandra
describes the importance of the 1857 council:
there were decisions made there that affect us today. For example, not to sell the
land. The policy was to protect the [Black] Hills, protect our homelands that went
way down to the southern Plains, all the way out to Minnesota, all the way out to
the Rocky Mountains, and up into southern Canada… They talked about taking
the fight to the wasicu. If they would have, they would have marched all the way
down to Saint Louis and would have wiped out every White settlement. That
could have happened. But no, they decided to protect the Black Hills, to protect
this relative of ours.37
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Mass gatherings prior to this certainly did take place, but the Oceti Sakowin more often
gathered at Mato Paha and elsewhere for peace not war. Mato Paha was a site for annual
ceremonies such as the Wiwang Wacipi, the sun dance. The Oceti Sakowin war councils,
however, have drawn more scrutiny and attention than the ceremonial celebrations of
life.38 The 1857 council did mark a significant shift because discussions mostly concerned
tactics and strategies for war and diplomacy. More importantly, the dialogue placed
emphasis on grounded authority and protection of the earth — not as an abstract thing,
but as a relative.
Most political divisions chose to avoid armed resistance altogether and began to
slowly accustom themselves to living near the agencies as the buffalo became scarce.
These people were pejoratively called the “Loafer Bands” for loafing around the forts.39
Others who were willing to break policy and sell land, which they were not authorized to
do so, were called Maka Utacipi, or the Earth Eaters. 40 Many disapproved of these
individuals’ behavior but they were still considered relatives, though pitied for “eating”
the land for the annuities and food rations they received for selling it. Political custom
dictated that families and larger political divisions were allowed to disagree or not follow
a course of action set out by others. If the disagreement was serious, individuals or entire
nations were allowed to leave. Just as easily as they could leave, they could also rejoin
their relatives. Force or coercion never compelled others to action or to stay.41 Harmony
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was disturbed when the entire Oceti Sakowin was confined to the reservation because
differing factions were confined together and could not depart each other’s company. In
other instances, “agency chiefs” were selected to represent an entire Indigenous nation
breaking down internal democratic processes. Regardless of competing views over the
correct approach to US invasion, the war on the Bozeman Trail drew the US to the
negotiation table once again.
By 1865, the 1851 Treaty had expired with little consequence having failed to
bring about the peace it promised. Another costly military campaign in the Northern
Plains was not an option. Most of the US military was stationed in the South to oversee
Reconstruction following the conclusion of the Civil War. As an effort to make freed
Blacks into citizens, W. E. B. Du Bois called Reconstruction “a splendid failure.”42
Reconstruction offered only a temporary vision of a free society because absolute
equality demanded too much of a departure from the status quo for a white supremacist
empire. The same could also be said of US treaties made with Indigenous nations at this
time. Letting Indigenous peoples live in peace and respecting their political autonomy
was too much to ask of a settler state. So why did it make Indigenous treaties in the first
place?
Treaties are the central agreements among sovereigns and the primary instruments
of international relations. After all, a sovereign nation does not enter into international
relations with internal or domestic peoples. Treaty making is a reserved right for foreign
nations, a sovereign’s expression of legal and political difference; it is also how different
nations are brought into relation with one another. So why did the US enter into
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international relations with the Oceti Sakowin when Indigenous nations were
considered “domestic dependent nations,” according to an 1831 Supreme Court
decision?43 This is the fundamental paradox of federal Indian law — taking international
agreements and attempting to determine their validity in the realm of domestic federal
law, or the courts of the colonizers.
Patrick Wolfe argues that “domestic dependent nations” was not so much a legal
reconfiguration of Indigenous nations as much as it was a “manifesto” for settler
colonialism.44 The US entered into treaties with Indigenous nations not to recognize their
inherent political sovereignty or self-determining authority but to facilitate land cessions
and eventual incorporation. To do so it had to reconfigure its own laws to essentially
justify what would, in other circumstances, be criminal. The US saw Indigenous
autonomy and self-determination as conditional, temporary, and always subordinate to
US sovereignty. Indigenous sovereignty could be diminished but never expanded. Even
treaties that didn’t cede land established US supremacy. For instance, previous treaties of
“peace and friendship” didn’t specifically transfer land, but they did recognize US
dominion — or ultimate authority. Under US rule Indigenous nations could transfer their
occupancy rights by ceding land to the US, but they could not transfer dominion over
territory because it was not theirs to give. Under Discovery rights, the US held the final
say over the land but frequently required a formal agreement with Indigenous peoples to
take it if it could not be taken by force.
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The replacement of Indigenous land tenure required not only laws to do so. It
also needed a population to carry out and apply a new of permanent land tenure. Put
simply, Indigenous dispossession and expropriation required settlers and private property.
In contrast to Indigenous occupancy rights, settlers could privately own land in
perpetuity. Private ownership or fee simple, under US law, is seen as the highest possible
form of ownership, while Indigenous occupancy is seen as a temporary condition.
Likewise, Indigenous sovereignty is an inconvenient sovereignty that would eventually
be extinguished or too severely weakened to continue. Collective Indigenous ownership
and use could be alienated and dissolved for private ownership, but not the other way
around. Indigenous peoples could give up their land but they could not acquire more or
expand their form of collective ownership. Fundamentally, the two systems of land tenure
— collective Indigenous use and private settler ownership — could not overlap. Land,
according to this logic, cannot be shared. Put another way, the confinement and removal
of Indigenous peoples to reservations was at its core racial segregation. It was believed
that settler and Native land tenure were so irreconcilable that separation was the only way
to ensure the supremacy of private property over collective ownership. In this sense,
Indigenous peoples were the original “Red Scare.” Or as, Lenape scholar Joanne Barker
puts it, moving the “Indian” from the realm of the foreign to a “domestic dependent”
erases the sovereign and ensures “the racialization of the ‘Indian.’”45 The “Indian” moves
from an external, foreign problem to an internal, domestic “racial” problem. To make the
“Indian” a race is to deny Indigenous sovereignty and to make Indigenous peoples into a
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domestic population to be managed, excluded, or included within a settler nation.
Treaties were indeed international agreements, but their intent was to limit and diminish
Indigenous political authority not expand it. For example, the US was removing
southeastern Indigenous nations (who it had previous treaties with) while it was making
treaties with Plains Indigenous nations as if they were foreign, autonomous powers.
Territorial acquisition, if not immediate than eventual, was the primary motive for treaty
making not the recognition of Indigenous peoples as equal sovereigns.
It was from this belief of political superiority that the US sued the Oceti Sakowin
for peace. As a token of good will, the US abandoned several forts along the Bozeman
Trail, leading Red Cloud and his followers to set fire to the deserted buildings. The forts
on the Missouri River, however, remained untouched and became the new bases of
operations for corralling the Oceti Sakowin closer to the forts as agencies and away from
the Powder River country.46 The 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty established a 32-million-acre
“permanent reservation,” which encompassed the entirety of present-day west river South
Dakota. To appease those who refused agency life, a vast expanse of hunting grounds
was set aside at nearly the same acreage of the permanent reservation making the total
territory more than 70 million acres or about the size of the present-day state of Nevada.
Article 11 of the treaty, however, stipulated the Lakotas surrendered “all right to occupy
permanently the territory outside their reservation as herein defined,” but retained the
right to hunt in the Powder River country “so long as the buffalo may range thereon in
such numbers to justify the chase.”47 General William Tecumseh Sherman, a member of
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the peace commission, at first opposed this provision, fearing that sustained resistance
through buffalo hunting over a vast region would make it impossible to reign in the
militant divisions. Fellow peace commissioners, however, assured him the treaty’s clause
was “merely temporary,” because once the buffalo were vanquished so too would the
millions of acres of hunting territory.48
In 1903 Red Cloud recalled what Lakotas said to treaty commissioners regarding
the hunting lands, “We told them that the country of the buffalo was the country of the
Lakotas. We told them that the buffalo must have their country and the Lakotas must
have their buffalo.”49 The Lakotas didn’t believe the US had the authority to simply
“give” them back land that already rightfully belonged to them and their buffalo kin. Red
Cloud made clear that the 1868 Treaty was not just an agreement between two human
nations, but was also an agreement among the nonhuman ones as well — including, the
buffalo nations. That Lakota territory began and ended with the buffalo nations’ territory
was his interpretation. This understanding was not a “mystical” reading but a simple fact
of Lakota life — and, at this time, a fact linked to pure survival.
For example, the most significant figure in Oceti Sakowin history descended from
the Pte Oyate. Pte Hincala Ska Win, the White Calf Buffalo Woman, established the
basis of not only human customary and ceremonial laws, but also how Lakotas would
exist in correct relations to the Pte Oyate and the nonhuman world. This first compact
— or treaty — with the nonhuman world is recorded in the Sicangu historian Brown
Hat’s winter count. His earliest pictograph depicts the White Buffalo Calf Woman as a
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white buffalo arriving in the center of a camp circle in the first decade of the tenth
century. Above the white buffalo is the Calf Pipe, a yucca plant, and a cornstalk. To the
right, in English, Brown Hat lists the various animal nations the White Buffalo Calf
Woman brought into formal relations with the Oceti Sakowin: elk, deer, antelope,
buffalo, beaver, and wolves. According to this history, it was a woman who formalized
the first compact — the first treaty — with the buffalo nations and their human
relatives.50 To be a good relative is to honor that original instruction. Lakotas often
viewed treaties with the US and other nations as commitments not just to human relations
but also nonhuman relations. And such agreements were not the sole domain of men, as
was the tradition of white society. Most important, Pte means female buffalo, and the Pte
Oyate was alternatively known as “her nation.”51 When Red Cloud spoke of the buffalo
nations, the Pte Oyate, he spoke of their true leaders — the women not the bulls (men)
and the original covenant with the White Buffalo Calf Woman. Therefore, the future of
the Oceti Sakowin was bound to the future of the Pte Oyate and vice versa.
For its part, the military began to take seriously this vital connection with the
buffalo as sustaining continued Indigenous resistance. The frontier army’s operations
were as much about securing armed defeat as much as they were also about exterminating
Oceti Sakowin kin — the Pte Oyate. But punishing highly mobile Plains nations by
defeating them in conventional battles was near impossible. From 1865 to 1883, the
frontier army sanctioned the mass slaughter of buffalo to shatter the will to resist by
eliminating a primary food supply and a close relative. In one such mission in 1868,
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lieutenant colonel Luther P. Bradley sole task in Powder River country was to
exterminate buffalo herds as part of a total war campaign. According to Bradley, his
troops were “ordered to forks of the Republican [River] to make [a] permanent camp: to
kill all the buffalo we find, and drive the Arapahoes and Cheyennes south, and the Sioux
north.”52 Many frontier soldiers never engaged Plains nations in direct battle, but soldiers
and hunters often considered the wanton slaughter of buffalo as akin to killing Indians. In
1872 Russia’s Grand Duke Alexie Alexandrovich joined a buffalo hunt near Denver with
the frontier army under the command of lieutenant colonel George Armstrong Custer and
general Philip Sheridan. As they descended upon a herd, the hunters and soldiers acted as
if the buffalo slaughter was also a massacre of Indigenous peoples. A guide, Chalkley M.
Beeson, recounted a “battle” where hunters were called “infantry” and the buffalo were
called “redskins”: “Custer, who was in charge of the hunting party, stopped and said,
‘Boys, here’s a chance for a great victory over that bunch of redskins [on] the other side
of the hill. Major B., you will take charge of the right flank, I will attend to the left.
General Sheridan and the infantry will follow direct over the hill. Ready! Charge!’”53 The
hunters slaughtered hundreds that day and perhaps countless more in the days that
followed.
The extermination of the buffalo was incredibly effective and efficient. In two
decades soldiers and hunters had eradicated the remaining 10-15 million buffalo leaving
only several hundred survivors. Taking only the hides and leaving the rest of the animal
to rot, the rancid smell of decaying carcasses wafted over the Plains. Hunters often
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poisoned their kill. The strychnine-laced carcasses killed off starved scavengers — such
as bears, wolves, or coyotes and sometimes Native peoples — all obstacles for white
settlement. Chickasaw scholar Jodi Byrd argues that, as its organizing principle, US
empire orients itself against all those who can be made “Indian.”54 The extermination of
the buffalo shows that elimination is not a solely human — or anthropocentric — process
but also corresponds with the elimination of nonhumans. The buffalo nations were made
— or racialized as — “Indian” and therefore a threat to empire because they sustained the
Oceti Sakowin’s resistance. Indian and buffalo were inseparable. The Indian problem was
the buffalo problem. Both Indigenous and buffalo nations faced similar extermination
processes and were as much connected in death as they were in life. The destruction of
one required the destruction of the other. The survival of one depended on the survival of
the other. Taking the Northern Plains required the end of both. Put simply, the treaty
clause “so long as the buffalo may range” was warrant to kill millions of buffalo. Buffalo
killing literally translated into Indian killing and the taking of millions of acres of 1868
Treaty territory — and, therefore, a direct attack on Indigenous sovereignty.
Another contentious aspect of the 1868 Treaty was the granting of the right to
construct railroads through Oceti Sakowin territory. By the time the Northern Pacific
Railroad began building its line through the Yellowstone Valley connecting Duluth,
Minnesota to the Puget Sound, Red Cloud, Spotted Tail, and their followers had accepted
the terms of the peace treaty. Most took it to mean that if they refrained from attacking
the railroads, stage coaches, and overland emigrants, they would in turn not be attacked if
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they remained within the reservation boundaries. The hunting grounds remained open
and so they thought that they could go on living as they always had with little change.
But railroads threatened that provisional peace and the provisional space of the hunting
grounds. They provoked another fight and hardened the resolve of the remaining
militants to stay off the reservations. Tatanka Iyotake, Sitting Bull, a powerful political
leader of the Hunkpapas, refused the conditions of peace specifically over the question of
rail lines and began making war on the railroad surveyors as they trespassed into
Yellowstone territory. The military sent two expeditions of thousands of men in 1871 and
1873 to secure the passage of railroad engineers. But Sitting Bull and his followers
harassed the progress of the Northern Pacific halting its construction from crossing the
Missouri River at Bismarck. Although Sitting Bull’s campaign did prevent construction,
the added 1873 economic crisis further imperiled the Northern Pacific’s progress
westward. Nevertheless, the military now had a sizeable standing army at Fort Rice
downriver under the command of Custer, a less well-known veteran officer of the Civil
War who history would only be remembered because he was killed by the Lakota,
Cheyenne, and Arapaho alliance in 1876 at the Battle of Greasy Grass. Custer and his
men were stationed at the northern border of the “Great Sioux Reservation” to prevent the
Hunkpapas and Sihasapas from leaving the reservation, waging war on the railroad
surveys, and joining their off-reservation relatives in the West.55
Soon on- and off-reservation labels became associated with degrees of
criminality. Those “off the reservation” were considered outlaws, renegades, hostiles, and
criminals who were to be hunted down summarily shot, hanged, or imprisoned. Those
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“on the reservation” were considered “peaceful” and “friendlies” who were not to be
disturbed. Either way, soldiers and settlers could hardly distinguish between the two.
When it came to collective punishment, all were at fault.
Since 1865, transcontinental railroads began lurching from East to West. With the
Panic of 1873, US capitalists and politicians sought a new form of currency and new
national project that would pull the nation out of recession. Relief would come in the
form of gold, more railroads, and continuous westward expansion — in other words, the
taking of more Indigenous land and the making of more war against Indigenous peoples.
The discovery of gold in the Black Hills in 1874 triggered a massive push to quickly end
the Indian problem on the Northern Plains. From the military’s perspective, reformers
had failed to secure peace with the 1868 Treaty. Prior military campaigns in the West and
the South were also coming to a close. The wars of conquests against the Apaches,
Arapahos, Cheyennes, Comanches, Kiowas, and Modocs from 1869 to 1873 largely
ended. Political backing for Radical Reconstruction in the South lost political backing
from a growing conservatism in the North. The US began to withdrawing federal troops
leaving freed Blacks to fend for themselves against the growing discontent among the
white southern elites who were looking to violently re-capture political and economic
power. Facing the squeeze of economic recession, labor in the industrial East also began
agitating. As historian Richard Slotkin argues, depictions of Black lawlessness in the
South, relentless Indigenous criminality in the West, and growing labor militancy in the
East provided the moral justification for the seizure of the Black Hills as a way prioritize
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national economic development.56 To contain the “threat” on its Western frontier, in a
1871 Indian appropriations bill the US abolished treaty-making with Indigenous nations.
While treaty-making ended, treaties themselves were never abolished. The bill qualified
the end of treaty-making by stating that the it didn’t “invalidate or impair the obligation
of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or
tribe.”57 The US viewed its “internal” and “external” threats in similar terms. For its
failures to live up to the promises of Indigenous peace policies, Black freedom, and labor
rights, a nationalistic military campaign to seize the Black Hills and continue westward
expansion would provide a much-needed pressure valve to ease anxieties of social unrest
and economic uncertainty. The cards were falling into place. An order to the US military
went out to notify all the Lakotas and Dakotas to return to the reservation by January 31,
1876 or face military action. Because it was during winter, both the US military and the
Oceti Sakowin largely ignored the impractical command.
When the US deployed its western army in Spring 1876 to put down the
resistance once and for all, however, the majority of the Lakotas lived on reservations,
were horseless, unarmed, and starving. Regardless of this fact, there remained several
groups who refused reservation life. The Lakota, Cheyenne, and Arapaho alliance had
evaded army capture for several years but could not effectively stop the deluge of miners
trespassing into the Black Hills. Crazy Horse, no longer a military leader at this point, led
several small groups into the Black Hills, killing numerous white miners. But the
imposition of reservation borders combined with the cutting off of British-Canadian and
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US traders made ammunition scarce and sustained armed resistance increasingly
impossible to carryout.58 General Sheridan and brigadier general George Crook had
decided to stop evicting gold miners to make real what could only be imagined at this
point, the taking of the Black Hills, the settlement of treaty lands, and the final surrender
of the Oceti Sakowin. Allowing the trespass of settlers and miners was a clear violation
of the terms of the 1868 Treaty which forbade whites from entering the permanent
reservation encompassing the entirety of the Black Hills. A violation of a treaty, as an
international agreement, would have meant conditions revert back to the way they were
prior to the treaty. The Oceti Sakowin, at this point, could have suspended their
obligations — such as allowing the passage of settlers, roads, or railways, or the cession
of certain lands. Instead of curbing the criminal behavior of the white trespassers and
living up to their treaty obligations, the army mobilized to the enforce the “peace” of the
1868 Treaty and made war against the Cheyennes, Lakotas, and Arapahos who refused to
stay on the reservation.
On June 25, 1876, Custer and Brigadier General Marcus Reno led a group of 650
men against a camp of thousands of Lakotas, Cheyennes, and Arapahos. Among them
were Sitting Bull, Pizi (or Gall), Inkpaduta, Crazy Horse, Pretty Nose, Left Hand, Two
Moons, Wooden Leg, and many more from the heroic armed resisters of the Cheyennes,
Arapahos, Dakotas, and Lakotas. Custer led the first assault, which was supposed to be a
surprise attack meant to quickly overwhelm the large camp. Custer’s men were quickly
halted and forced to retreat uphill. Despite popular myths, Custer and his men never
mounted a brave last stand but were instead taken down as they ran away from the
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Indigenous warrior men and warrior women. For his courage, Custer was promoted to
the rank of general after his death.
Hunkpapa warrior woman Moving Robe Woman who fought against cavalrymen
later remembered that historic day. A young woman at the time, Moving Robe Woman
was harvesting tinpsila, or prairie turnips, when the cavalry stormed the camp. After
hearing her brother was killed in the initial attack, she recalled, “I ran to a nearby thicket
and got my black horse. I painted my face with crimson and braided my black hair. I was
mourning. I was a woman, but I was not afraid.”59 Indigenous warrior women among
Plains nations were common. In fact, according to Northern Cheyenne histories, Buffalo
Calf Trail Woman is credited for knocking Custer from his horse before he was killed.60
Indigenous women also knew what defeat meant — if they were not killed, their bodies
would be forced over to the desires of their captors. They fought back not because they
wanted to, but because they had to.
The defeat of Custer’s Seventh Calvary and the killing of 268 of his men was a
major victory. According to Moving Robe Woman, however, not everyone saw it that
way. None, she recalled, “staged a victory dance that night. They were mourning for their
own dead.”61 About four dozen were killed during the fight. From the start of the battle to
the end, Moving Robe Woman was in mourning for her brother and relatives. Many
popular accounts of the Battle of Greasy Grass and histories of the West over-romanticize
the battles of what became known as “the Great Sioux Wars.” Extreme violence and
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wanton slaughter is nothing to callously celebrate, as Moving Robe Woman reminds us.
Each victory against the invaders resulted in immeasurable casualties, if not at that
moment then later. Armed resistance was a calculated risk that was not carelessly
undertaken — it was not fatalistic. Like Moving Robe Woman’s account of Greasy
Grass, from the beginning of the first battles to their violent conclusions the Oceti
Sakowin was in constant mourning over the theft of their lives, their world, and so many
countless relatives. The profound courage of valiant armed resistance protected the
dignified life of one’s ancestors not only at that moment but also for the ancestors already
forthcoming. Armed Indigenous resistance has always been a future-oriented and lifeoriented project that deserves the utmost honor and celebration. It is because of armed
struggle that all has never been forever lost or stolen. It is because of this fearless struggle
that we remember.

Anti-colonialism and the Ghost Dance Prophecy
The whole world is coming.
A Nation is coming,
A Nation is coming.
The Eagle has brought the message to the Nation...
Over the whole earth they are coming.
The Buffalo are coming,
The Buffalo are coming.
— Maka Sitomaniya Olowan, a Lakota Ghost Dance Song, 189062
After Greasy Grass, the military sought retribution. Unable to sustain long,
drawn-out resistance, the Plains alliance dispersed and Sitting Bull and his followers,
including Inkpaduta, fled to Canada. Three years after the 1868 Treaty, Congress
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abolished treaty making with Indigenous nations. In May 1877, Crazy Horse
surrendered himself and his followers at the Red Cloud agency near Fort Robinson in
Nebraska. There he was imprisoned by the reservation authorities. On September 5, 1877,
Crazy Horse was led to Fort Robinson to be formally arrested on the charge he was
planning an uprising. While attempting to flee, one of the guards stabbed Crazy Horse in
the back with a bayonet. The military assassinated Crazy Horse at the age of thirty-seven.
In 1881 Sitting Bull finally surrendered himself and his followers, and was taken to Fort
Yates on the Missouri River at present-day Standing Rock. Organized armed struggle
against the US military had mostly ceased, but the spirit of Indigenous resistance had not.
The prisoner of war camps, or reservations, became ground-zero for the US’s renewed
assault and the battleground shifted. Christian missionaries, boarding schools, and
military discipline and punishment came to the reservations as the vanguards of white
civilization.
The design and development of the carceral reservation world was well under way
by the time Cheyennes, Lakotas, and Arapahos had made Custer and his Seventh Cavalry
famous by killing them. In 1876 Indian commissioner John Q. Smith envisioned US
Indian policy as having three central goals: the concentration of remaining Indigenous
peoples onto fewer reservations, the allotment of remaining lands, and the expansion of
US laws and courts over reservations.63 Although the number of reservations didn’t
decline, allotment combined with the increased reach of US laws over Indigenous
peoples were effective at disintegrating political and social structures and carving up the
remaining communally held lands. The fur trade may have introduced the capitalist
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market, but it never truly made the Oceti Sakowin individualistic in their way of life.
Communal land practices and social customs prevailed as they had before, even under the
long shadow cast by US colonialism. Military campaigns and genocidal massacres had
not accomplished their absolute purpose — complete extermination or crushing the will
to resist. Removal and confinement to reservations were taken as opportunities for final
conquest.
First came the assertion of US law. In 1881 an ongoing dispute between Spotted
Tail and Kangi Sunka, Crow Dog, on the Rosebud reservation led to Crow Dog
murdering Spotted Tail, a reservation leader and “agency chief.” After the murder, Crow
Dog made amends with Spotted Tail’s surviving family, paying restitution for the slain
relative according to customary law. Internal harmony was quickly and effectively
restored. Dissatisfied with the ability of Oceti Sakowin political authority to resolve their
own internal disputes, federal and territorial officials demanded Crow Dog’s arrest and
prosecution. With little legal authority to do so, the case wound up at the supreme court
where it was ruled federal courts had no jurisdiction on reservation lands. As a result,
Congress passed the 1885 Major Crimes Act that authorized federal jurisdiction over
major crimes committed in Indian Country — such as murder, larceny, rape arson, and
burglary. Congress used Crow Dog’s case as opportunity to extend plenary power — or
complete or absolute power — over Indigenous nations to further erode and define the
parameters of Indigenous sovereignty by asserting criminal jurisdiction.64
The creation of the modern day reservation system had a significant impact not
just on Indigenous societies but also on settler society. What were once military and
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trading forts either grew into white settlements or reservation agency towns. A new
spatial arrangement of apartheid formed between them, mediated by the militarized
function of both. The confinement of Native people to diminishing reservation lands
made it simpler for settlers to assume ownership over “unused” land. Among the most
highly-prized possessions were the gold-rich Black Hills. To secure title to the land,
Congress passed the 1877 Black Hills Act which stole the Black Hills from the Oceti
Sakowin and opened it to white settlement. A clause of the 1868 Treaty stipulated that
any future land cessions, including the Black Hills, must “be signed by three-fourths of
all the adult male” members. In a clear case of fraud and theft, the US was only able to
attain ten percent of the needed signatures to legally cede the Black Hills.65
Agency towns, which were often at military forts or near them, were established
to control and surveil the movements and the behaviors of Indigenous peoples on- and
off-reservation. Reservations became sites of social engineering to break communal
organization and enforce colonial rule through social control. In 1878, to administer law
and order the first reservation police forces were formed, drawing from Indigenous ranks
to enforce a new social order dictated by the federal agents and church officials. In 1883
the Bureau of Indian Affairs created the court of Indian offenses to compel “civilization.”
Punishable offenses included sun dancing, ceremonial dancing, customary giveaways,
owning guns or weapons, owning ponies, men wearing long hair, polygamy, large feasts
not organized by the church, Indigenous funerary rites, leaving the reservation, and
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honoring ceremonies. A violation brought starvation or imprisonment. These
“offenses,” also known as “the civilization regulations,” were enforced until their repeal
in 1935.66 Coercive force, through an armed body of the state, such as the police and the
courts, to control behavior was relatively unknown to the Oceti Sakowin. “No Lakota
chief,” writes Luther Standing Bear, “ever dreamed of using the power of a judge in
court, or a policeman on a street corner, for it was not a tenet of his society that one
individual should account to another for his conduct.”67
For the defiant political leadership, their children were taken from them and sent
to far-off boarding schools where many died. Although leaders such as Red Cloud and
Spotting Tail voluntarily sent their children to boarding schools, they protested the
military-like discipline and corporal punishment. The system, however, was as much
about taking the children hostage to use them as leverage to coerce the behavior of
reservation leadership. Richard Pratt, a former Indian fighter who marched under Custer
against the Oceti Sakowin, was the main architect for the modern off-reservation
boarding school system. The idea first came to him when in charge of Indigenous
prisoners of war at Fort Marion in Florida. Assigned to oversee the confinement of
Kiowa, Comanche, and Cheyenne inmates, Pratt experimented with assimilation through
education. To his military mind, the Indian war would no longer be waged on the
battlefield but in the classroom. Pratt’s vision won him the backing of Indian reformers
and in 1879 he founded the Carlisle boarding school in Pennsylvania.
The success of the Fort Marion experiment, however, could only be reproduced in
similar prison-like and militarized conditions. It was impossible to “recruit” and “retain”
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students without the use of force. Complete removal from their parents, it was believed,
was the only way to prevent relapse back to Indigenous ways. Taken and then returned to
their communities, the children were sometimes alienated by their parents and relatives
because they could not speak their languages or had no bonds to their kin. At Carlisle,
Indigenous students were subjected to a highly regimented routine. Although founded on
military principles of discipline and order, the boarding schools didn’t train Indigenous
students to fight. It taught them docility, compliance, and submission — the necessary
ingredients for indoctrinating US patriotism and citizenship. “The Indians are destined to
become absorbed into the national life,” one Indian commissioner advised in an 1889
memo entitled “Inculcation of Patriotism in Indian Schools,” “not as Indians, but as
Americans.”68
To many the US flag, which flew above the soldiers as they killed, raped, and
pillaged Indigenous peoples and lands, was a hated symbol of growing US authority. It
was one of the first means used to signify US supremacy at reservation headquarters.
When soldiers attempted to build the first flagpole to fly the “Stars and Stripes” at the
Red Cloud agency in 1874, outraged Oglalas took hatchets and chopped it down. The
troopers rebuilt the flagpole and proceeded to take a census of the reservation agency —
wielding two highly symbolic instruments of growing colonial rule: a flag and a census.69
With armed struggle mostly abandoned, Indigenous resistance changed from tactics of
armed struggle to a strategy of challenging the reservation system by continuing to refuse
to sell land or cooperate with reservation officials.
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Coming out of a five-year recession, from 1878 to 1887 the desire for cheap or
“free” Indigenous land in Dakota Territory infected white settlers like a fever. The decade
was known as the “Great Dakota Boom,” and the white population in the region nearly
doubled. Pressure increased to open more of the remaining 1868 Treaty lands. In 1887
Congress passed the Dawes Severalty Act, signaling a new assault on Lakota and Dakota
lands. Dawes sought to disintegrate collective Native identities and communal land
practices by allotting private plots to Native families and opening millions of acres of
“excess” land for white settlement. The Plains nations began organizing against the
Dawes Bill as soon as they learned of its dire consequences, and the Lakotas and Dakotas
came to a consensus that they would unconditionally refuse to sell the land or to accept
the terms of allotment. Achieving mass consensus and the consent of all divisions of the
western Lakotas and Dakotas — under the ever watchful eye of agency and church
officials and in conditions where most were half-starved — was a significant feat of
political mobilization and discipline. In 1888 Pratt led a commission to convince the
Lakotas to accept the terms of the Dawes Bill. While the US had not followed 1868
Treaty protocol for the Black Hills Act, this time the Pratt Commission, as it was known,
attempted to obtain the three-fourths male consent required to fractionate remaining
reservation lands and open up millions of acres for eventual settlement.
In one instance the Pratt Commission came to the Standing Rock reservation. All
the commissioners needed were either votes of “yes” or “no” to accept allotment or not.
Twenty-two million acres remained of the 1868 Treaty lands. If half were sold, the US
would sell land at $.50 an acre which would create a permanent fund of $1 million.
Earning a five percent interest per year, half would go towards education and agriculture,
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the other half would be payed to those who accepted allotments. Under the leadership
of Hunkpapa John Grass, the entire Standing Rock reservation held council to discuss the
conditions of the Dawes Bill. In all night meetings, the Standing Rock council calculated
the total distribution of money which would amount to an insulting payment of $1 per
year to each individual on the reservations. Grass had signed the 1876 Black Hills Act,
which ceded the Black Hills, having not understood the terms. For him, the Dawes Bill
was most likely an another elaborate scheme to swindle lands. For not addressing past
wrongs or ongoing depredations, Grass led Standing Rock’s opposition against allotment.
In a speech refusing to sign any paper — the red for “no” and the black for “yes”
— Grass said: “The whole nation here that are located on this reservation have come to
the conclusion that we will not sign that black paper. We say also that we will not sign
the red paper. You know exactly how many there are of us. I do not see what further
evidence you would want. Here is the whole nation, and we say: ‘We decline.’”70 The
Pratt Commission, unable to acquire minimal consent to even vote on the Dawes Bill at
Standing Rock, went to remaining reservations and faced similar, unified refusal. An
utter failure, a mere 120 signed.
The initial defeat of the Dawes Bill was a momentary victory. In 1889 general
George Crook, a veteran Indian fighter who coaxed Crazy Horse to surrender, led another
commission to secure “consent.” This time Crook lied about the bill saying it would
alleviate restrictions on dancing and generally improve reservation life without affecting
prior treaty agreements. When lies didn’t work, threats of violence and the outright taking
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of the land with or without Indigenous consent at first pressured many to sign. When
met with resistance, the Indian agent at Rosebud warned the opposition that their refusal
to sign would jeopardize not just their standing with the US but also their entire legacy:
“after you are dead and gone, and somebody reads… the names of the people who signed
this treaty, I think you will want your names to be read out.”71 At Pine Ridge Agency,
when Oglalas under the leadership of Red Cloud refused to sign, an Indian agent “read
the riot act” to Red Cloud and his followers to criminalize those who refused to sign
away land.72 Oglala leader Wasicu Tasunka, American Horse, had signed but regretted
his decision later when beef rations were drastically cut further imperiling an already
famished people. The commissioners previously stated the bill would not affect rations or
annuities. Cutting rations combined with a whole host of other grievances that went
unaddressed, according to American Horse, was like “cutting our heads off.”73 Among
the unfulfilled promises included the poor quality of annuity goods such as clothing and
farming equipment and continued unexplained deaths of children at off-reservation
boarding schools such as Carlisle.
Indeed, the new reservation political order had attempted to sever the heads of the
Oceti Sakowin by taking children, usurping land, killing the buffalo nations, and
diminishing political authority. With the necessary signatures to enforce allotment, the
“permanent reservation” guaranteed under the 1868 Treaty was now open for white
settlement. Crook’s commission left the western divisions of the Oceti Sakowin deeply
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divided and in disarray after it destroyed the unified effort to resist the sale and further
dissolution of remaining reservation lands. Now the Black Hills were taken and nine
million acres of land were opened for white settlement. What became known as the 1889
Sioux Agreement created the six modern reservation boundaries for the Pine Ridge,
Rosebud, Cheyenne River, Standing Rock, Lower Brule, and Crow Creek reservations.
During the late 1880s — disarmed, hungry, horseless, confined to concentration
camps, their land broken up and taken, the buffalo nearly exterminated, and their children
stolen from them — a new political movement spread like prairie fire across the West
promising Indigenous rebirth. Dead relatives and the buffalo nations, it was prophesied,
would once again walk the earth. Wovoka, a Paiute holy man, had a vision that assured
the restoration of Indigenous peoples to their rightful place in a world taken from them.
The Ghost Dance prophecy envisioned the end of the present world by wiping the earth
of settlers and the return of human and nonhuman relations vanquished by colonialism. It
was foretold, at some unspecified time in the near future, a cataclysmic event — such as
an earthquake or whirlwind — would wipe the US off the surface of the earth. Once the
land was cleansed, life afterwards would be disease- and colonialism-free and correct
relations among human and nonhuman worlds would be restored. Dakota anthropologist
Ella Deloria recorded the following description of the Ghost Dance from the viewpoint of
an unnamed Lakota man, who participated in the dance at the Pine Ridge agency as a
young runaway from boarding school:
The rumor got about: “The dead are to return. The buffalo are to return. The
Dakota people will get back their own way of life. The white people will soon go
away, and that will mean happier times for us once more!” That part about the
dead returning was what appealed to me…
Soon fifty of us, little boys about eight to ten, started out across country
over hills and valleys, running all night… There on Porcupine Creek thousands of
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Dakota people were in camp, all hurrying about very purposefully… A woman
quickly spied us and came weeping toward us. “These also shall take part,” she
was saying of us. So a man called out, “You runaway boys, come here.” They
stripped our ugly clothes from us and sent us inside [a purification lodge]. When
we were well purified, they sent us out the other end and placed sacred shirts on
us… Everyone wore one magpie and one eagle feather in his hair, but in our case
there was nothing to tie them to. The school had promptly ruined us by shaving
off our long hair till our scalps showed lighter than our faces!
The people, wearing the sacred shirts and feathers, now formed a ring…
All walked cautiously and in awe, feeling their dead were close at hand… The
leaders beat time and sang as the people danced going round to the left in a
sidewise step. They danced without rest, on and on, and they got out of breath but
still they kept going as long as possible. Occasionally someone thoroughly
exhausted and dizzy fell unconscious into the center and lay there “dead”… After
a while, many lay about in that condition. They were now “dead” and seeing their
dear ones. As each one came to, she, or he, slowly sat up and looked about,
bewildered, and then began wailing inconsolably…
The visions varied at the start, but they ended the same way, like a chorus
describing a great encampment of all the Dakotas who had ever died, where the
buffalo came eagerly to feed them, and there was no sorrow but only joy, where
relatives thronged out with happy laughter to greet the newcomer. That was the
best of all!
Waking up to the drab and wretched present after such a glowing vision, it
was little wonder that they walked as if their poor hearts would break in two with
disillusionment. But at least they had seen!… They preferred that to rest or food
or sleep. And so I suppose the authorities did think they were crazy — but they
weren’t. They were only terribly unhappy.74
In contrast to the “wretched present,” the visions were not escapist but rather part
of a growing anticolonial theory and movement. Participants were transported to a
forthcoming world where the old ways and dead relatives lived. It was a utopian dream
that briefly suspended the nightmare of the “wretched present” by folding the
remembered experience of a pre-colonial freedom into an anti-colonial future freedom.
Upon awakening, dancers were forced to relive the horrors of their current reality. Above
all, like all good revolutionary theory, the visions enabled the Lakotas to experience and
imagine something different, to understand that life need not always be this way.
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Annihilation of the present reality was the required act necessary to realize the
possibility of a past and future freedom. The Ghost Dance provided not only a criticism
of the “wretched present,” but also the necessary theory and vision to be struggled for
— total liberation. The true aspiration of the Ghost Dance anticipated nothing less than
the utter destruction of the colonial relation with the US. But it was not a cultural
revitalization movement, since the Ghost Dance was not internally-derived from Oceti
Sakowin culture. Cultural revitalization also fails to account for the Ghost Dance’s
oppositional spirit. Lakota Ghost Dancers, historian Jeffrey Ostler observes, “hoped to
see the present world destroyed and a new one come into being.”75 In this sense, the
Ghost Dance, although certainly religious in nature, was not a new religion because it
didn’t preach moral, social, or spiritual redemption or salvation — but rather the
unequivocal obliteration of this world and its replacement. The Ghost Dance arose from
the brutal reservation system and sought its final departure. Indigenous life could not be
remade inside reservations or within a colonial system but only through the complete
destruction of both.
The Ghost Dance’s revolutionary premises are often downplayed or misconstrued.
The most widely used text on the movement, The Ghost-Dance Religion and Wounded
Knee, written in 1896 by armchair ethnographer James Mooney, for instance, distorted
the meaning of the Ghost Dance. Pandering to the sympathies of a US public in an
attempt to make the Ghost Dance more palatable, Mooney used cultural relativism to
justify its existence. In his mind the movement had largely embraced elements of
Christianity and resembled modern Judeo-Christian religions because Ghost Dancers
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followed a Christ-like messianic figure, Wovoka. Mooney also claimed Lakota Ghost
Dancers didn’t properly adhere to Wovoka’s message of nonviolence and pacifism. The
Lakotas, according to Mooney, warped Wovoka’s message of pacifism into a “hostile
expression,” confirming the US military’s later characterization of the Lakota Ghost
Dancers as “militants.”76 But Wovoka taught peace not perpetual harmony with white
settlers, since his prophecy began with their end. Wovoka’s plea for peace was also not a
submission to Christian morality or pacifism but was instead pragmatic: under present
conditions armed Indigenous resistance was futile. The Ghost Dance’s mass appeal had
less in common with Christianity and more in common with previous prophet-inspired
pan-Indigenous movements. They include the 1760s Lenni Lenape prophet Neolin and
his Odawa follower Pontiac who fought British military occupation in the Great Lakes
region, the 1800s Shawnee prophet Tenskwatawa and his brother Tecumseh who fought
US occupation of the Ohio River Valley, the 1860s Wanapum prophet Smohalla and his
follower Nez Perce leader Chief Joseph, and the 1870s Pauite prophet Wodziwob,
Wovoka’s predecessor and the first practitioner of the Ghost Dance.77 Each of these
successive prophets built upon the messages and doctrines of the others by calling for
pan-Indigenous resistance — sometimes through armed struggle — to reject colonial
occupation. Each was an accumulation of historical experience united by a common
desire for Indigenous liberation.
The question of whether or not the Lakotas adhered to the Ghost Dance’s alleged
pacifism or nonviolent doctrine ignores central issues. Such questions, often devised by
colonizers, divide people fighting for survival into two different camps of “legitimate”
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nonviolent pacifists and “illegitimate” violent militants. The divisions cater more to the
feelings of settler society than they accurately portray the lived experiences of real
Indigenous peoples. The categories of “good Indians” versus “bad Indians” purposefully
create criminal elements within Indigenous nations and movements to obscure or hide US
colonialism’s own criminal enterprise. The Ghost Dance never intended to appeal to the
moral sensibilities of US colonizers, nor did its followers seek its recognition as a
“legitimate” religion equivalent to Christianity. It was the criminalization of all things
defying the civilizing mission, not just the dancers themselves, that led the military to
conclude that the dance was a “hostile expression.” Beyond this, dancing, specifically,
and practicing Indigenous lifeways, in general, were still criminal acts punishable by
imprisonment or the withholding rations. To reservation officials, it didn’t matter if the
dancers were militant or nonviolent — they were criminals regardless because they were
dancing. Therefore, Ghost Dancing was inherently an oppositional, political act.
Nearly a third of all Lakotas — about 4,000 – 5,000 — and many Dakotas
participated in the Ghost Dance, demonstrating its mass influence. As a resistance
movement, its tactics included: complete withdrawal from reservation life, opposition to
reservation authorities, the refusal to send children to school, the creation of resistance
camps in remote areas far removed the influence of the agency, the pilfering of annuity
distribution centers, the refusal to work, the destruction of agricultural equipment, the
refusal to speak English, the refusal to attend church, the refusal to attend agency and
council meetings, the refusal to be counted in censuses, the refusal to live on assigned
allotments, the refusal to obey “agency chiefs,” the refusal to cut one’s hair, the refusal to
quit dancing, the refusal to wear white clothing and attire, the refusal to use metal tools,
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and sometimes the pilfering of white settlers’ cattle and crops. In short, it posed a
serious challenge to the colonial order of things. At first Indian police were sent to the
suppress the dances, because they were illegal, but were met by armed guards willing to
defend the dancers. As a result of the strident refusal to quit dancing, some Indian police
simply resigned because they refused to kill their relatives or imprison them.78
The widespread appeal of the Ghost Dance as an anti-colonial movement was in
large part due to its main primary promoters and interlocutors — boarding schooleducated Indigenous students. Two of its primary Lakota visionaries, Mato Wanahtake,
Kicking Bear, and Tatanka Ptecela, Short Bull, used trains and writing to diffuse the
message of the Ghost to the Oceti Sakowin. Boarding school students who could read and
write, often in both English and Lakota, transcribed Kicking Bear’s and Short Bull’s
reports after they traveled by train to meet with Wovoka in Nevada. Ghost Dance
prophesies, prayers, and songs were also transcribed and mailed to the various
reservations where boarding school students would read them aloud to fellow Ghost
Dancers. The Ghost Dance would not have been so widespread had it not been for the
boarding school-educated, admits Mooney, “who conducted the sacred correspondence
for their friends at the different agencies, acted as interpreters for the delegates to the
messiah, and in various ways assumed the leadership and conduct of the dance.” Letters
conveying Ghost Dance songs and doctrines poured into Oceti Sakowin reservations
from Indigenous nations in Utah, Wyoming, Montana, and Oklahoma.79
When Ghost Dancing began among the Lakotas, it was reported as troubling and
unrelenting. The largest deployment of the military since the Civil War arrived on the
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Northern Plains to crush the movement. National Guard units from the surrounding
states were brought in as back up for the federal troops. The first target was Sitting Bull,
the last powerful leader who had never signed a treaty and still resisted the imposition of
reservation life. James McLaughlin, the Standing Rock agent, feared Sitting Bull and his
Ghost Dancers would leave the reservation. On December 15, 1890, under heavy
surveillance for his part in spreading the Ghost Dance, Indian police attempted to arrest
Sitting Bull. Roused from bed early that morning, Indian police dragged Sitting Bull from
his log cabin and shot him in the head. A brief firefight ensued, and Sitting Bull’s
followers killed six Indian police and the Indian police killed seven of his followers.
Following Sitting Bull’s assassination, military arrest warrants were issued for other
Ghost Dance leaders such as Mniconjou leader Hehaka Gleska, Spotted Elk. To diminish
his standing among his own people by mocking Spotted Elk, soldiers derisively called
him Si Tanka, or Big Foot, because he wore US government-issued shoes that were too
small for his feet. Fearing further reprisals, Sitting Bull’s followers joined with Spotted
Elk’s people at the Cheyenne River reservation. The Ghost Dancers then fled to turn
themselves in at Red Cloud’s agency in Pine Ridge where they were detained at
Wounded Knee Creek and surrounded by soldiers. The Seventh Cavalry, Custer’s old
regiment, took command of the camp and began to demand the group turnover all
weapons and surrender. Tipi-by-tipi raids were conducted. Anything that could be
construed as a weapon, such as hatchets and knives, was confiscated.
On the morning of December 29, 1890, Spotted Elk and all the camp leaders were
called to council with soldiers to turn in the last remaining guns. Hotchkiss guns were
strategically placed on the hillsides and trained at the mostly unarmed, starving, and
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surrendering Ghost Dancers. A scuffle broke out and a shot was fired. The Seventh
Cavalry massacred 270-300 Lakotas that day including Spotted Elk. More than two-thirds
among the slain were women and children. The Ghost Dancers were not passive victims,
however, and fought back against the soldiers and inflicting casualties. There is no doubt
had Spotted Elk’s followers not defended themselves the way they did more would have
been killed and others would not have been able to escape. In the course of several hours,
the Cavalry chased down and killed the fleeing Lakotas. When the soldiers administered
the killing blows, often by point blank execution, they were heard muttering, “Remember
Custer.”80
The military still refers to the massacre of half-starved and surrendering people as
a battle against armed Indigenous militants. Congress awarded twenty medals of honor to
the soldiers involved in the massacre. In retaliation for the unprovoked slaughter, many
sought revenge. The story of a young Sicangu Carlisle boarding school graduate who
returned to the reservation and joined the Ghost Dance movement is significant in this
regard. Tasunka, or Plenty Horses, was stripped of his language and culture at a crucial
moment in his childhood and returned to his family and community with nothing to offer.
“I found that the education I had received,” Plenty Horses recalled, “was of no benefit to
me. There was no chance to get employment, nothing for me to do whereby I could earn
my board and clothes, no opportunity to learn more and remain with the whites. It
disheartened me and I went back to live as I had before going to school.”81 His experience
was not exceptional. The civilization experiment failed. Growing his hair long and
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donning pre-boarding school Lakota clothing, Plenty Horses joined armed resisters in
the aftermath of the Wounded Knee massacre. Lieutenant Edward Casey went to meet
with the resistance camp that had holed up in the Badlands. Angry at what he had
experienced in boarding school, the starving conditions he returned to on the reservation,
and witnessing his people killed with impunity at Wounded Knee, Plenty Horses
positioned himself behind Casey as he approached and shot him in the back of the head.
Army officials charged Plenty Horses with murder, but he was later acquitted. Had he
been guilty of murder then so too were the soldiers who massacred his people at
Wounded Knee, the court reasoned. At trial, the court concluded that a state of war
existed, although not formally declared, so Plenty Horses was not at fault and neither
were the soldiers involved in the Wounded Knee massacre, thus suspending the criminal
act of genocidal murder.82

Beyond Historical Trauma
An undeclared endless war had created the conditions necessary for the massacre
at Wounded Knee. It was the justification for nearly a half a century of an oscillation
between US peace making and war making. War and peace often worked seamlessly
together making them nearly indistinguishable but nonetheless vital to the colonial
project. The war, however, had no clearly defined battlefield or a beginning or an end,
and was waged against the entirety of Indigenous life. Frederick Jackson Turner
famously declared 1890 as the final closing of the frontier. Others have called it the
inauguration of the so-called “American Century.” The historic landmark is indelibly
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marred by its genocidal origins at Wounded Knee. Yet, the Indian wars never stopped.
And dreams of freedom prophesied in the Ghost Dance have never been entirely crushed.
Wounded Knee was indeed pure horror. But reading the nineteenth century
experience through trauma — many have called it “historical trauma” — easily slips into
the thinking of Indigenous peoples solely as victims and objects of violence rather than as
historical actors. First, the adjective “historical” suggests a past trauma, an exceptional
trauma, a fundamental departure of the past from the present. There was no departure but
rather a continuation of colonial processes. Elimination tactics have changed from
outright massacre to other means, but elimination remains the active organizing principle
of settler colonialism. The long duration of trauma remains simply because colonialism
has not ended, gone away, or been overthrown. One cannot simply “heal” individually
from these experiences, especially if they live in a world still structured by Indigenous
elimination. For instance, Wounded Knee was not a stand-alone event, but rather a
cumulative event that condensed key elements of longer historical processes. Surely,
Wounded Knee came to inform other events that followed, but the colonial structure
remained and continued to wound, kill, and destroy.
Lastly, what sustained Indigenous peoples during this horrific time was the recent
memory of freedom, the visions enacting it, and the daring conspiracies to recapture it.
The Ghost Dance, for example, was not a monolithic movement but an accumulation of
prior anticolonial experiences, sentiments, and struggles. The Lakota Ghost Dance
adopted essential features of previous traditions of Indigenous resistance, while creating
new tactics and visions to address the present reality, and, consequently, projected
Indigenous liberation into the future. Trauma played a major role, but framing one’s
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historical and contemporary experience solely through the lens of injury narrows our
understanding of Indigenous history and liberation. If we reduce Indigenous peoples as
being perpetually wounded, we cannot possibly understand how they created kinship and
constantly recreated and kept intact families, communities, and governance structures as
fugitives and prisoners of a settler state and as conspirators against empire; how they
loved, cried, laughed, imagined, dreamed, and defended themselves; how they remain, to
this day, the first sovereigns of this land who still possess the oldest political authority. If
we read history solely through the lens of trauma, if traditions of Indigenous resistance
are our roadmap towards liberation, focusing solely on trauma narrows that vision of
freedom; and it prematurely aborts its realization as a future possibility.
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Chapter Four: The Flood
Even today advocates of an innocent U.S. history say to protesting Indians, “You
still exist, don’t you? You still have land, don’t you?” The suggestion is that if
there were crimes committed, they were just the unfortunate incidents of
economic development of a country… [T]he concept of ecocide, the intentional
destruction of the physical environment needed to sustain human health and life in
a given geographical region, has now been accepted in the international arena as
part of the analysis of the term genocide… This policy of deliberate destruction of
the environment and resources and the continuing theft of Indian lands, which is,
unlike the physical destruction endured by the people, well documented and
available to researchers, could well become a persuasive feature in the definition
of historical genocide as it concerns native people.
—Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, Anti-Indianism in Modern America, 20011
It is the wish of our people that no more land be taken from us. With us, the point
is simple. When our land is gone, our way of life is gone, our tribes are destroyed.
The bottom lands the Corps of Engineers want to take are the very best on the
reservations. They are our heart lands. They can never be replaced. No similar
lands are for sale. We depend on land for our livelihood, it furnishes us our
income. To take our land is to take our homes and income, and a part of our
history and heritage.
— J. W. “Jiggs” Thompson, Chairman of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, 19592
Dramatic scenes of violence and heroic resistance of the nineteenth century
capture the popular imagination, freezing Natives in the past and making them unreal in
the present. The problem is also true for twentieth century Indigenous life, which has
been until recently relatively understudied and underappreciated. In this century,
spectacular armed struggle would not come again until the 1970s. Between the Wounded
Knees (the massacre in 1890 and the armed takeover in 1973), the struggle for land, life,
and self-determination, however, relentlessly continued. Although largely ignored, the
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interlude between these two violent confrontations was by no means peaceful. Lack of
attention to this period is less a testament to the absence of Indigenous sovereignty
struggles. Settler society’s selective memory has more to do with its obsession with war.
Unlike dominant society which frequently chooses to ignore Indigenous peoples,
Indigenous peoples cannot and did not disengage from settler society. In fact, they
continued to vigorously confront it at all turns as they do today. Much was at stake and
much was lost during this time. Increasingly, the US used its powers of eminent domain
to seize Indigenous lands for large public works projects. For the Oceti Sakowin along
the Missouri, it was the construction large multipurpose, earthen-rolled dams for flood
control, reclamation, and irrigation. The massive flood control and irrigation projects
would make otherwise desert grasslands bloom, promoters promised. The Pick-Sloan
plan, as it became known, intersected with the so-called termination movement, which
sought to liquidate federally recognized Indigenous nations. Termination, in the words of
Edward Valandra, “made legal the overthrow of Native governments, the stealing of their
lands, and the extermination of Native Peoples and cultures.”3 In other words, it was not
simply regime change but the entire abolition of Indigenous self-government. In their
own ways, river development and termination promised to solve the Indian problem,
often working in tandem. During this era, treaty-breaking was done by statute rather than
by brute force.
In the Missouri River Basin, the Pick-Sloan Plan, a joint water development
project designed by the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation in
1944, destroyed more Indigenous lands than any other public works project in US history
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affecting twenty-three different reservation communities. The project, writes Standing
Rock activist and scholar Vine Deloria, Jr., “was without a doubt, the single most
destructive act ever perpetrated on any tribe by the United States.” 4 The project targeted
Oceti Sakowin lands, flooding over 202,000 acres of the Standing Rock, Cheyenne River,
Lower Brule, Crow Creek, and Yankton reservations. A third of the populations of each
were removed to marginal lands or were forced to leave the reservation entirely. In total,
the US took 550 square miles of Indigenous lands, an area half the size of Rhode Island.
D’Arcy McNickle, a Flathead scholar and Indian affairs employee at the time, offered
this bleak assessment of eminent domain as a devastatingly effective legal instrument for
dispossession:
The earlier procedure for quieting Indian title was the treaty process: when Indian
lands became desirable for settlement or for public purposes, a treaty, or a revised
treaty, was negotiated. The Indians always yielded, but at least a show of respect
for tribal sovereignty was maintained. Under the new procedure [of eminent
domain], the Indian tribe was put in the category of private land owner, against
whom the state could proceed; compensation in money was made the equivalent
of ethnic and cultural identity. The process, in time, can only lead to the
extinction of the Indian people as a separate and identifiable thread in American
Life.5
The difference between private and reservation lands, however, was that white farmers
whose lands were condemned could easily reproduce their businesses and lifestyles
elsewhere. For Indigenous peoples, their livelihoods were not reproducible elsewhere
simply because that elsewhere didn’t exist. Once taken or destroyed, the favorable river
environment could not be replaced.
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In the nineteenth century the US military was the primary vehicle for conquest
and expropriation by Indigenous massacre and imprisonment and the extermination of the
buffalo. In the twentieth century a civilian branch of the military, the Army Corps of
Engineers, would pick up where its predecessors left off. They would not need guns.
Pick-Sloan dams annihilated entire ways of life by attacking the very means of survival:
land and water. Many communities found refuge along the river and continued to live
with the land. Not a shot was fired, but Indigenous livelihoods were mowed down by
paper bills and flood waters. The Army Corps weaponized water to disrupt, remove, and
destroy Indigenous peoples’ ability to reproduce themselves along the life-giving
shorelines of the Missouri River. Water was life, and then water became death.
The dams were a cruel reward for those returning from service in the Second
World War. In every war from the first world war to the present, Indigenous peoples have
served and volunteered in high rates. The US military has purposely distorted Indigenous
warrior culture for its own ends, often enlisting Indigenous names and motifs such as the
“Lakota Helicopter” or the “Tomahawk Cruise Missile” for imperialist endeavors.
Natives have served not so much as “national minorities” but often as separate, sovereign
nations. During World War I, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, for example,
independently declared war on Germany in 1917, choosing to send their soldiers to fight
for their own nation. They did the same during World War II, independently declaring
war on the Axis Powers. Native military service had more to do with maintaining
Indigenous sovereignty in the beginning. Natives enlisted in the US military during the
First World War, fighting alongside an empire in which they were not citizens. Although
widely resisted, American Indian citizenship would not be granted until 1924.
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The Oceti Sakowin held similar views towards military service and maintained an
understanding with the US that military service was for the protection of their own
homelands. They understood their service would not require deployment overseas against
enemies named by US empire that didn’t directly threaten Indigenous livelihoods. “There
was an agreement between the [US] Government and the Indian people,” Lakota holy
man Fools Crow explained in 1978 about Lakotas’ volunteerism during World War I,
“that they will only fight within their own country, in defense. They send him overseas
which is contrary to the agreement that was made. It is something unusual for an Indian
to fight in a foreign country… [W]hen they come back they are not the same boys. They
drink. They destroy themselves.”6 When thousands returned home after the Second
World War, the enemy threatening their homelands was the very military they fought for.
The war was at home not overseas. For the Oceti Sakowin, the dams ruined more lives
and caused more destruction than the world wars. A country that demanded Natives
sacrifice their lives in war now demanded the sacrifice of their best lands and their
governments.
It was not so much about the amount of the land taken and destroyed as it was
about the worth of that land. Taken lands were irreplaceable. Nothing existed where
Native peoples could recreate their lifestyle by moving to a similar environment. The
choice to live near the Missouri River and its tributaries was practical. Abundant game,
wild fruits and vegetables, and drinkable water provided for human and nonhuman needs.
Since the reservation cattle boom in the early twentieth century, river bottomlands also
provided livestock shelter and prime ranchlands for the small-scale cattle enterprises. It
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was a mixed economy that was only possible with subsistence hunting, gathering, and
small-scale agriculture, since the small reservation cattle enterprises could not provide
year-round employment and did not benefit everyone. Virtually all reservation timber
was concentrated along shore lands, and provided the necessary materials for home
construction, shelter, and heating and cooking fuel. What could not be produced by the
selling of livestock was replaced with the harvesting of wild game, fruits, and vegetables
that flourished in the river valley. Others less fortunate avoided starvation in winter
months when employment was scarce through total dependence on “the free goods of
nature.” What little farming existed was subsistence and completely relied on the
abundance of the arable soil found almost entirely to the river valleys.
Indigenous peoples were close to nature, but not in the way most people like to
imagine about Indigenous peoples as a part of nature. The relationship to the land and the
river was not mystical or purely “spiritual.” Water was life in a concrete way. It was a
matter of life and death. It was material. It put food on the table. It provided safety,
security, community, shelter, homes, warmth, care, and livelihoods. It guaranteed the
survival and reproduction of Indigenous societies in a very real way. Nearly all of this
along with the history of the land was stolen and exterminated. Policy-makers, the Army
Corps, and the BIA well understood this sober reality. But it didn’t matter to them.
Indigenous life was seen as technical and logistical problem, like the river, that could be
managed, controlled, tamed, and rationally dealt with through industrial technology and
scientific administration.
Continued communal land practices and subsistence economies demonstrated the
failure of assimilation programs: complete dependency had not been accomplished by the
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Indian Bureau. In fact, the opposite could be said. Settlers had become dependent on
reservation economies and Indian land policy. The failure had to do with introduced land
practices that emphasized individualism and private land ownership. Many individual
families refused to become farmers and abandoned their allotments. Others tried farming
and failed. Very few prospered from reservation economies. All those that did benefit
either worked for the Indian Bureau or were white farmers who leased Indigenous lands
for pennies on the dollar or had purchased Indigenous land, taking it out of trust status
and putting it into private ownership. On some Lakota and Dakota reservations, whites
had gained ownership of 80 percent of the allotments. The result was a “checkerboard” of
ownership between land held in trust by tribal members and land held in fee patents by
whites. Combined with an heirship system that fractionated allotted reservation lands that
sometimes resulted in thousands of individuals owning a single plot of land, individual
land tenure eroded reservations lands and made it impossible to consolidate Indigenous
landholdings.7 In more ways than one, white farmers and ranchers had become dependent
on reservation economies by leasing and buying cheap Indigenous land — a dependency
that continues relatively to the same degree nearly a century later.
Indigenous removal and territorial dispossession are often placed safely in the
distant past. The Pick-Sloan dams demonstrate the near-present and ongoing legacy of
Indigenous removal, land dispossession, and expropriation. Nineteenth century wars of
extermination hardly ended in the twentieth century. Only the tactics changed.
Indigenous elimination took new shape in the form of large-scale infrastructure projects,
such as massive earthen-rolled dams. The entry points for early US colonization began at
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the Missouri River with the advent of the fur trade. It expanded into full-scale wars and
eventual Indigenous confinement to reservations to make white settlement easier. To
achieve ongoing accumulation of Indigenous lands and resources required relaunching
strategies that targeted Indigenous political authority and subsistence economies. As it
had in the nineteenth century, the Oceti Sakowin’s authority resided in its continued
ability to sustain and reproduce itself upon the land. Indigenous life and political
authority once again grounded itself in the land and water. The erosion of this mostly
subsistence way of life severely weakened Indigenous peoples’ ability to successfully
resist further encroachment. Once Indigenous life flourished in the buffalo hunt, it now
flourished in the fertile river bottomlands through hunting, gathering, cattle ranching, and
small-scale agriculture.
These land-based practices were what Yellowknives Dene scholar Glen Coulthard
describes as a “grounded normativity,” a “place-based foundation of Indigenous
decolonial thought and practice” that is necessary to understand how Indigenous peoples
not only respond to dispossession, but also attend to the necessity of maintaining ethical
relationships between human and nonhuman worlds.8 Coulthard calls this a “mode of
life” that re-centers relationships to land as a form of Indigenous “culture.” According to
this view, Indigenous culture is “the interconnected social totality of [a] distinct mode of
life encompassing the economic, political, spiritual, and social” that is crucial for
appreciating how land or nature’s value is fundamentally altered through the forceful and
coercive transition from subsistence economies to capitalist economies.9 The Pick-Sloan
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Plan destroyed the very root of the Oceti Sakowin’s grounded normativity, the very
foundation of their sovereignty and political autonomy — Mni Sose, the Missouri River.
Before reservations, nearness to the Missouri determined degrees of interaction
with, and the negative influence of, settlers, traders, Indian agents, and soldiers at the
river forts. The farther west Indigenous peoples lived away from the Missouri, the greater
degree of autonomy and self-determination they exercised and the easier it was to resist
and escape the catastrophic effects of invasion. Now confined to reservations and with
many town sites (former military and trade forts) concentrated on the Missouri’s shores,
proximity to the river increased the ability of Indigenous societies to recreate life and
survive in its bounty. A century before the river had become a source of death because it
carried devastating agents of change, and it once again, for more than half a century,
became a source of life and the basis to successfully contest white settlement. The dams
deracinated — violently uprooted — Indigenous peoples from the river lands. Breaking
dependence on the land became the necessary step to secure the taking of the river, much
like how exterminating the buffalo was required to crush protracted, armed Indigenous
resistance. Once killing nonhumans, such as the buffalo, meant killing Indigenous
peoples. Now destroying a river, its shorelines, and the nonhuman life it cradled meant
destroying Indigenous peoples — and the perpetrators were the same cast of characters,
the US and its military.
The common understanding of the Pick-Sloan project was that it was triggered by
massive flooding in 1943 and imposed from above by powerful tyrannical government
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agencies such as the Army Corps.10 Floods certainly quickened the resolve to pass water
development legislation through Congress. But the origins for these large-scale
infrastructure projects were more unassuming and were well in the works decades before
1943. At the grassroots level, white community organizations in the Missouri River
corridor agitated for river development and so too did states and federal agencies.
Consensus centered on the damming of the river for flood control, hydroelectricity, and
irrigation.11 The catastrophic impact on Indigenous communities was an afterthought — if
it was considered at all.
The framework of settler colonialism is necessary for understanding water
politics. Land plus water are the fundamental elements of agrarian life, the distinct
character of plains settlement in the Missouri Basin. In this formula, water development
for irrigation is necessary for settler life. If we take the axiom Patrick Wolfe spells out for
settler colonialism — “Land is life — or, at least land is necessary for life,” it could
equally be said, “water is life” and “water is necessary for life.”12 Territory is settler
colonialism’s primary component. Territory is the spatial expression of sovereignty,
which not only includes the control of land and its population but also water, such as
rivers and aquifers. The power of a sovereign derives from the capacity to control a
specific geography and its population. Likewise, the control of water is an expression of
sovereignty. From this perspective, agriculture as a mode of production personifies settler
colonialism: it’s sedentary and mostly permanent; it reproduces itself; it always needs
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more land and water; as it expands, it eats away at Indigenous territory destroying fauna
and flora, thereby curbing or annihilating Indigenous subsistence economies’ ability to
reproduce themselves over time. This is not to say Indigenous peoples were not
pastoralists, farmers, or ranchers. By the time the Pick-Sloan Plan was proposed,
Missouri River Indigenous nations had developed successful cattle ranching enterprises
and small scale agricultural projects. With this strong economic base grounded in the
land, which was not solely based on the profit motive but rather reflected communal
practices, Indigenous nations could effectively resist and challenge the further
diminishment of their reservation lands. Such economies were only possible because of
their proximity to the river. Like a good relative, Mni Sose, the Missouri River, took care
of its relatives and provided for them the means to contest attempts to remove
communities and take lands. The Pick-Sloan Plan, however, had not selected prime
Indigenous lands to hand them over to white farmers and ranchers. The value of
Indigenous lands and lives was their inherent disposability. Indigenous land was needed
— mostly, to be wasted, to put water on top of it. The massive reservoirs that trapped
water behind the dams would be used for recreation and irrigation projects for the benefit
of settlers.
Severely weakened by the attack on the material and economic base of Indigenous
authority, paper legislation from Congress attacked its political structure. After World
War II, the US sought to reverse previous policies of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA) through federal termination. The IRA did three important things. First, it formally
overturned the catastrophic allotment policy, ending near half a century of the alienation
of tens of millions of acres of reservation land by returning surplus lands. Second, it
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ended the draconian prohibition on dancing, improved Indigenous freedom of religion
and speech, created a relatively more reasonable reservation criminal justice system, and
provided moneys for land reacquisition and economic development. Lastly, it imposed
Western style governance through a BIA model constitution. The last point was the most
contentious. While Indigenous peoples desired increased political autonomy, they didn’t
want to replace existing governance that was based on consensus and kinship. It was also
feared the competitive Western-style electoral system could also further intensify
political factionalism. It could create another class of reservation elites whose allegiance
lay not with community councils but with an external authority, the US, and whose
political power was kept in check by the BIA and the Department of Interior. As part of
the New Deal to pull the US out of the Depression, Vine Deloria, Jr., commented, “While
the rest of America suffered from the temporary deprivation of its luxuries, Indian people
had a period of prosperity.” Cattle programs prospered. Temporary employment was
available through Civilian Conservation Corps. Through New Deal programs, including
the IRA, the Oceti Sakowin, Deloria observes, “had climbed from absolute deprivation to
mere poverty, and this was the best time the reservation had.”13
Despite the IRA’s grand intentions by its primary architect, commissioner of
Indian affairs John Collier, it didn’t address outstanding treaty and land claims. But its
design was not to increase national independence or Indigenous sovereignty. The IRA
came out the New Deal era. Rather than narrow the focus of its design as part of US
national history, however, Collier saw it as part of a global design of colonial
administration. He described Indigenous peoples as the US “oldest ‘colonial’ problem”
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and saw the IRA as applying “indirect administration” to manage that problem, not as
external to US empire but as internal to it. Collier drew inspiration Lord Lugord’s model
for British colonial administration, which was designed to work against fostering national
independence among the colonized by forever suspending it. In 1947 Collier compared
the US’s colonial administration of Indigenous peoples as similar to its imperial
annexation and colonial management of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Alaska, the
Pacific Islands, the Panama Canal, and the Virgin Islands.14 National independence for
colonized peoples was never the goal for US imperial endeavors, so why would
Indigenous peoples be any different? This was an era when European colonial authorities
were experimenting with indirect and delegated governance to quell the colonial world’s
clamoring for national independence and self-determination. Indigenous peoples were no
exception. The IRA was a New Deal program, but it was also part of global processes.
Too often do we regard Indian policy as domestic policy. Typically, Indigenous history is
viewed as a subfield of US history. This approach fails to take seriously Natives as
colonized peoples and part of a global order. It naturalizes a colonization process
whereby Indian affairs were removed from the realm of international relations — from
treaty-making and diplomacy — and relegated to domestic, territorial rule, a process we
should be critically analyzing and challenging rather than reproducing.
With all its flaws, the IRA enshrined certain principles of self-government for
Indigenous peoples and provided them with a formally recognized government structure.
Although not all reservations accepted the IRA model constitutions, those that did
possessed a distinct advantage in negotiating with the US over the taking of lands for the
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Pick-Sloan Plan. For example, the Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, Lower Brule, and
Crow Creek reservations created IRA tribal councils. The Yankton reservation adopted
the IRA but never formally adopted a model constitution or tribal council. For the
construction of Fort Randall Dam, the Army Corps condemned 2,851 acres of Yankton
lands. With no formal council or government, the Yankton reservation could not muster a
unified response. The Army Corps completely bypassed the required consent of the
Yankton reservation and its trustee, the secretary of the interior, and proceeded to seize
Native property by right of eminent domain. Yankton reservation members had little to
no recourse. In the end, while IRA governments were deeply flawed, without them the
Oceti Sakowin would not have been able to negotiate damages and ultimately resist
termination.

Not Without Consent
By 1910 the state of South Dakota, barely two decades old, was at the forefront of
the movement to develop the Upper Missouri. Other states such as Montana and North
Dakota had their own plans, but none compared to the scale and organization of South
Dakota. Early attempts had failed to garner federal support especially from the US Army
Corps of Engineers who had final say over any river improvement projects. In 1924 the
state designated Big Bend, the largest ox bow bend on the Missouri, as a potential site for
the construction of a hydroelectric plant. A large multipurpose dam, according to this
plan, promised cheap electricity and irrigation for the exclusive benefit of the nearby
white-dominated border towns of Pierre, Winner, Chamberlain, White River, Mitchell,
Huron, Redfield, and Murdo. Ignored were the very people most impacted: the Lower
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Brule and Crow Creek reservations. Although the dam would be constructed on their
lands and directly affected their water rights, both Indigenous nations were not consulted
and were entirely disregarded during the initial planning of the project. South Dakota’s
river development projects failed to gain the necessary federal support, so the Upper
Missouri Valley Development Association formed in the spring of 1933 to further states’
interests in river development at the same site, among others.15 Its most zealous promoter
and de facto leader was M. Q. Sharpe, who soon became South Dakota governor and
would later be appointed the Lower Brule and Crow Creek attorneys to represent them
during the Pick-Sloan negotiations for taking lands and Indigenous removal.
The Big Bend site was just miles south from where the Lakotas first discovered
the Lewis and Clark expedition in 1804 attempting to trespass through their territory
unnoticed. So too did South Dakota politicians and boosters promoting river development
attempt to bypass the scrutiny of the Oceti Sakowin. Like the expedition, the plan was
soon discovered. On May 16, 1937, Lower Brule Tribal Chairman Ruben Estes wrote to
South Dakotan Republican Congressman Francis Case showing support for a
hydroelectric plant at Big Bend that could potentially provide “labor and relief” and
electricity to the Lower Brule town site. Estes also expressed profound concern at being
excluded from the development of Lower Brule lands and water without their input.
“[W]e can do our own business under the leadership of the Tribal Council,” Estes
reminded Case. Estes invoked the new powers Lower Brule was willing to exercise under
the IRA, challenging the legality of a state-initiated project on tribal lands without their
consent. Ultimately, Estes questioned if the state or the federal government had the right
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to develop water within reservation boundaries “without the consent of the people” of
Lower Brule and Crow Creek, or perhaps any Indigenous nation living on the river.16
By 1935 the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe adopted the IRA, becoming the first tribe to
do so from the Oceti Sakowin and the second in the US.17 The urgency of embracing
reorganization was not an acquiescence to a superior mode of governance to overtake
prior forms of political organization, which until then had largely been organized in
councils based on kinship. Instead, the Lower Brule implemented the IRA for pragmatic
reasons: to counter attempts by state and federal agencies to lay claim to and develop the
Missouri River that would disproportionately affect their lands.18 Without an IRA
council, the Lower Brule had little power to halt river development, to apply for federal
loans, or to employ legal counsel to defend its lands. In the first instance, the Lower
Brule did not support the development of the river without their consent. But they did
support plans in which they could determine what that development would like and to
what extent it would provide much needed relief and employment during the Great
Depression.
On June 1, 1937, Case responded to Estes agreeing that the Big Bend site “is right
there in your reservation and you are entitled to first consideration.”19 Lower Brule
followed suit, passing a resolution seeking federal loans from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) to develop a small-scale hydro-plant. While the tribe had planned a smaller
project for the immediate benefit of their community, Case had bigger ideas, in which the
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Indigenous communities were not considered or were minor players. Case claimed that
the Big Bend site “could mean much to national defense, to Indian rehabilitation and to
the general welfare of central South Dakota.”20 From 1937 to 1940 the Lower Brule
requested approval for developing the site, but the BIA and the Army Corps both denied
the requests for different, but important, reasons. The Secretary of the Interior Harold
Ickes favored the plan as a BIA- and Interior-led project to increase the department’s
influence and control in the region and over river management.21 The Army Corps,
however, rejected both the BIA and Lower Brule proposals, basing their decision on a
“cost-to-benefit” analysis and the simple fact that they didn’t want to relinquish any
authority to tribes or the federal government.22 On the surface, it may have seemed like
bureaucratic conflict or a lack of political will. What South Dakota, the Army Corps, and
BIA agreed on, however, was that river development would happen with or without
Indigenous consent — and such negligence would have dire consequences.
Lower Brule’s initial opposition to arbitrary state and federal interference with
their water rights was not historically exceptional. In the 1908 Winters decision, the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Fort Belknap Tribe’s claim to water rights over a
white farmer’s effort to control and alter the flow of the Milk River, a tributary to the
Missouri River in Montana. The Court ruled that even if Fort Belknap had given up
claims to former lands in exchange for lands that were arid and without irrigation —
which “was adequate for the habits and wants of a nomadic uncivilized people” — that
those lands were inconsistent with the federal government’s desire to have Natives
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“change those habits and become a pastoral and civilized people.”23 According to this
view, Indigenous peoples retained quantifiable water rights if and only when the water
was used in accordance with the civilizing mission of the federal government. The
decision would become known as the Winters Doctrine. The doctrine holds that however
diminished current reservation boundaries may be, tribes retain senior, reserved rights to
water flowing through the originally defined boundaries established by treaty, statute, or
executive order.24
Neither the Lower Brule or any Indigenous nation challenging river development
ever invoked the Winters Doctrine. Nevertheless, they still possessed the power to do so.
The doctrine’s intended application, however, illustrates limitations to Indigenous water
rights under settler law. The Court employed the language of civilization to determine the
extent of Indigenous water rights by privileging usage. The more an Indigenous
community used the water for “civilized” means, such as agriculture, the more rights they
retained; the less they used the less they retained. In this sense, Indigenous water rights
are to an extent about quantifying degrees of “civilization.” Had the doctrine been
invoked, the Lower Brule would have had to prove that use of the water would be
towards “civilized” ends, such electricity or irrigation — which it did. Altering or
disrupting the flow of the river by state or federal agency for any reason without the
consent of the tribes, such as the construction of dams, violates the spirit of the Winters
Doctrine.
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For Dakotas and Lakotas, water rights are defined by treaty. For example, Article
2 of 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty delineated the eastern boundary of “Sioux territory” as
beginning at the “low-water mark” of the east bank of the Missouri River. In contrast, the
IRA constitutions for the Cheyenne River, Standing Rock, and Lower Brule reservations
delineated reservation boundaries according to the 1889 Sioux Agreement. The
Agreement divided west river tribes into five distinct reservations (Pine Ridge, Rosebud,
Cheyenne River, Lower Brule, and Standing Rock) and defined the eastern boundary of
the three reservations bordering the river (Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, and Lower
Brule) as beginning at “the center of the main channel of the Missouri River.” Regardless
of the 1889 Agreement’s diminishment of reservation lands, all these reservations and the
Oceti Sakowin still possess powers under the Winters Doctrine to the Missouri River
according to the original 1868 Treaty boundaries as long the use of that water is used in a
“civilized” manner.
The Winters rights are effective on the date reservations are created by federal
authority and are considered unquantifiable or, according to the court decision,
“uncircumscribed,” to allow for the perpetual benefit and use for a permanent Indigenous
homeland. According to Diné scholar Melanie K. Yazzie in her analysis of 2012 NavajoHopi Little Colorado water settlement, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
described this “uncircumscribed” quality to mean a “minimal need” required by the
reservation. In other words, Indigenous nations are only entitled to water they can use for
“civilized” purposes. Those purposes are quantified — or, put another way, Indigenous
sovereignty is quantified according to water usage and degrees of “civilized” usage.
Anything falling outside these qualifications is considered surplus, unused, or wasted.
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The rest can be quantified and siphoned away to meet the need on non-Native interests,
primarily for private enterprises. After each party quantifies their needs, water that flows
through reservation or treaty lands is then, by no small feat of the imagination, not
entirely “owned” by Indigenous nations. The result is that Indigenous nations can only
use a restricted amount — in some instances, a fraction of a percentage — of the water
flowing through their territory.
Settler agricultural interests in water, because they are so great and insatiable,
always outweigh the bare survival of Indigenous peoples. Pick-Sloan’s massive irrigation
projects, for instance, quite literally meant snatching the food from the mouths of
Indigenous peoples. Indigenous sovereignty is not an abstract thing. It could literally be
felt through the hunger in one’s stomach, as was the case for the Oceti Sakowin who had
their most productive lands taken. In this scenario Indigenous sovereignty can be
calculated according to water rights, and, according to Yazzie, face “unlimited
limitations” in federal courts.25 That is, settler law has never expanded the material basis
of Indigenous sovereignty — land and water; it can only erode Indigenous sovereignty
and place upon it endless restrictions. When it comes to water rights and the Winters
Doctrine, it is not just the legal character of “Indians” that is defined, “settlers,” too, with
or without their input, become legal subjects with invested interests in the taking of
Indigenous water. Put differently, in cases where Indigenous peoples possess water rights
according to federal statute, executive order, or treaty, settler communities are dependent
on the diminishment of those rights to fulfill their needs with or without Indigenous
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consent. Indigenous water rights are calculated according to settler needs first and
foremost.
Most likely fearing the diminishment of their water rights and sovereignty, to date
no reservation affected by the Pick-Sloan Plan has invoked the Winters Doctrine, but
nevertheless they still retain the right to do so and senior reserved water rights according
to treaty.26 The 1944 Flood Control Act, which authorized the Pick-Sloan Plan,
authorized the Army Corps to construct dams — not to expunge Indigenous jurisdiction,
treaty rights, or water rights. In less than precise language, Section 4 of the Act opened
the river for “public use” and “recreational purposes.” It didn’t strip Crow Creek, Lower
Brule, Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, Yankton, Fort Berthold, or any Indigenous
nation, for that matter, of their political authority over their river. Regardless, the Army
Corps condemned reservation lands under eminent domain and Congress awarded
compensation to the affected reservations. Neither the Flood Control Act — which took
the land — nor the congressional acts addressing damages — which rewarded
compensation for taking the land — explicitly extinguished Indigenous jurisdiction; and
neither authorized or provided any compensation for the Army Corps’ taking the
Missouri River itself. Compensation was only provided for taking the land and not the
water. Since then, the Oceti Sakowin has contended the Missouri River and its shoreline
were never legally ceded and, according to statute, they are right. The Army Corps’
altering the flow of the river by damming it directly violates the Winters Doctrine and the
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1868 Fort Laramie Treaty.27 Regardless of treaty rights and sheer legality, the Army
Corps proceeded anyway.
The construction of the Fort Peck Dam on the Missouri River in Montana in 1933
also set certain precedents for how the Army Corps would ignore Indigenous
communities, treaties, and water rights. After destructive floods in 1927, the Army Corps
conducted an exhaustive four-year hydrological study on the Missouri River. The
findings were published in what was called the 308 Report, which became the go-to
manual for all future developments in the basin including the 1944 Pick-Sloan Plan. The
report also designated Fort Peck (not to be confused with the Fort Peck Indian
reservation) as the best site for a massive reservoir. The project fell in line with New Deal
labor relief and massive public work projects, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt
quickly authorized the Fort Peck Dam under the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act.
The Army Corps built what was at the time of its construction the largest dam on earth
and provided much needed employment for about 10,000 workers. Regional histories
celebrate the dam as an historic engineering masterpiece, and it is considered
instrumental in pulling Montana and the region out of the depression. The successes of
the Fort Peck Dam secured Army Corps control in planning and constructing future
massive multipurpose dams on the main stem of the Missouri and, according to historian
Michael Lawson, “greatly expanded its powers and functions beyond its constitutional
limits.”28
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While the dam’s history is well-publicized and well-remembered as an economic
boon and engineering marvel, missing from these popular accounts is the largely untold
and undocumented history of the removal of 350 Nakota, Dakota, and Assiniboine
families on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation and the flooding of previous Indian Affairs
irrigation projects to benefit Native farmers.29 The Fort Peck project paved the way for
the 1944 Pick-Sloan Plan and Flood Control Act, and a similar process would repeat
itself: postwar employment and river development projects would come primarily at the
sacrifice of Indigenous lives and lands.
The undercurrents of the Pick-Sloan Plan originated from the US’s centralization
of federal power to imagine and enact theories of space through land policy. The practice
began as early as the 1785 Land Ordinance and continued on into the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries as federal authorities worked to know, map, reorganize, and
manage land as territory. Water management was vital to these policies. Westward
expansion and the taking of Indigenous lands confronted the problem of creating
irrigation systems to make possible settler life in arid environments. After removing
Indigenous peoples, the first task was to induce colonization. Federal policies such as the
1862 Homestead Act encouraged agricultural settlement on arid western lands unsuited
for settler farming techniques developed in the East. Pushed by the railroad lobby to spur
settlement and therefore the need for railroads to transport agricultural goods, the 1877
Desert Land Act amended the Homestead Act and provided federal money for western
irrigation projects. The Northern Pacific Railroad, for example, also opened colonization
offices in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and England to entice European
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immigrants with cheap transportation and land deals to settle the Northern Plains and,
therefore, to create a demand for railroad transportation.30 Conservation policy,
influenced by President Theodore Roosevelt at the turn of the century, led to the creation
of the creation of the Bureau of Reclamation in 1902 to provide for the irrigation of arid
lands in the West. Land policy was the legal justification for the sometimes unwilling
shock troops of colonization — white settlers. Settlement and settlers literally made
“legal” and operational contemporary water law that depends so heavily on the theft of
Indigenous water.
“Public land” for “public good” was a highly subsidized federal endeavor for
private enterprise, racial exclusion, and Indigenous elimination. One and half million
white families gained title to 246 million acres of Indigenous lands — an area nearly the
size of California and Texas combined — under the Homestead Act with the added value
of federally subsidized irrigation. A quarter of adults alive today in the US are direct
descendants of those who profited from the Homestead Act’s legacy of exclusive,
racialized property ownership and economic mobility, a legacy that categorically
excluded Black, Indigenous, and other non-white peoples.31 Access to indigenous water
was crucial to securing the ownership of Indigenous lands and generating wealth from
these lands over generations. A single land policy has had a profound lasting political and
economic legacy. It informs present disparities that boil down to a single axiom: land is
wealth and water is wealth. The Pick-Sloan Plan is part and parcel of this massive settler
colonial agricultural machine that greases its gears with water. Today, agriculture in the
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western US accounts for three-quarters of all water usage.32 Water is settler colonialism’s
lifeblood, blood that has to be continually excised from Indigenous peoples.
To meet incessant demands for irrigation, the Pick-Sloan Plan was made to appear
as inevitable. But it was not a dream manifested in a dusty federal office-building in
Washington, D.C. to be handed down to unwitting agricultural communities. States, local
governments, the Army Corps, and other federal agencies all pushed for Missouri River
development in various ways, in spite of the consequences for Indigenous communities.
Although most of the power was concentrated in federal authorities by 1944, “grassroots”
organizations continued to play a significant role. By 1941, the Upper Missouri River
Valley Development Authority dissolved. In its place formed the Missouri River States
Committee, an organization of governors from Missouri Basin states. Rather telling, the
first states to enthusiastically join the committee (South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana,
Wyoming, and Nebraska) encompassed thirteen Indian reservations whose lands
immediately either included or bordered the Missouri River (the Omaha, Winnebago,
Santee, Rosebud, Ponca, Yankton, Rosebud, Lower Brule, Crow Creek, Cheyenne River,
Standing Rock, Fort Berthold, and Fort Peck reservations). Later, Missouri, Kansas, and
Iowa would join the committee. Representation ranged from federal, state, and municipal
agencies and officials to businesses and community organizations. The channelization of
the river benefited mostly downriver states. Upriver states would bear the heaviest burden
by taking on the majority of the dams and reservoirs. Since most of the land flooded was
Indigenous, this was a “burden” South Dakota and North Dakota politicians were willing
to assume. In 1951 during an appraisal hearing, Standing Rock Chairwoman Josephine
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Kelly challenged this aspect of the Pick-Sloan Plan and especially the Oahe Dam’s taking
of Standing Rock lands. Someone asked why the dams were not built in the lower basin
states, who benefitted the most from flood control. Kelly responded bluntly in front of
Army Corps and federal authorities, “Because there are no Indians down in that
country.”33
At no time did the state committee solicit the attendance or input of a single
Indigenous representative from the affected reservations. The committee would work
closely with the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps, in the words of its chair M.
Q. Sharpe, “for the general development [of the Missouri River] for the multiple purposes
of flood control, power development, irrigation, navigation, soil conservation, [and] wildlife and recreational development.” In othe words, “the Missouri River States Committee
had really become the general over-all supervising, coordinating, steering and
representative committee for the development of the Missouri River basin on a valleywide, over-all plan, representing all the sovereign states of the basin in their sovereign
status and in a semi-official way.”34 States’ interests didn’t just lay in river development.
They also proposed the total liquidation of Indigenous political authority as well.

The Destroyer of Nations
In anticipation for the need of postwar employment and coming at the heels of
massive flooding, in 1944 the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps, with the input
and guidance of the Missouri River states, consolidated their interests into a unified river
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basin program that became known as the Pick-Sloan Plan. The plan called for the
construction of five earthen rolled dams that would create massive reservoirs on the
river’s main stem. In South Dakota and North Dakota the dams flooded 611,642 acres of
land. Just over a half of this land — 309,584 acres in all — belonged to the Yankton,
Lower Brule, Crow Creek, Cheyenne River, Standing Rock, Rosebud, Santee, and Fort
Berthold reservations. The Oahe Dam flooded Cheyenne River and Standing Rock. The
Fort Randall Dam flooded the Yankton and Rosebud reservations. The Fort Randall and
Big Bend dams flooded both the Lower Brule and Crow Creek reservations. The Garrison
Dam flooded Fort Berthold. The Gavin’s Point Dam flooded the Santee reservation. As a
result, more than 900 Native families, one-third of the overall populations, from these
five reservations alone were forced to relocate. Entire communities were forever
submerged. Seventy-five percent of wildlife and plants and 90 percent of all commercial
timber on these reservations lands were destroyed.35 By design the Pick-Sloan Plan was
the destroyer of nations.
The Garrison Dam inundated the Fort Berthold reservation, composed of the
Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara nations, taking 152,360 acres of their land. Thirty percent
of the community populations from Lower Brule, Crow Creek, Cheyenne River, and
Standing Rock would be removed. Although less lands were taken by the Garrison Dam
than compared to the Oahe Dam, Fort Berthold lost a quarter of its entire land base
including its agency at Elbowoods. Because of its smaller size and the greater
concentration of its population in the river valley, approximately eighty percent of its
people (325 families) were removed and 94 percent of its agricultural lands were
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destroyed.36 No care was exercised to minimize the damage to Indigenous lands. To
protect the white border town of Williston, North Dakota from losing its land, however,
the Army Corps modified the Garrison Dam. The dam was also built safely upriver so as
not to flood Bismarck, the white-dominated border town and state capital of North
Dakota. The reservoir that sits atop Fort Berthold lands was named Lake Sakakawea after
the Shoshone woman captured and sold by the Hidatsas and who gained notoriety for her
services to the Lewis and Clark expedition and US empire.37
Although the Army Corps proclaimed before Congress that they would negotiate
with the affected reservations, they seemed to have forgotten ever making such a
statement and forwent tribal consultation almost entirely throughout the construction of
the dams and assessment of damages.38 White landowners were dealt with on an
individual, case-by-case basis, and Missouri River tribes were dealt with as separate
reservations. In contrast to white landowners, the entire tribe received compensation and
not the individual tribal members whose allotments were directly flooded or condemned.
The creation of separate reservations severely weakened a sense of national unity for the
Oceti Sakowin. Once individuals identified according their as political affiliation, such as
Hunkpapa or Sicangu. Now they identified according their reservation, for example,
Standing Rock or Rosebud. Allotment emphasized individualism. It first assaulted the
tightly-knit family units made up of direct kin and extended relations called the Tiospaye.
Tiospayes were the fundamental political unit of Oceti Sakowin governance, where each
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family collectively selected its own representatives for general councils. Preferring to live
according to the social and political customs of Tiospayes, individual landownership
broke up these units by separating families and isolating them on different plots of land in
distant parts of the reservation. Because of the way it negotiated with the separate
reservations and didn’t deal with individual allottees, Pick-Sloan further fomented
disunity among the different reservations and between individual tribal members and
their tribal governments.
Indigenous nations were, however, awarded more money per acre than their white
neighbors. The higher monetary values were not due to political sympathies for the
disproportionate taking of Indigenous land. Congressional sympathies leaned instead
toward termination. In 1954 South Dakota Congressman E. Y. Berry stated, during a
debate on the Cheyenne River settlement, that giving more money to tribes would put
them in a better position to “throw off the shackles of Federal supervision.”39 The initial
negotiations for taken lands and relocation resulted in a $34 million award to Lower
Brule, Cheyenne River, Crow Creek, Yankton, and Standing Rock. But that money, as
evidenced by Berry’s statements, came with strings attached — they would have to give
up their political authority; and his eliminationist agenda were not entirely novel or outof-step with the thinking of the day.
Indigenous communities were well aware of the Pick-Sloan dams but had little
idea where they would be built and how much it would affect them. Some communities
were flooded twice and experienced two dislocations, such as Crow Creek and Lower
Brule. First came Fort Randall which began flooding Lower Brule and Crow Creek in
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1954. As early damages were still being calculated, on November 2, 1949, BIA
Superintendent Frell M. Owl wrote to the Lower Brule and Crow Creek Tribal Councils
advising them, perhaps for the first time, of the inevitable inundation of their lands. The
two tribes no doubt knew about Pick-Sloan, but none fathomed the catastrophe it would
bring. Owl told them Congress conferred to the Army Corps all the lands “required’ for
the Big Bend and Fort Randall dams. Emphasizing Lower Brule and Crow Creek had no
say in the matter, Owl wrote, the proposed to take their lands “is submitted to you not as
a document that you should adopt but it, more or less, points out the events to come in the
future.”40 Owl later conveyed the convoluted negotiations process. The Army Corps
would condemn the land and negotiate directly with Crow Creek and Lower Brule legal
counsel. The BIA would then submit its approval and estimation of damages (which were
always much lower than tribal estimates). Lastly, Congress held final approval over all
the negotiations and would pass legislation awarding monetary compensation.41 This
lengthy back-and-forth process resulted in the tribes negotiating with three different
entities — the Army Corps, the BIA, and Congress, often causing such a backlog in
hearings and proceedings that tribes received their relocation money only after their lands
were flooded.
In 1946 the BIA sponsored a two-year fact-finding mission, known as the
Missouri River Basin Investigation (MRBI) project, to estimate damages to Missouri
River tribes and estimate monetary awards for relocation, taken lands, and “intangible
damages.” While simply tasked with land and resource appraisal, the BIA went a step
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further. Like their congressional counterparts, they saw “opportunity” in removal,
relocation, and rehabilitation. In its opening pages, the investigation spelled out its
broader schemes for the Pick-Sloan plan:
The Indian Bureau is attempting to see the Indian and to see him whole, a member
of a changing society derived from primitive status, which is slowly but steadily
merging with the total population. Resource development is viewed from the
standpoint of enlarging the Indians’ opportunities for economic and social growth
towards self-dependence, absorption into the body politic, and release from
governmental guardianship and supervision… The dislocations caused by
enforced removals and the readjustments which must be applied to the reservation
economics and Indian social structure are part of the total story.42
Resource development meant river development. River development for Indigenous
peoples meant mass flooding and forced displacement. Forced removal hastened
elimination by destroying the very thing holding Indigenous peoples back and to which
they would be unable to return: the reservation and the land. BIA investigators reasoned,
resource development should be embraced no matter the costs.
Our Indian agencies are growths descended from the frontier. Over the years they
have accumulated the barnacles of outmoded habits of thought and custom, as
well as physical plants established to service self-contained and ingrowing rural
communities. Indian life on the reservation has inevitably been channeled toward
the essentially undemocratic controls of the ‘Agency,’ rather than outwards to the
surrounding society with which the Indian people should become associated in the
long sweep of cultural amalgamation. Even when considered in terms of
integration of Indian life after the pattern of their cultural heritage, the Indian
agency has exerted its influence more to create cultural malaise than cultural
integration... The objective might take the course of transferring most of the
Federal Government’s services to the States.43
Put plainly, the dams would speedup termination and relocation. Indigenous culture was
seen as a “self-contained and ingrowing” culture of poverty that could only be saved,
once again, through benevolent state intervention and the civilizing project. Although

42

Emphasis added. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Missouri River
Basin Investigation, The Indian and the Pick-Sloan Plan, Billings, Montana, 4-5.
43
Ibid., 9.

155

Indigenous nations had achieved a relative degree of autonomy under IRA governments,
termination justified itself by extending the gift of democracy through the programmatic
liquidation of Indigenous political authority and federal trust responsibilities. In other
words, Indigenous peoples could only attain democracy once they were destroyed as
nations.
Since federally-imposed “self-determination” was a failed project, the only hope
to fulfill its democratic promises was the complete annihilation of Indigenous autonomy
altogether. The “wiping out” of the agencies, the MRBI concluded, was a “rare
opportunity” that “may lead to significant discoveries which will have wide application to
the conduct of Indian affairs in the United States.”44 In other words, it was an experiment
in democracy. In 1949 the bills authorizing negotiations for the settlement for the Oahe
Dam bluntly acknowledged that people below the dam would benefit greatly while
Indigenous peoples would not benefit at all. “[I]t takes the very heart out of these
Indians,” one congressman said speaking candidly about the legislation, “when you take
reservation land, you destroy not only the land that is taken, but you destroy the
community life, [the] religious and civil life of the people. You destroy nations, as a
matter of fact.”45
The political and governmental heart of these nations were their agency
headquarters. Hospitals, health clinics, schools, and administrative offices were all
located in agency towns, the very things necessary to continue on as a sovereign nation.
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The Oahe Dam entirely inundated Cheyenne Agency, Cheyenne River’s headquarters and
largest community. The agency had to re-establish sixty miles inland at the isolated
prairie town of Eagle Butte. More than 180 families, about thirty percent of the
population, were forced to leave their homes. Fort Yates, the Standing Rock agency,
remained above the Oahe Dam flood waters but the land below it, where most of the
community’s population lived, was flooded. As a result, Fort Yates was made into an
island that had to be connected by a bridge and 170 families were forced to relocate,
twenty-five percent of the reservation population. The Fort Randall Dam dislocated 84
families from Crow Creek, 35 families from Lower Brule, and 20 families from Yankton.
At Crow Creek, the Fort Randall Dam flooded Fort Thompson, the agency headquarters
for Lower Brule and Crow Creek and the largest community. The combined agency
headquarters were relocated to Pierre, the small capital city of South Dakota some sixty
miles north of both reservations. Indian health services were relocated to Chamberlain, a
notoriously racist, white-dominated border town twenty miles to the south.46
Of the five dams, the Oahe Dam, according historian Michael Lawson, “destroyed
more Indian land than any single public works project in the United States.”47 It destroyed
160,889 acres of Standing Rock and Cheyenne River: 104,420 acres of Cheyenne River
lands and 55,994 acres of Standing Rock lands. Nearly all the Cheyenne River lands
taken were grazing lands and 75 percent and 60 percent of Native ranchers at Cheyenne
River and Standing Rock, respectively, were impacted. The most expensive and largest of
the Pick-Sloan dams, the Oahe project cost $346 million, is 245 feet high, and generates
595,000 kilowatts of hydropower. Oahe reservoir is as deep as Lake Eerie and longer

46
47

Lawson, Dammed Indians, 46-9.
Ibid., 47.

157

than Lake Ontario that stretches 250 miles from South Dakota capital of Pierre to the
North Dakota capital of Bismarck, storing 23.5 million acre-feet of water. The second
largest Fort Randall that rose 245 feet high destroyed 21,497 acres of Indigenous land.
Crow Creek lost 9,418 acres of land and had 84 families removed. Lower Brule lost
7,997 acres and had 35 families removed. Yankton lost 2,851 acres and had 20 families
removed. Rosebud lost 1,231 acres of land. The Fort Randall generates 320,000 kilowatts
of hydropower, is 160 feet high, and cost $200 million. The reservoir it created, Lake
Francis Case, was named after the South Dakota congressmen who was an early river
development advocate and is 107 miles long with a storage capacity of 5.7 million acre
feet. In an incredibly stupid and cruel engineering calculation, the Big Bend Dam, the
third largest dam, flooded and dislocated Crow Creek and Lower Brule lands where
communities had been already relocated from the previous Fort Randall flooding. Both
reservations would have to relocate twice. At 94 feet high and putting out 468,000
kilowatts of power, the Big Bend Dam was built directly on the now-inundated Fort
Thompson town site and directly on Crow Creek and Lower Brule lands, flooding 20,478
acres of each and destroying the Lower Brule agency headquarters. Lower Brule lost
14,299 acres and had 62 families, more than half its population, removed. Half the
remaining Lower Brule farms not destroyed by the Fort Randall project were destroyed
by Big Bend. Crow Creek lost 6,179 acres and had 27 families removed. The reservoir
behind Big Bend, Lake Sharpe, was named after the appointed Lower Brule and Crow
Creek attorney M. Q. Sharpe who represented the two tribes during the Pick-Sloan
negotiations. For his lifelong commitment not to Indigenous peoples, but to the taking of
their lands by flooding it, Sharpe is immortalized by the water that sits atop Lower Brule
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and Crow Creek lands. The smallest and southern-most dam, Gavin’s Point, took 593
acres of Santee lands. Gavin’s Point created Lewis and Clark Lake, named for the two
US explorers, who famously branded the Oceti Sakowin as “the vilest miscreants of the
savage race.”

Who Will Mourn the Murder of a Mouse?
Much like how the Army Corps viewed the Missouri River as a technical problem
to be managed and administered, the MRBI reduced Indigenous relocation and the
trauma it inflicted to a set of technical questions and problems to be sorted out by the
administration of federal and state services. By all accounts most of the Indigenous river
communities, as the MRBI put it, still depended on the “free goods of Nature” — such as
hunting, trapping, and gathering — in the lush bottomlands where many Lakotas and
Dakotas historically camped before forced relocation and containment to reservations.
Acutely aware of this relationship — which was viewed as preventing full assimilation
into the market economy — the BIA argued that the flooding of the bottomlands “will
force [Indians] into seeking cash income to make up for the substantial portion of income
now represented in their use of natural resources of their present environment.”48 Income
— what is normally viewed as earned from wage labor — calculated not just cash income
but also what was harvested from the land for consumption and not for profit. The added
benefit, as far as the BIA was concerned, was that valuation of “intangible” and
“tangible” resources forced many to begin thinking in terms of the cash economy, rather
than relying on non-market values of what was otherwise “free” and, if properly
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managed, naturally replenishing. “Substitutes for native products destroyed by the
reservoirs,” the MRBI reasoned in cold bureaucratic language, “will be commercial
products acquired through cash payments. This change will greatly increase the
importance of cash in the Indian’s economy and force substantial change in his way of
life.”49
In 1958 during congressional hearings on the Oahe Dam, Standing Rock member
Louis Thief explained the material impact of “intangible damages” that had no monetary
equivalent. He compared the taking of these intangibles to the delayed explosion of an
atomic bomb exploding gradually over time and space rather than a split second, a
process that could be started but not stopped and that would forever ruin the land. The
bomb would kill the “little things” that had no market value, such as the mouse — to
whom many Indigenous peoples facing starving conditions on the reservations owed their
lives. According to Thief, the true devastation could only be measured over generations:
Intangible means that you cannot hardly put your finger on it. In an Indian way, it
is better expressed to say without a body. It is a spirit. You cannot catch a hold of
it. It is difficult…
This intangible, the way I look at it, is the A bomb in the whole question.
It is the energy that is locked up and when it is released, it will explode and hurt
us. What I wanted to mention in that intangible question that I know by
experience, and I have seen it, that where families were saved from starvation by
little things that I am going to mention.
For instance, one of the funniest things that Army Engineers heard, and
MRBI, was this. We included in this intangible injuries — and you could call it
direct, too — the mouse. I know what you are going to say. They said how could
a mouse be of any benefit to you. All right. We will show you… There was one
family last year that I have seen and know — he has heart trouble, and cannot
work, but he has nine kids — there was one time he didn’t have nothing to eat and
no relief. He was not old enough to get on the old age. So he walks into the
woods. There is quite a trick in finding them. I don’t know what they call them. It
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is just like a lima bean, ground beans… Mouse beans. He dug up some of this,
enough to tide him over two weeks and saves his family from starving.50
Thief’s testimony is insightful for several reasons. First, the comparison to atomic
weapons detonation evokes the idea of Missouri Indigenous communities as “sacrifice
zones,” similar to the Shoshone and Paiute lands that were taken for nuclear testing at the
Nevada Test Site. With no small irony, the US Department of Energy created a 1,360
square mile “reservation” where 928 nuclear bombs were detonated, making it the most
nuclear bombed area in the world. Whereas the Nevada Test Site sought to release the
energy contained in atoms, Pick-Sloan sought to release the energy contained in the
movement of water and to convert it into hydropower. To accomplish this engineering
feat, it had to destroy the power possessed in the little things such as the lives of mice. It
had to destroy the future realization of that life energy that sustained Indigenous lives,
that kept families from starving to death. In this sense, the dams reached into the future to
take human and nonhuman life and literally drowned its potential reproduction.
Calculations for damages were calculations for the amount of life taken — both in its
present form and future possibility. The Army Corps condemned and destroyed land and
killed wildlife and plant life. It was not just about taking land but also about taking
nonhuman relations, destroying the past, and stifling the possibility of a livable future.
Missouri River Indigenous nations were forced to surrender not just their best lands. They
also were forced to surrender their nonhuman kin who had kept them alive, such as the
mouse. Such relations were not abstract, but had a real material impact. Their loss could
be felt through the pangs of hunger and that wanton murder of one’s relatives.
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For the Lower Brule reservation, the history of land loss had real, material
consequences to their daily lives and dependence upon the land. On 23 June 1955, Lower
Brule Tribal Council Member Richard LaRoche, Jr. spoke in frustration before Congress
on what he believed was a lowball MRBI appraisal of the 7,997 acres targeted for the
Fort Randall Dam inundation. LaRoche asserted the BIA’s MRBI reports
overlooked many of the true and important elements of the values of this kind of
land. We doubt if any group of strangers to this land, even though they may have
some skill as appraisers[,] could come on to it and find all of the real values of it
and appraise them accurately. We who have lived with it and owned some of it
and worked it all of our lives, we think, are better able to tell you its true value.51
Forced to place a monetary value on the land, LaRoche and Thief portrayed profoundly
different knowledges of value that existed outside the market value of the land. These
relations could be called a grounded normativity or a subsistence economy that lived with
the land rather that off the land, in an extractive sense. As LaRoche stated, BIA and
federal officials wielded the power of the river to violently tear the Indigenous peoples
away from this way of life. It also forced them to calculate their loss, through the tally of
“tangible” and “intangible” commodities. Intangibles included wild game, timber, plums,
and berries — that had no intrinsic market value and which facilitated noncapitalist ways
of living. BIA estimates categorized these “little things” as “sense-perceptible losses” that
held “subjective or psychological values.”52 The result of the destruction of these
resources, which often sustained profoundly different knowledges and ways of living
with the land, was incalculable. While “intangibles” were sensory losses and held
psychological value — like the land’s beauty and aesthetic — they could also be felt
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through hunger. After all, a source of food was being destroyed not just an “immaterial”
thing. Upon reflection of these procedures, LaRoche lamented that the monetization of
land for its “intangible” value “was something new to everyone…We were losing our
land, and our economy and way of life were being interrupted.”53
Added to the “intangible” list of losses were things like mice beans, wild plums,
chokecherries, buffalo berries, wild game, plant medicines, and a bountiful timber supply
for fire, shelter, and home construction. To account for these losses and to force thinking
in terms of market value, or in terms of commodities that had commensurable value in a
cash economy, the BIA estimated that “The value of wild products is the estimated value
at the grocery of food to replace the loss of wild products.”54 Many of the “wild products”
lost were not only for sustenance, but also played central roles in seasonal ceremonial
practices. One such practice involving women’s coming of age required the use of
buffalo berries, which would never again grow on Lower Brule land again after
inundation, thus ending the ceremonial practice. LaRoche expressed outrage at having to
explain this and place a monetary value on the loss of ceremonial rites: “Well, the white
man, he never cared about these things; he didn’t even know what it was.”55
In a 1958 congressional hearing on the Oahe relocation and rehabilitation
program for Standing Rock, Josephine Kelly, no longer the Chairwoman, expressed
disgust at the way the US and the Army Corps ran roughshod over treaties, treaties the
US came to Indigenous peoples to make, and the sacrifices Indigenous peoples had
already made. “[W]hen the United States go into war our boys do not have to be asked,”
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she said, “They go right in. They fight for their country where they were born and raised
and so forth. They are good soldiers. But even some of those [soldiers] are condemned.
Their mothers are condemned and so forth. It is a disgrace.” Frustrated congressmen in a
patronizing tone told her that the settlement would provide agricultural and community
development loans. “We don’t want loans,” Kelly shot back. “We are not loaning the
[Army Corps] the river bed or buying up all that land in loans. They are taking it away
from us… It is just like our Black Hills that our grandfathers signed [away]. They signed
only for gold.” “[I]t would be like Santa Claus coming,” one congressman responded
infantilizing her as if the US was presenting them with gifts on Christmas morning,
“other than we are trying prepare especially the young people on this reservation so that
they can be in a position, through education and other means, to move into the economy
of your section of the nation. They should take their rightful place. Do you understand
that?” “I realize that,” Kelly said. She reminded the congressmen that wasicus had
exploited Lakota “generosity” as a sign of weakness and cut down his condescending
attitude: “We have been Santa Clauses, too, the Sioux Indians. We gave up our Black
Hills and gave up our land… and now we are down to bedrock, just like a bunch of
beggars, and that is really sad.” Kelly went on describe the treaty relationship between
the US and the Oceti Sakowin. “Those treaties are still valid today,” she repeated
questioning the power to take lands and relocate people without their consent, “They say
they were thrown in the wastebasket, but just the same we were here first and maybe
we’ll be here last.”56
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Regardless of the deferred promises of upholding treaties, the dams broke the
treaties once again by flooding entire communities forcing them to relocate. Human and
animal life, BIA officials harshly explained, would “have to re-establish on the open
upland plains where a less hospitable and more rigorous climate prevails, or [would] have
to leave the reservation.”57 And compensating land loss at “fair market value” was next to
impossible, since the increased need for hospitable lands increased real estate prices and
market competition for prime ranchland.58 As a result, many families had to subsist on a
monetary compensation that arrived only after their homes were flooded, “with the result
that they run the real risk of ending up penniless and homeless.”59 And many did. Michael
Lawson describes an all-too-familiar scene that unfolded at Standing Rock that was also
experienced by the Lower Brule and Crow Creek reservations:
In January 1960, when the Corps of Engineers finally delivered the settlement
funds to Standing Rock, it also served the tribe with an immediate eviction order.
In the midst of a fierce Dakota winter, with temperatures falling as low as thirty
degrees below zero, tribal families who lived within the Oahe reservoir taking
area were forced to gather all their possessions and to leave their land. Because
the federal government had not yet made funds available for either the
construction of new homes or the relocation of old dwellings, these people were
crowded into cold and cheerless trailer houses, which they had to maintain at their
own expense until permanent housing could be prepared.60
Termination and Its Discontents
Amid all the losses in the 1950s, there were incredible victories for the Oceti
Sakowin in the 1950s and 1960s over the state of South Dakota’s attempt to assume
jurisdiction over Lakota and Dakota reservation lands effectively defeating termination
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dead in its tracks. Although the dams promised to hasten the death of Indigenous nations,
they failed to actually accomplish this task. The roots of failure descended from the very
nature of the Pick-Sloan Plan to outsource the management of Indigenous life to states
and surrounding white communities. More importantly, the incredible mobilization of the
Oceti Sakowin to unite and defeat termination legislation, not once but twice, during the
ongoing assault on their lands from the Army Corps dams is a testament to the political
wherewithal the severely weakened tribes still possessed.
During early Pick-Sloan negotiations, most of the legal and political “advocates”
for the Oceti Sakowin were also ardent terminationists and Pick-Sloan supporters during
the initial negotiations: South Dakota congressmen Karl Mundt, E. Y. Berry, and Francis
Case; the Lower Brule and Crow Creek legal counsel M. Q. Sharpe; and the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dillon Myer. The dams, which promised and delivered
wholesale destruction, coincided and worked in tandem with the federal policies of
termination and relocation. In 1953, Congress passed House Concurrent Resolution 108
(HCR 108) that inaugurated termination policy, and called for the immediate termination
or ended federal recognition of the Flathead, Klamath, Menominee, Potawatomi, and
Turtle Mountain Chippewa tribes. That same year, Congress passed Public Law 280 (PL
280) that authorized states to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over Native lands.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs supported these programs and carried out the Indian
Relocation Act of 1956 that relocated thousands from the reservation to far-off urban
centers. HCR 108, PL 280, relocation, and the Pick-Sloan dams did not just promote
assimilation — they enforced genocide and elimination.61
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But South Dakota and federal leadership began experimenting with relocation and
termination prior, as soon as the prospects of mass forced Indigenous removal provided
the opportunity to entertain such ideas. One such experiment impacted on the
consolidated agencies of Crow Creek and Lower Brule and the relocation caused by Fort
Randall Dam flooding. The failure of Indian relocation and termination, in this instance,
revealed a fatal flaw for termination policies in South Dakota and the overall “Indian
Problem” of settler colonialism: white settlers want Indigenous lands but they don’t want
Indigenous peoples. Settlers could no longer just advocate outright extermination but they
certainly could not tolerate integration.
If Lower Brule’s situation had not been bleak enough, an enthusiastic Pick-Sloan
advocate and terminationist represented them in the negotiations process. In June 1951,
the consolidated agencies Lower Brule and Crow Creek appointed M. Q. Sharpe as their
legal counsel. Three factors determined Sharpe’s selection: 1) his law practice was
located near the reservation; 2) he had political connections in Congress and within
federal agencies; and 3) he was the most affordable lawyer and came as a packaged deal
for the two consolidated agencies. The final reason was the most important. Indian
Commissioner Dillon Myer refused to allow Crow Creek hire separate legal counsel
when they selected Lakota attorney Ramon Roubideaux.62 The failure to select a legal
counsel for both reservations delayed negotiations, and Myer intervened and made the
decision for them.63 Impending flooding would force both the reservations to relocate
their agency headquarters from Lower Brule to a set yet to be determined.
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According to Congressmen Berry and Myer, leaders of the white-dominated
border town of Chamberlain appealed to them as a potential site for relocation for the
agency headquarters. The off-reservation location would fulfill a dual purpose of
providing a model for termination as well as beginning the process of Indigenous
relocation into surrounding white communities. Myer wrote to Berry on August 31
agreeing that forced relocation would hasten the termination process:
We realize that if the agency is moved to Chamberlain it may result in some
inconvenience to individual Indians, but we feel strongly that the long range
results from such a move would far outstrip any temporary inconveniences. If the
agency were moved, there is the possibility that many of the Indians who now
take all their problems, great and small, to the agency superintendent might
through necessity have to start taking care of some of them for themselves. It
seems to us that the completion of Fort Randall Dam is going to become the
starting point from which we can either lead the Indians toward more and more
assimilation and integration, or allow them to retrogress to the narrow and inbred
way of life which has been… customary of reservation living.64
The very prospect of charging the local municipal government of Chamberlain
with the burden of incorporating Natives into the community met a more virulent reaction
from local leadership. Because Chamberlain was the county seat of Brule County, the
county commissioners adopted a resolution to thwart an effort by the BIA and Congress
to force the members of Lower Brule and Crow Creek into integration at the public
schools and into the community at large:
[The Brule County Commissioners] hereby expresses its firm belief that if such
[agency] offices are moved within Brule County that as a result of such move
Brule County would necessarily be forced to provide the necessaries of life for a
considerable number of reservation members moving into the county, and this
would place an intolerable financial burden on Brule County, South Dakota.65
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In a more threatening letter to congressmen Case and Berry, Mayor of the City of
Chamberlain Hershel V. Melcher echoed the sentiment of the Brule County
Commissioners with threats of vigilante violence that echoed southern segregationist
responses to integration.66 On March 30, 1954, Melcher wrote:
Lately the Indian Offices at Fort Thompson, S.D. say they want to move into
Chamberlain, S.D., [and it] seems they want to come whether we like it or not.
Some of the boys in the Community Club seem to favor it but the people in town
are most all against it. If they come in here, it will be necessary to declare open
season on Indians and Government Agents, we do not feel that we are entitled to
this kind of abuse from the government and we do not intend to take it
peacefully… The people of Brule County do not feel we should be saddled with a
relief load for Indians, that is the job of the Federal Government, and we do not
intend to let an Indian light around here at all. We do not want to live with them,
we don’t want them in our schools… [W]e advise you that if it come in [sic], we
will then do everything we can to get rid of it and to make them wish they were
not here. We do not intend to even be gentlemen about it, this is an unjust
imposition on us any way you look at it.67
Following the advice of Congressman Berry to adopt a resolution voicing the
opposition to the proposed move to Chamberlain, the city commissioners adopted a
resolution that stated:
we are opposed to the moving of the Indian Offices from Ft. Thompson, S.D., to
the City of Chamberlain, S.D., for all the above reasons and for the further
reasons that [it] creates an extra police problem as to drunks and petty larceny.
That we therefore strongly oppose any such move to the City of Chamberlain.68
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On April 14, 1954, impatiently awaiting a response from Case, Melcher again
wrote the South Dakota congressmen to express the urgency the white community felt in
light of the prospect of having to put up with a Native population they utterly despised:
we have no intention of making an Indian comfortable around here, especially an
official. We have a few dollar diplomats that have been making a lot of noise and
trying to get everyone they possibly could to write you people in Washington that
they wanted the Indians in here but the fact is that 90% of the people are strongly
opposed to it and will get much more so if this thing come in [sic]. Anybody who
rents them any property will have to change his address and I would not want the
insurance on his building. We do not feel that this town should be ruined by a
mess like this and we do not intend to take this lying down irregardless [sic] of
what some official in Washington may think.69
Crow Creek and Lower Brule expressed dissent and dissatisfaction with the proposed
relocation of agency services to Chamberlain as early as August 27, 1951. In a letter
pleading with Berry to deal with Myer’s arbitration on the matter of Crow Creek
selecting proper legal counsel for the Fort Randall negotiations, Tribal Chairman Herbert
Wounded Knee wrote to Berry expressing concern over the proposed relocation to
Chamberlain and the failure of the BIA to allow the tribe to properly select legal counsel.
The tribe adopted a resolution that Commissioner Myer refrain from further obstructing
the tribe’s request for legal counsel and to open negotiations with Congress and the Corps
of Engineers. Finally, Crow Creek proposed that
The people of [the] City of Chamberlain are affected with racial prejudice against
Indians. THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Crow Creek Tribal Council
urges the Commissioner of Indian Affairs [Dillon S. Myer] to instruct all his
subordinates to take no steps and to make no recommendations looking toward
the removal of the Crow Creek Agency to Chamberlain or any other place.70
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Myer’s refusal to halt the proposed relocation to Chamberlain, to allow the tribe
to select its own legal counsel, and to open immediate negotiations for Fort Randall
claims indicated his response to the resolution. Inaction to effectively resolve the
relocation of the agencies to the mostly white-dominated community of Chamberlain
spoke to the larger failure of termination in general: white settlers wanted Indigenous
land, but they didn’t want Indigenous peoples. This was also an experiment and a
precursor to how federal agencies adopted a hands-off approach when dealing with tribes
once their land bases were destroyed. It was a tactic of neglect. The BIA and Congress
would recommend a policy or course of action and then stand back and watch as the
cards fell leaving already hard-pressed Indigenous communities threatened with the loss
of their lands to fight for themselves against powerful federal bureaucracies and violently
hostile white settlers. Ultimately, the Pick-Sloan Plan created an opportunity for both
Congress and the BIA to experiment with forced relocation with the intention that
Natives would assimilate into white communities and thus become self-sufficient and
relinquish themselves from federal wardship. The experiment failed and led to the
abandonment of the plan altogether. But termination remained on the table.
In 1957 the South Dakota legislature introduced a bill to assume criminal
jurisdiction over Dakota and Lakota lands. It was no accident the push to extinguish
Indigenous jurisdiction coincided with the catastrophe brought on by flooding. Despite
having cards stacked against them, possessing no power at the state level, and having
their land bases destroyed, the Oceti Sakowin fought back. The majority of the Lakotas
and Dakotas whose lands were circumscribed by the state resoundingly rejected state
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jurisdiction in 1958 reservation-wide referenda.71 The victory was short-lived. In 1963
South Dakota again introduced legislation to attempt to overthrow tribal governments
under the auspices of PL 280. PL 280 did not immediately require Indigenous consent but
mandated that states had to assume all the financial burdens of taking over authority of
Indigenous lands and lives. Within weeks the Oceti Sakowin formed United Sioux Tribes
(UST) and collected more than 20,000 signatures to put the legislation up for a statewide
referendum. In 1964 the UST mobilized both Native and non-Native communities with a
savvy media and publicity campaign appealing to the “fairness” of state jurisdiction,
which had been imposed without consent. Although having never participated in large
numbers in state politics because of South Dakota’s historic anti-Indian hostilities, nearly
90 percent of Natives in South Dakota turned out to vote. The referendum won in a
landslide victory with nearly 80 percent voting for it and therefore against termination.72
As shown above, while South Dakota was deeply anti-Indian, many wanted Indigenous
lands but not Indigenous people. The financial “burden” of termination and state
jurisdiction was too much to bear. But the victory killed the state’s terminationist agenda
dead in its tracks and demonstrated the resiliency of the Oceti Sakowin to defend its
sovereignty even after surviving the destruction of their nations after the Pick-Sloan Plan.

More than Cultures
The legacy of the Pick-Sloan dams endures. While many witnessed and survived
the initial ecocide, the intentional destruction of the Indigenous river nations’
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environment that sustained their life and health, the long-term impacts are harder to
ascertain. While the termination era came and went, the dams have not. They remain the
permanent, disruptive infrastructure on the riverscape. Rob Nixon argues that
environmental devastation, much like climate change, is harder to understand as it
unfolds over a long duration. Violence is often viewed as immediate, explosive, and
spectacular. Nixon calls for understanding environmental degradation as “slow violence,”
“a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and
accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales.”73
For example, had the Army Corps proposed the Pick-Sloan Plan as a typical military
campaign that waged war on Indigenous peoples the way the US military had in the
nineteenth century, it would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and
could be viewed as a military or imperialist invasion. In one sense, the dams the justify
their existence in the absence of control over the “wild” Missouri River. Likewise, amidst
the chaos the Pick-Sloan created among Indigenous governments, the perceived absence
of social and political stability justified state intervention and attempts to overthrow tribal
governments.
For the Missouri River Lakota and Dakota communities, a life source, a relative,
Mni Sose, who embodies the assertion Mni Wiconi, water is life, was transformed into a
taker of life. Her life-giving waters were transformed into life-taking waters. Her veins
swelled, engulfing her relatives. In social theory, agents of capital often take human form,
exacting their will and consciousness through the harnessing of nature as a productive
force. The capitalist, as Marx poignantly reminds us, becomes “capital personified” when
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“his actions are a mere function of capital — endowed as capital is, in his person, with
consciousness and will.” 74 If the settler as agent of change is settler colonialism
personified, then what do we make of infrastructure such as irrigation, reservoirs, dams,
and pipelines that are, too, endowed with a will to dispossess and eliminate Indigenous
peoples and lifeways? When they became the means by which to not only dispossess but
also to terminate and relocate, they, too, became endowed with a consciousness, will, and
intent. The water becomes weaponized, a tool for ongoing colonial dispossession. The
dams personify settler colonialism. Poured concrete and rolled rock and dirt were
endowed with the will to disrupt, flood, dispossess, remove, and ultimately eliminate
Native society to be replaced by settler society.
The tendency is to think that Indigenous peoples’ culture was being taken from
them by the dams, which indeed it was. But Indigenous peoples are more than cultures,
they are sovereign nations. Thinking purely in terms of culture as a form of historical
agency tends to neglect the concrete reality of Indigenous life. People need to eat. They
need shelter, warmth, safety, and care. Without these basic necessities Indigenous nations
cannot exercise the right to reproduce themselves and live as they choose. Cultural
revitalization, while doing important work, doesn’t bring back the lands taken by PickSloan dams, nor does it translate into providing food and the material things necessary for
nations to reproduce themselves and to live. Cultural revitalization or cultural resurgence
defines Indigenous existence according to deficit — what it lacks (culture) and not what
it possesses (land and political sovereignty). While indeed there were, and still remain,
cultural and spiritual connections to Mni Sose, there was also a connection to the river

74

Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, 739.

174

based purely on material survival that prevented people from starving or freezing to
death. Those basic necessities are paramount — the foundations of political autonomy —
and cannot be separated from Indigenous culture.
While Nixon’s framework of “slow violence” as a steady accretion — a gradual
buildup — of violences through environmental contamination is useful for understanding
the lasting impact of the Pick-Sloan Plan, there is also another kind of accretion that is
not always spectacular nor instantaneous but nevertheless makes the endgame of
elimination an impossibility: traditions of Indigenous resistance. This accretion is a
radical consciousness and political practice, deeply embedded in history and place, and
cannot be simply overturned by colonial fiat or by submerging it under water. It cannot
be killed. This accretion is centuries old and carries the memories past, present, and
already forthcoming struggles against the state, capital, and large-scale infrastructure
projects. It pushes back not only against the spatial order of settler authority but also its
self-possessed notions of permanence as an enduring feature of the land and river. And it
demands freedom and justice
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Chapter Five: Red Power
Red Power will win. We are no longer fighting for physical survival. We are
fighting for ideological survival. Our ideas will overcome your ideas. We are
going to cut the country’s whole value system to shreds… We Indians will show
this country how to act human. Someday this country will revise its constitution,
its laws, in terms of being human beings, instead of property. If Red Power is to
be a power in this country it is because it is ideological.
—Vine Deloria, Jr., 19681
They can't stop the wind and they can't stop the rain. They can't stop the
earthquake and the volcano and the tornado. They can't stop power.
— John Trudell (Dakota), “We Are Power,” 1980
Visions for Indigenous freedom coalesced into the Red Power movement in the
1960s. For the Oceti Sakowin, the American Indian Movement (AIM) became the
militant vanguard for the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty and Indigenous nationhood in the
1970s. Policies of termination, relocation, and the damming and flooding of the Missouri
River had torn thousands of Indigenous peoples from rural reservations and scattered
them in far-off urban centers. For many there was a direct link between Pick-Sloan plan,
which took reservation lands in the 1950s and 1960s and relocation policies. “I grew up
on along the Missouri River,” Madonna Thunder Hawk told Indian Country Today. The
Oahe Dam flooded her home and community on the Cheyenne River reservation. “I’ve
never been able to take my children and grandchildren to where I grew up. That was
probably one of the major events that put me on the road to activism.”2 She later joined
AIM after the 1969 Alcatraz takeover. “It was like a bomb that dropped, and we were
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scattered like shrapnel,” Lakota and Ho-Chunk AIM activist Lakota Harden recalls.3 The
fragmented shrapnel that was Native life was scattered to places like Minneapolis,
Chicago, San Francisco, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Denver, and other major cities.
Originally envisioned to disintegrate Native communities by removing them from
the land and integrating them into mainstream society by isolating them in cities,
relocation had the opposite effect. Indians didn’t simply stop being Indians once they left
the reservation. Relocation, for all its malicious intent, helped birth a new movement that
arose from both poverty-stricken urban ghettos and rural reservations. Natives on
relocation found each other in the cities and at universities and formed pan-Indigenous
organizations, such as the National Indian Youth Council, United Native Americans,
AIM, and many more. Their concerns, however, didn’t fundamentally differ from the
concerns of their reservation-based relatives. They merged their experiences from rural
and urban into one that was explicitly anticolonial. It was a force of nature. A radical
political consciousness emerged and took the world by storm. It looked at the federal
system as a colonial structure and not the solution. And unlike youthful generational
protests of its day, Red Power looked to older generations, the traditional reservation
leadership, for guidance, the elders who had rejected federal administration and kept alive
the “old ways.”
In less than a decade, AIM went from a neighborhood patrol to stop police
violence against Natives on relocation in the streets of Minneapolis, where it was founded
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in 1968, to the United Nations. How they wound up at the UN and the historical context
of Red Power is important to understand this trajectory.

The Indian Revolution
Powerful pan-Indigenous organizations such as the National Congress of
American Indians (NCAI) preceded Red Power by nearly two decades. While it had led
the fight against and successfully defeated termination legislation in the 1950s, NCAI
was ambivalent about the future of Native sovereignty and was heavily wedded to formal
IRA governments and incremental reforms within the federal system. Like its
predecessors, many of NCAI’s solutions pandered to the rampant anticommunism and
flag-waiving patriotism at the time. It was the height of the Cold War. To curb Soviet
influence in the Third World, where colonial regimes were being violently overturned,
the US expanded its covert counterinsurgency campaigns in Latin America, the Middle
East, and South East Asia. The justification was an increasing ideological and economic
struggle between Soviet communism and Third World decolonization, on one side, and
North Atlantic imperialism and capitalism, on the other. Humanitarian aid became
empire’s bargaining chip and a way to win hearts and minds both at home and abroad.
NCAI leaders understood this and appealed to the domestic contests over the meaning of
freedom and democracy. Black Americans had also pointed to the disparities in civil
rights and racial injustice in the US. In 1951 NCAI co-founder D’Arcy McNickle called
for “a domestic Point 4 Program for our Indian reservations.” McNickle drew parallels
with President Harry Truman’s Point IV program for international aid in the world’s
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poorest countries in an effort to forestall the spread of communism.4 Furthermore,
McNickle understood that Natives shared “the world experience of other native peoples
subjected to colonial domination.”5
NCAI was asking: how could the US defend its claims to a moral superiority
when Native people were not free and remained in an impoverished state excluded from
the wealth and bounty the new global superpower? For this reason, Daniel Cobb writes,
“The assertion of a global indigenous identity stands among the most potentially
transformative aspects of the struggle for tribal sovereignty during the Cold War era
(1945-1991).”6 The geopolitical realignment of the world created a sense of uncertainty
and urgency. New nation-states emerged carving up old empires. The old imperial globe
had been carved up among European superpowers. Only further division was possible as
colonized people clamored for independence. Native people were no different. The fast
growing decolonization movement inspired Indigenous activists in the US. The horizon
of struggle began to eclipse the limited promise of the nation-state. For Natives, the
colonial state itself could not be relied upon to correct its mistakes. More radical steps
had to be taken. The Indigenous movement during the Cold War began to identify less
with domestic policy solutions and began to imagine itself as part of a larger political
community of colonized peoples.
As more Native youth followed NCAI leadership, the more they became
disenchanted with its limited vision for change. As part of President Lyndon Johnson’s
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“war on poverty,” NCAI’s efforts had garnered funding from new Office of Economic
Opportunity for rural and community development known as CAP (Community Action
Programs). Once Johnson’s priorities switched from the war on poverty to the war in
Vietnam, organizations like the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC) adopted more
militant tactics. Founded in Gallup, New Mexico in 1961 after the fallout of an NCAI
conference in Chicago, NIYC initially gained traction by supporting the “fish-ins,” a
drawn out struggle for Pacific Northwest Native treaty rights where many were beat and
some killed by white vigilantes and state officials.7 This new generation of activists —
such as Hank Adams, Clyde Warrior, Shirley Hill Witt, Janet McCloud, and many others
— pioneered a new era of Indigenous protest that called itself Red Power. It deployed
confrontational tactics that included sit-ins, occupations, and direct action while also
working within existing channels of power.
Above all, as Vine Deloria suggested, Red Power was at its core ideological.
More so than others of his generation, Deloria best read the pulse of Indian Country. His
wit and relentless advocacy made him the most prolific and iconic intellectual of the
Oceti Sakowin and twentieth century Indigenous thinker. His 1969 classic Custer Died
for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto set aflame a generation of young Indigenous activists.
Deloria’s calls for a renewal of Native politics and culture spoke truth to everyday Native
experiences. Custer’s main arguments still ring true today. Indigenous peoples are
political by default. They continue to exist as nations when they are supposed to have
disappeared, and they have to not only fight for bare survival but also for accurate
representation. They are the inconvenient truth that the US was founded on genocide and
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the continuing theft of a continent. Deloria understood this. He also came from a
prominent family of scholars and activists — his aunt Ella Deloria was a prominent
anthropologist who studied under Franz Boas; his father Vine Deloria, Sr. was a wellknown reservation-based Episcopal priest; and his son Philip Deloria is a preeminent
Native historian.8 This pedigree combined with the tumultuous years — in which,
according to him, “the Indian revolution was well underway” — placed Deloria at the
forefront as the intellectual lightning rod for the burgeoning movement.9
Deloria’s potent Red Power ideology — spelled out in his numerous writings —
was fundamentally at odds with US and Western values and economic and political
systems. This new ideology sought to reclaim tribalism, not as a thing of the past but a
modern political identity that existed both within and beyond the borders of the US. In
the recent past, an Indigenous collective national identity had been targeted by
assimilation and allotment policies and was seen as preventing individuals from
achieving “civilization.” The destruction of tribalism meant the eradication of
nationhood, which worked in tandem with land theft. In a 1964 Senate hearing on
termination legislation, Deloria, then the executive director of NCAI, charted a new path
forward. “We suggest that tribes are not vestiges of a past, but laboratories of the future,”
he stated. For him, the difference between “civil rights” and Indigenous rights was that
settlers “came over as individuals” and earned citizenship by converting Indigenous lands
into private property. This individualism wasn’t just fundamentally at odds with
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Indigenous societies. Settlers were incorporated into the constitution as individuals, not
as groups. However, Indigenous peoples had been brought into the US constitutional
framework as separate nations through treaties. “[W]e were here as independent nations,”
he proclaimed, “and treaties were made with us, and we each have traditions.” PanIndigenous organizations such as NCAI and NIYC unified Indigenous nations not in
sameness but in difference, with “independent relations to each other” as “a kind of
miniature United Nations.”10 He envisioned Indigenous international relations to exist not
only among themselves or the US, but also with others.
Deloria was especially taken by Stokely Carmichael’s (Kwame Ture) version of
Black Power. For Deloria, Black Power and Red Power weren’t just repudiations of “the
exploitation of land, people, and life itself” by capitalism, colonialism, and racism; they
were affirmations of peoplehood. “Peoplehood is impossible without cultural
independence,” Deloria argued, “which in turn is impossible without a land base.”11
Peoplehood was a departure the “civil rights” that called for equality under the law.
Deloria’s calls for peoplehood, an understanding of unique tribal or national status, was a
step towards national self-determination — Black and Indigenous peoples taking charge
of their own lives and destinies and overturning the colonial order.
Deloria saw the 1960s and 1970s as “the third ideological American revolution.”
According to his thinking, major racial groups — Blacks, Mexicans, and Native nations
— had been brought under the US constitutional framework not as individuals but as
entire groups of people and nations. The 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo ended the

10

Vine Deloria, Jr., “We Were Here as Independent Nations,” in Say We Are Nations, 134, 137.
Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1988), 180.
11

182

US-Mexican war and annexed Mexican territory and citizens. The end of the Civil War in
1865 made freed Black slaves citizens. And the 1871 abolition of Indigenous treaty
making made Native nations an internal “problem” to be dealt with.12 In each instance,
each group had no say about citizenship and how they would be incorporated. It was
thrust upon them, often without consent. The revolutionary potential of these groups had
to do with the inability to seamlessly “absorb” them into mainstream political and social
life as individuals. Also, the indiscriminate lumping together of oppressed peoples into
one based solely on their economic status as poor people — as a universal category —
failed to account for how race and colonialism intersected with class, and reproduced the
“melting pot” theory of the US as a “nation of immigrants.” Except there were those who
had not migrated from anywhere (Native nations and Mexicans) and those who had come
in chains (Black slaves). These groups could hardly be called “immigrant.” Even if
economic inequality could be levelled, it would still be atop stolen Indigenous land.
Indigenous concerns were socioeconomic. But the false promise of “equality” had
also been guaranteed under termination. For Natives, “civil rights” frequently meant
assimilation, and the language of “civil rights” had been the justification for termination.
Unlike others, Native concerns dealt specifically with the colonial relation, that many saw
enshrined in the 1871 abolition of treaty making. Prior to this the US had confirmed more
than 370 times through more than 370 ratified Indigenous treaties that Indigenous peoples
were in fact distinct, self-governing nations in control of their own territories. In total, the
US negotiated more than 500 treaties and agreements with Indigenous nations. As a result
of treaty-making, numerous other agreements, and the reservation system, more than 500
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federally-recognized tribes still existed to a large degree as autonomous political entities.
“The real issue for Indians — tribal existence within the homeland reservation — seemed
to have been completely be ignored,” Deloria observed criticizing Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s 1968 Poor People’s Campaign, which had not garnered significant Native support.13
“[F]or the majority of Indians,” he contended, “their struggle was one of historical
significance, not of temporary domestic discontent. Many Indians remained fully intent
on raising their claims of national independence on the world scene.”14 Deloria’s
tribalism thus had become an anticolonial nationalism that aligned itself with other
oppressed and colonized peoples by attacking the root — colonialism — rather than the
symptom — poverty. If Natives truly were nations, then they should act like nations,
make their own relations, and determine their own futures.
A fellow traveler, the fiery Ponca prophet and NIYC president Clyde Warrior,
best explained this assertion in a 1967 speech before a presidential poverty committee on
poverty. For him, what held back Native freedom were the very systems in place to
secure it:
We are not free. We do not make choices. Our choices are made for us; we are the
poor. For those of us who live on reservations these choices and decisions are
made by federal administrators, bureaucrats, and their “yes men,” euphemistically
called tribal governments. Those of us who live in non-reservation areas have our
lives controlled by white power elites. They are called social workers, “cops,”
school teachers, churches, etc., and now OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity]
employees.15
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In his speech, Warrior contested the bureaucratic practices of the BIA, tribal
governments, and state institutions as part of the same colonial structure. Throwing
money at the “Indian Problem” wouldn’t make it go away, especially when congress
determined the amount of money (which was never enough) and unelected bureaucrats
determined how and where it was spent. “The solution to Indian poverty is not
‘government programs.’” According to Warrior, the solution could only be selfdetermination: “let poor people decide for once, what is best for themselves.”16 Centuries
of paternalism dictated everyday Native life. It was engrained in the very institutions and
way of thinking meant to lift them out of poverty; it was an ideological force with real
power that had to be reckoned with.
Ideology doesn’t just exist in the minds of people. It is a historical force.
Dominant ideologies are built into the fabric of society and are reinforced by institutions
such as schools, the police, government bureaucracies, etc., that sustain, mask, or justify
racism, sexism, colonialism, capitalism, and inequality. Historically marginalized and
radical ideologies also grow from and respond to lived realities of poverty and
oppression. When properly developed, they can become a social force for change.
Likewise, Red Power was not just an abstract theory or an intellectual exercise. It was a
practice, a movement of everyday Native people taking charge of their lives and their
communities. It was a Red Power revolution. Education, paternalism, police violence and
incarceration, and the false promise of citizenship had to be challenged, if not entirely
undone. Furthermore, Red Power built upon centuries-old traditions of Indigenous
resistance and sprang into action in rural reservation geographies and urban centers.
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A Red Dawn
The flame of Indigenous resistance had been lit and it could not be put out. In the
following years, Red Power galvanized around attention-grabbing occupations and
protests. While these actions often overshadow their origins, specifically in the 1960s and
with NIYC, they also point towards a significant shift. The 1969 occupation of Alcatraz
island, an abandoned federal prison, by Natives in the San Francisco Bay was the spark,
and growing Native discontent was the kindling. Previously, in 1964, a group of Lakotas
— Russel Means, Hank Means, Belva Cottier, Richard McKenzie, and others —
attempted unsuccessfully to reclaim the island as federal surplus property when the prison
shut down. Five years later, another group organized by LaNada Means (War Jack), a
Shoshone-Bannock student who organized the Third World strike at the University of
California Berkeley, and Mohawk activist Richard Oakes, who was later murdered in
1972 by a white man, led a nineteen-month occupation of the island.17 Calling themselves
Indians of All Tribes, Alcatraz symbolized and practiced a pan-Indigenous unity that had
been “long dreamed by our people.” They saw themselves as a “new” but “old”
movement that wasn’t beholden to government funding, but to the people. It arose from
everyday Natives on relocation and in reservation communities. “New concepts based
upon old ideas demand that new leaders emerge,” their manifesto read. “Our children will
know Freedom and Justice.”18 The reclamation of the island and the plans to turn it into
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an “All Indian University” was, to be sure, a major historical event and turning point.
Although they never achieved their goals and were evicted by police under orders by the
Nixon administration, they had galvanized the movement away from just seeking reform
within the halls power and turned power into the hands of poor, working class Native
people.
The formation of United Native Americans in the San Francisco Bay and the
American Indian Movement in Minneapolis made the occupation possible. In 1968 AIM
was founded in Minneapolis by Ojibwes — Dennis Banks, Clyde Bellecourt, Vernon
Bellecourt, Patricia Bellanger, George Mitchell, and others — as a community patrol,
partly inspired by the Black Panther Party for Self Defense founded two years earlier in
Oakland. Like the Black Panthers, the original focus was on community empowerment
and service programs, such as creating survival schools to educate urban Native youth.
But AIM also confronted the institutions of the state, such as the police and education
systems. At the time, police would sweep Indian bars making mass arrests and profiling
poor, urban Natives, of whom many were on relocation. Through successful organizing
and AIM community patrols, which often involved violent confrontations with police that
ended in the arrests of AIM members, the practice nearly halted. Even in its early days,
AIM was more than a protest movement. It founded survival schools in Minneapolis and
in Pine Ridge, as alternative schools for youth who had faced discrimination in public
schools. Survival schools, in contrast, taught Native history and culture. By the 1970s
there were about sixteen AIM survival schools in urban centers and reservation
communities. The founders of these schools were women, like Mniconjou activist
Madonna Thunder Hawk and Patricia Bellanger. AIM also provided legal advocacy for
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parents and children against state welfare programs that incarcerated Native youth or
separated them from their families and placed them in the custody of white families, a
practice that continues, to a large degree, to this day.19
As has been true in every revolutionary movement, women’s roles in AIM are
nearly forgotten, with men taking center stage as leaders. The feminist slogan — “women
hold up more than half the sky” — was equally true for AIM and has been for Indigenous
movements, in general. When the FBI began targeting AIM men, AIM women filled the
vacuum and kept the movement going. Much like in the past, Indigenous women were
not seen as leaders by the media or by state institutions. Such a misconception has been
repeated in many histories of Red Power — and even by the activists themselves. Yet the
invisibility provided freedom and security in ways not granted to male leadership. “The
women of AIM then realized that we could just about do anything under the eyes of the
feds and press because we were invisible,” Madonna Thunder Hawk recalls.20 “The
stability of our people has always been with the women, regardless of what disease has
come along, whether it has been religion, or federal Indian policy,” she explains.21
Nevertheless, Indigenous women participated and filled leadership roles in all
major AIM actions, takeovers, and campaigns. As mentioned in previous chapters,
nothing in the traditions of the Oceti Sakowin suggest they were patriarchal. Colonialism
and capitalism largely overturned historical gender relations, favoring men as heads of
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households and relegating women out of sight into the realm of the domestic sphere. To
be sure, patriarchal masculinity and sexism were rampant in AIM. But such behavior was
more a symptom of a patriarchal and sexist society than it was an invention of Red
Power. As has been shown, women of the Oceti Sakowin have long held leadership
positions, whether as warriors or political leaders, or both.
While it built community programs, AIM became known more for its highpublicity protests. After Alcatraz, AIM grew rapidly. By 1973, there were seventy-nine
chapters, with eight chapters in Canada.22 When the movement swept through Oceti
Sakowin country, it adopted a specifically nationalist character focusing on the 1868 Fort
Laramie Treaty. In 1970, AIM, United Native Americans, and Lakota activists from
South Dakota occupied Mount Rushmore in the Black Hills to bring attention to the 1868
Treaty and the fact that the land upon which the monument had been built was stolen.
Activists pointed out that the monument itself was a form of vandalism — not “a shrine
of democracy” but “a shrine of hypocrisy.” Each president — Washington, Jefferson,
Lincoln, and Roosevelt — had participated in Indigenous genocide and land theft. The
Haudenosaunee Confederacy called Washington “Town Destroyer” for his role in the
extirpation of their villages. Jefferson had advanced Indigenous removal policies and
began the expansion of US empire west of the Mississippi. Lincoln had ordered the
hanging of thirty-eight Dakota patriots after the 1862 US-Dakota War and oversaw the
1864 Long Walk for Navajos in the Southwest. Roosevelt had “nationalized” millions of
acres of Indigenous lands for national parks. While symbolic, there was a growing
militancy to the tactics of takeover and occupation. Across the US, BIA headquarters
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became the targets for protest. Among the many concerns was the failure to uphold
treaties. Critics viewed treaty claims as mere rhetoric.
As the war in Vietnam intensified, by 1972 a full-throated treaty movement had
crystallized. Eight Native organizations — AIM, NIYC, the National Indian Brotherhood
of Canada, among others — led a coast-to-coast caravan of thousands of Natives to
Washington, DC, gathering participants at each city and reservation along the way, and
occupied the BIA headquarters from November 3-9. The occupation and the negative
media it attracted overshadowed the real issues of the caravan. The Trail of Broken
Treaties, as it was known, intended to disrupt the presidential election by drawing
attention to unfulfilled treaty rights. Organizers drafted a document, primarily authored
by Hank Adams, called the “Twenty Points.” The first point demanded, “Restoration of
Constitutional Treaty-making Authority: This would force federal recognition of each
Indian nation’s sovereignty.”23 The most salient points proposed the restoration and
enforcement of treaty-making. Although the federal officials promised to look into the
demands, their response was hardly adequate and led to no action. A genius document, in
1977 the Twenty Points was presented at the United Nations forming the basis of the
2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.24

Border Towns
A long time ago there was an Indian medicine man, Drinks Water, a Lakota, who
foretold in a vision that the four-leggeds were going back into the earth. And he
said in the future all over the universe there shall be a spider's web woven all
around the Sioux and then when it shall happen you shall live in gray houses, but
that will not be the way of your life and religion and so when this happens,
alongside of those gray houses you shall starve to death. He said: “You people
23
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have made me regret, so I will go back to mother earth,” and shortly afterward he
died. The people believed in this forecast of Drinks Water. What he said we are
now into. The Long Knives [Americans] have woven the gray blanket over us and
we are now prisoners of war.
—Black Elk, Lakota Holy Man, 193225
After the Trail of Broken Treaties, AIM regrouped and continued working on
urban Native rights, or what Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Warrior call its “border town
campaign.”26 In February 1972, a brutally harsh winter month, four white men — Melvin
and Leslie Hare, Bernard Ludder, and Robert Bayless — kidnapped fifty-one-year-old
Oglala man Raymond Yellow Thunder, stripped him naked, beat him, forced him to
dance as “drunk Indian” for the entertainment of whites in a dance hall, and left him to
die in Gordon, Nebraska. The town is on the southern border of the Pine Ridge
reservation. In common vernacular, the white-dominated settlements — cities and towns
— that ring Indian reservations are called “border towns.” In border towns, persistent
patterns of anti-Indian exploitation, discrimination, violence, and criminalization define
everyday Native life. Gordon was such a place. AIM was called to investigate the death
by Yellow Thunder’s family, who were worried that the authorities would chalk it up to
“just another dead Indian,” an all-too-frequent sentiment for dead Natives off-thereservation. Because of AIM’s advocacy, Leslie and Melvin Hare were charged with
manslaughter and sentenced to prison. Yellow Thunder was immortalized in the
“Raymond Yellow Thunder Song” that became the AIM anthem — or alternatively
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known as “the AIM Song.”27 The successful campaign earned AIM the respect of the
Oglala elders and traditionalists in Pine Ridge, who called upon AIM in 1973 again to
take a stand at Wounded Knee.
Despite the horrific nature of the crime, career anti-AIM critic and journalist Stew
Magnuson has cast doubt on Yellow Thunder’s murder. He goes as far to title his 2008
book The Death of Raymond Yellow Thunder and purposefully questions calling what
even an all-white jury had decided was unequivocally a “murder.” Like the generations of
journalists before him, Magnuson peddles a myth of white settlers and friendly Indians as
victims “criminal, “militant,” and “hostile” “Sioux warriors.” The scenario is familiar: the
“good Indians” versus “bad Indians.” AIM was the bad Indians. His narrative has less to
do with the historical and brutal reality of colonialism than it does with an obsession with
the bravado of AIM men. In the book’s opening pages, Magnuson describes a 1999
protest against alcohol sales in White Clay, a notorious of border town. Less than a mile
south of the reservation border with a population of about a dozen, White Clay liquor
stores sell millions of cans of beer a year entirely to residents of Pine Ridge where
alcohol is banned. A frequent site of protest to this day, countless Native lives have been
consumed and destroyed, in a clear profiteering of death and suffering, by White Clay
and border towns like it. “Everyone feared the young men,” he describes the protestors as
they descended on White Clay.28 The description is evocative of a common trope of
settlers being surrounded by lawless Natives. By casting the settlers as victims — in this
case, a handful or white liquor store owners — colonialism looks like self-defense. The
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description also invokes the fearsome image of AIM warriors descending on racist border
towns, like they did in Gordon and elsewhere in the 1970s.
Despite its racial undertones, Magnuson’s “angry Indians” stereotype is useful for
understanding what AIM was trying to accomplish and how they became criminalized for
it. These were Natives “off the reservation.” “Off the reservation” is an American English
idiom. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the phrase as meaning “to deviate from
what is expected or customary.”29 The expression is also current in military and political
spheres to describe someone who defies orders, who is unpredictable and therefore
ungovernable. Those who “go off the reservation” are rogues or mavericks in military
jargon — the ones who “cross the wire” of military bases (called “reservations”) or enter
hostile territory (called “Indian Country”).30 For Natives to “go off the reservation” refers
to those who historically refused reservation life or refused to respect its borders, where
they could be contained and managed. Those willfully crossing borders were considered
renegades, outlaws, or hostiles, and were usually hunted down and summarily shot,
hanged, or imprisoned. It is no coincidence the phrase arose from the language of the
nineteenth century Indian wars and the murderous consequences inflicted upon those who
refused reservation life. In this way, “off the reservation” is a question of territory and
sovereignty, and a political practice. To evoke Kahnawà:ke Mohawk scholar Audra
Simpson, Native trespass into the domain of what is considered “settled” territory calls
into question the legitimacy of settlement — that indeed it is anything but settled.31 In
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other words, Natives off the reservation are the unfinished business of settler colonialism,
the ones who refused to disappear, refused to sell their lands, and refused to quit being
Indians.
In Rapid City, South Dakota such dynamics were well in place and became a
target for AIM’s border town campaign. The city occupies the moral and political
universe of the Oceti Sakowin, He Sapa, the Black Hills, and, like Gordon and White
Clay, is within the territory of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty. As they had for generations,
most Natives in Rapid City lived in squalor in shanty towns near Rapid Creek, the
downtown area next to the railroad district, or in Sioux Addition, the “Indian Ghetto” (or
“Red Ghetto”) outside city limits and built upon remaining trust lands of the Rapid City
Indian School, an off-reservation boarding that closed its doors in the 1930s.32 The
“Indian Problem” had returned in the form of “urban Indians” who left the reservation.
To curb and control off-reservation migration into white towns, in 1939 South
Dakota passed a series of “warning out” laws that required “transient” populations to fill
out and sign “certificates of non-residence” that excluded them from poor relief, public
welfare, voting, and establishing permanent residency. In Rapid City, Pennington
County, and South Dakota more broadly, warning out laws specifically targeted offreservation Natives, barring them from legally residing within certain communities or
receiving basic housing, social, welfare, educational, and medical services. Ramon
Roubideaux, a Sicangu attorney from the Rosebud reservation, described the practice at a
1962 civil rights hearing: “in Rapid City they follow that program religiously. They serve
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transient Indians… a nonresident notice. This is what they call it. In other words, by
service of this notice on the individual, you prevent him [sic] from acquiring, as the
statute says, a legal settlement.”33 Often county social service and health officials issued
nonresident certificates when Natives applied for services, or they were simply denied
receiving services altogether. The labeling of Natives off-reservation as “transient” did
important work. It made normal the practice of settling — home ownership, citizenship,
paying taxes, employment, etc. — as a prerequisite for personhood versus the lifestyle of
a “nomadic” or “transient” Indian. Questions of personhood and citizenship came to a
head in 1972. It began with a flood.
On June 9, fifteen inches of torrential rain clogged the Canyon Lake dam, which
burst early the next morning sending a wall of water down Rapid Creek. In a matter of
hours, the flood swept away more than 1,300 homes, 5,000 automobiles, and 238 lives.
Hardest hit were the poor, poor Natives and poor whites, who lived near the creek in
mobile homes and dilapidated structures. Although Natives made up five percent of
Rapid City’s population, they accounted for fourteen percent of those who perished in the
flood, and a significant number of those displaced. The city received $160 million for
disaster relief and urban renewal programs.34 The relief money, however, was allocated
along racial and class lines. While all flood victims were equally entitled to relief, Mayor
Don Bartlett, a liberal Democrat, observed, “that doesn’t mean that we just divvied up the
money equally all around. The Indian who lost a shack and few sticks of furniture didn’t
get as much as somebody who lost a $40,000 house with 25 years of accumulated
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possessions.”35 More relief was dispensed to white, middle-class homeowners and
business-owners. Discrimination didn’t end there. Many Natives fled to live with
relatives elsewhere including the reservation making them ineligible for relief. For those
who stayed, temporary shelter was offered but was segregated.36
While white residents re-sheltered within city gymnasiums and churches,
hundreds of Natives were concentrated at “Camp Rapid” at the National Guard base on
land originally belonging to the Rapid City Indian School. The camp housed Natives in
militarized conditions that were intensely policed and kept under constant surveillance, in
what amounted to little more than open-air concentration camp. Lakota housing activist
Edgar Lonehill described conditions in the camp:
the segregating of HUD [Housing and Urban Development] trailers, we believe,
was partly done out of prejudice against the stereotype (drunken, troublemaking)
Indian. It was done, we think, so that it would be easier for the white police and
HUD to ‘keep an eye on us.’ Further proof of this is offered by the fact that the
Indian trailer courts are floodlighted at night.37
Relief was slow, uneven, and often used to collectively punish the Native
community. Camp Rapid was supposed to be temporary. Months passed before all the
Native families were given homes, although many white families had already been rehoused. HUD homes were made available at Sioux Addition for Native families — which
became the federal housing project Lakota Homes — outside city limits. Yet, community
harassment and policing intensified because now Natives were cordoned off into a
designated neighborhood — a permanent fix to the city’s perpetual Indian Problem. It
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was no longer a matter of leaving the reservation but rather leaving the “Red Ghetto” that
made the Indian suspect.38
The flood accomplished what could not be done previously. It gave the city a
clean slate. The built environment that kept everyone in their place was destroyed. City
officials viewed the flood as a social equalizer that leveled not only homes but also race
and class divisions. Yet, the flood led to a post-disaster structural racism. It removed (and
killed) the undesirable, poor, and Native people concentrated in the city center, literally
forcing them out of town to make way for the business community’s “Urban Renewal”
program to rebuild the destroyed downtown area. The practice aligned with federal
housing policies and community development programs targeting low-income families
and disenfranchised communities. Housing activists have often called this gentrification.
The process is often backed by wealthy business interests, to remove poor, racialized
urban communities to make way for middle-class and wealthier neighborhoods and
businesses that raise real estate values. High rent and housing prices make it nearly
impossible for poor communities to return or inhabit these “renewed” neighborhoods.
Typically, such practices are seen as seen as taking place in larger cities, most famously
the Lower East Side in New York City in the 1970s. Gentrification doesn’t just mimic
colonial processes — it is colonialism. And it doesn’t just happen in cities. Settler
colonialism, whether in border towns or in rural or urban geographies, is gentrification.
Gentrification is the history of US expansion that entails the removal, dispossession, and
elimination of Indigenous peoples to make way for a settler population. In Rapid City is
thrice stolen land — the first is the illegal seizure of the Black Hills; the second is the
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theft of remaining Indian trust lands from the Rapid City Indian School; and the third is
the taking of Native and poor communities by the flood and the subsequent housing
policies. But the colonial parallels don’t end there.
A 1974 article in HUD’s serial publication The Challenge promoted “urban
homesteading” inspired by the 1862 Homestead Act that gave rural acreage to farmers for
free under the condition they migrate to it and improve it. “Just as nineteenth century
homesteaders required government aid to hack out an existence as they helped to develop
the West,” the article reasoned, “people who are willing to undertake a difficult and
rugged experience in the urban wilderness require aid designed to make the communities
around them viable.” In other words, urban homesteading sought to revitalize and
repurpose land and housing “not worth maintaining because disease, crime, and lack of
public services have made it too depressing and dangerous for anyone to live in.”39
Former slums and abandoned neighborhoods would be made anew. It was a civilizing
effort. Rapid City utilized this program to deal with its own “urban wilderness,” the
savage Indians who refused to go away and who brought down property values because
they embodied the disease and crime of what Lonehill identified as the criminal
“drunken, troublemaking Indian.” Nevertheless, the city rebuilt itself and became a HUD
success story. Meanwhile, Native resentment fostered against enforced gentrification and
further segregation. The fundamental challenge that the city sat atop stolen land was
never addressed and was only exacerbated by the influx of federal housing programs
meant to “improve” Native lives by granting community self-determination and
autonomy through federally subsidized housing.
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While federal housing policies further re-entrenched Native-settler boundaries
within border towns such as Rapid City, vigilantes, police, and everyday settlers upheld
the order of things to defend (often with violence) against the hyperbolic threat of Native
invasion. The figure of the “drunk Indian” became a specific target. The murderous
practice of “Indian busting” — the targeting of intoxicated Native men for beating,
torture, and homicide — was a weekend pastime and sport for white settlers in border
towns. In January 1973 after Wesley Bad Heart Bull was stabbed to death by a white man
in Buffalo Gap near Custer, South Dakota, 200 AIM members descended on Custer to
demand murder charges be brought against the accused. After not being allowed access to
the courthouse where Bad Heart Bull’s murderer was being arraigned for manslaughter, a
violent confrontation with police ensued. Several police cars were set ablaze. Dozens
were arrested.
The Custer fight spilled over into Rapid City’s bar district, where Natives faced
violent discrimination from both white vigilantes and the police. The figure of the “drunk
Indian” is seared into the minds of the popular settler imaginary. Although being “drunk”
or “Indian,” or both, were not definitively illegal, constructing Natives off the reservation
as drunk, militant, and violent is an historic political art of policing. Native presence in
border towns, therefore, is always conflated with criminality and lawlessness. In 1973, a
white Rapid City police officer explained: “I don’t think any of us go out on purpose to
arrest Innuns [sic] for being drunk, but chances are an Innun’s on the street by himself,
he’ll be arrested, because chances are he’s got no place to go. A drunken white man’ll
have a home… Of course that makes our record for arresting Innuns look pretty high.”40
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To counter this, AIM called for actions in Rapid City bars and saloons — where
Natives had been victimized by vigilantes and the police — to “keep the people stirred
up” and to remind settler presence was conditional on Natives allowing them to be there:
“You are here because we allow you to be here.”41 Mayor Bartlett described AIM’s
campaign as creating “a sense of uncertainty and fear.”42 On February 6, 1973, just weeks
before the armed takeover of Wounded Knee, AIM stormed a Racial Conciliation
Committee hearing, a commission created partly to resolve ongoing discrimination in
housing and employment that was exacerbated by the flood and to improve “race
relations.” About 200 Natives packed the meeting. “They weren’t committed civil rights
people,” Bartlett described the crowd.43 AIM leadership struck fear into the hearts of the
officials as they gave fiery speeches calling for revolt if their demands for equal housing,
more Native police officers, and the hiring of Native city attorney were not met. AIM
leader Dennis Banks stated, they were there “to declare war on every town in the Black
Hills” if demands were not met. The committee agreed to host a series of meetings to
discuss the demands — some were carried but most were not.44
In response, Bartlett reminded the Native community that if they participated in
“uncivil” disobedience and didn’t follow to the liberal doctrine of level-headed, rational
dialogue, he would respond with violence. He stated, “if [AIM] wanted Rapid City to be
as famous as Selma, Alabama I could take care of that in about 15 minutes.”45 AIM
didn’t relent. Neither did Rapid City. For several nights AIM members took the streets
41
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after their demand to close the bars for 30 days while the negotiated with city officials
was not met. Street fights broke out. Riot cops were deployed and hundreds were beaten,
arrested, and driven out of town. Bartlett even directly participated in strong-arming AIM
members from local motels and out of the downtown area.46 White elites were on high
alert, their tenuous claims to the land were made clear.
AIM’s border town campaign remained incomplete, but not over. The same
month AIM took Rapid City by storm, they also occupied Wounded Knee which further
emboldened the movement within and beyond the US. The outcome of Wounded Knee
and the rise of AIM’s internationalism through the International Indian Treaty Council,
which formed in 1974, paved the way for Indigenous internationalism at the UN and laid
the groundwork for the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
In 1980, AIM returned to the Black Hills and Rapid City. This time, however,
Women of All Red Nations, an AIM contingent of women leadership, formed the Black
Hills Alliance (BHA), a coalition of white ranchers and Native activists to halt uranium
and coal mining in the Black Hills. Eleven thousand people from around the world
gathered and successfully halted mining operations. After the Alliance dissipated, AIM
formed a short-lived encampment, named Yellow Thunder Camp (YTC) after the
Raymond Yellow Thunder, on the outskirts of Rapid City. The goal was to begin to
reclaim the Black Hills region under the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty. Unlike the previous
border town campaign, BHA and YTC garnered local white support under the umbrella
of environmentalism and treaty rights. For example, a union of Black Hills gold miners
supported both campaigns, citing the inviolability of Lakota treaty rights and a concern
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for corporate energy development that jeopardized “the health and welfare of working
people.”47
AIM had successfully generated anti-colonial sentiment in both Native and nonNative people, solidifying alliances with white working people and farmers who were
historic enemies of Lakotas. The alliance proved vital because it demonstrated that
working class settlers and Natives had a common struggle against corporate exploitation,
and that centering Native land rights and sovereignty would protect lands both required
for continued existence. It was the recognition that dispossession was the primary mode
for exploitation in Rapid City and the Black Hills and that the liberation for both Native
and settler required upholding, at bare minimum, the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty. In this
way, when poor settlers abandoned anti-Indian racism and aligned with the interests of
Natives, new anti-colonial solidarity and liberatory possibilities arose, albeit temporary.
This era of anti-colonial uprisings in Rapid City successfully evicted corporate polluters
and the dynamics of border town life for Natives improved, if even for a short while.
Even one of AIM’s main detractors, Mayor Bartlett, conceded “quietly behind the scenes
there is an effort being made without headlines” to improve the lives of Natives in Rapid
City in the wake of the uprisings.48

The First Way of War
In February 1973, the Oglala Sioux Civil Rights Commission (OSCRC), a
grassroots organization, along with a group of traditional headmen called upon AIM to
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take stand. Richard “Dick” Wilson, the elected tribal councilman of Pine Ridge, had
become increasingly authoritarian, terrorizing political opponents with his paramilitary
GOON squad (which stood for Guardians of the Oglala Nation). In particular, the
grassroots people opposed the Indian Reorganization Act government and called for the
restoration of the treaty councils and customary leadership. At this time, ceremonies such
as the sun dance had still been nearly criminalized and were practiced underground.
People wanted a return of the “old ways,” the return to treaty relations with the US, and
the end to the rampant violence on the reservation. They saw the successful publicity
AIM got as potentially useful for inspiring a political and cultural revitalization of the
Oceti Sakowin. More importantly, they needed their own self-defense against the
GOONS and Dick Wilson regime who were backed by federal marshals.
On February 27, in a late-night meeting in Calico, a small village in Pine Ridge,
the OSCRC and a council of customary chiefs — Red Cloud, Iron Cloud, Fools Crow,
Bad Cob, and Kills Enemy — met with AIM and deliberated what was to be done. But it
was the elder women who proved decisive. While the men discussed, Oglala elders
Gladys Bissonette and Ellen Moves Camp spoke, pleading AIM warriors to take a stand.
The two recalled how those who protested Wilson were mostly elders and women. Moves
Camp asked, “Where are our men? Where are our defenders?”49 The impassioned plea
worked, and Fools Crow asked Russell Means, an Oglala leader of AIM, to take his
warriors to the hamlet of Wounded Knee, the site of the 1890 massacre at the hands of
the vengeful Seventh Cavalry. Instead of dying, however, AIM would make a stand for
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the life and liberation of all Indigenous peoples. The message was heard around the
world.
While the media trailed AIM and the Red Power movement from one action to
another, the FBI also followed. Informants infiltrated the organization and a smear
campaign began. In 1956 the FBI began its Counter Intelligence Program
(COINTELPRO) to infiltrate, disrupt, and destroy the Communist Party. By the 1960s
and 1970s, COINTELPRO targeted civil rights leaders, student antiwar movements, the
Black Panther Party, and the Black Freedom Movement, in general. In an internal 1967
memo titled “Counter Intelligence Program Black Nationalist-Hate Groups,” its stated
goal was to “expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize” targeted
groups and “their leadership, spokesman, membership, and supporters, and to count the
propensity for violence and civil disorder.”50 After reports were leaked to the press about
COINTELPRO, it was officially terminated in 1971. It was later revealed, however, that
the FBI had infiltrated AIM and began its own COINTELPRO operation to discredit and
neutralize the organization and its leadership.
The 71-day takeover of Wounded Knee revealed to AIM and the world the
lengths to which the US was willing to go to crush the Indigenous movement. Armed
mainly with shotguns and hunting rifles, AIM faced off with the paramilitary GOON
squad and federal marshals armed with fully automatic weapons and armored personnel
carriers. Fire fights broke out daily. On AIM’s side, Frank Clearwater and Lawrence
“Buddy” Lamont were killed by law enforcement. Despite the heavy-handed police
tactics, AIM, OSCRC, and the Oglala traditional leadership declared the Independent
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Oglala Nation under the authority of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty and the need to end
the colonial relationship between the US and the Oceti Sakowin and Indigenous peoples.
There was a critical link, however, between the war waged against the
anticolonial uprising in Vietnam and the one waged against social movements in the US.
Both were counterrevolutionary campaigns to crush decolonization and revolutionary
movements, but they have often been read separately; or they have been read in such way
to say the war in Vietnam and the US counterinsurgency operations around the world
“brought the war home.” While the parallels do exist, as has been shown, US
counterinsurgency traces its origins to the Indian wars of the nineteenth century and
earlier. Coincidentally, the five-year anniversary of the My Lai massacre occurred during
the 1973 Wounded Knee takeover. The similarities were hard to miss between Wounded
Knee 1890 and the US Army’s wanton slaughter of hundreds of Vietnamese villagers.
Military historian John Grenier defines what he calls “the first way of war” as being
frontier violence: “From both military necessity and hands-on experience, successive
generations of Americans, both soldiers and civilians, made the killing of Indian men,
women, and children a defining element of their first military tradition and thereby part
of a shared identity.”51 What D’Arcy McNickle called in 1949 “the Indian war that never
ends” — the forever conflict between Natives and imperial dispossessors — clearly had
global implications.52 In the 1960s and 1970s the war was not necessarily “brought home”
but had always been “home” in occupied Indigenous lands. As the original enemies of
empire, the US mobilized against all those who could be made “Indian,” whether it was
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the Viet Cong in Vietnam or Black Power and Red Power activists in the US. The tactics
descended from the “irregular wars” waged against Indigenous combatants and
noncombatants. For instance, vigilante murders of and rampant police violence against
Indigenous peoples in border towns are simply continuations of this military tradition of
frontier homicide. Colonial states do not always have to kill Indigenous peoples, when
everyday settlers can do that for them. In past actions, AIM connected the everyday
policing, surveillance, and criminalization of Indigenous peoples in border towns to the
broader anticolonial struggle and treaty rights. The takeover Wounded Knee was a
continuation of that struggle, not a deviation from it.
In the aftermath of Wounded Knee 1973, the FBI and Dick Wilson waged a dirty
war against its opponents in Pine Ridge in what became known as the “reign of terror.”
Dozens were murdered. Hundreds were imprisoned. On June 26, 1975, ninety-nine years
after Custer was defeated at the Battle of Greasy Grass, two unmarked FBI cars pulled
into the Jumping Bull ranch. The two FBI agents entered the property over a reported
theft of a pair of cowboy boots. AIM had set up camp on the property to protect the
Jumping Bulls, an elderly couple, from GOON and FBI harassment. They had also
constructed a culture camp for youth. A firefight broke out and agents Ronald A.
Williams and Jack R. Coler were killed. In the ensuing firefight with FBI and BIA
officers, Joeseph Stuntz Killsright, a young Native man, was killed by sniper fire. A
massive manhunt ensued. AIM leader Leonard Peltier was later charged and sentenced to
two life sentences for the murder of the FBI agents. Federal prosecutors and agents
manufactured evidence, hid proof of innocence, presented false testimony, ignored court
orders, and lied the jury about Peltier’s involvement in the murders. Since his
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incarceration, former FBI agents and federal prosecutors (including the head of the
prosecution team that convicted him) and numerous civil rights and human rights leaders
and organizations have found faults on the FBI’s handling of Peltier’s case and called for
his clemency. Twice has Peltier’s case come close to presidential pardon or clemency. In
both cases, the FBI lead a smear campaign against AIM and Peltier, showing that the
Indian war continues unabated. Most recently, President Obama denied Peltier’s
clemency application during the Standing Rock efforts to halt Dakota Access Pipeline,
after issuing the more executive clemencies than the past thirteen administrations. His
administration could not let go of either its commitments to the oil and gas industry and
the continued imprisonment of an innocent Indigenous freedom fighter. So it refused the
halt the construction of a toxic pipeline and refused to end ongoing injustice against
Peltier, and all Indigenous peoples subject to the carceral regime.
The aftermath of Wounded Knee and the immense amount of life lost because of
it has led to sense that AIM was to blame for murderous crackdown and the increased
deprivations of Indigenous communities. While Red Power attracted a heavy response
from the state, historian Jordan Camp notes that “those focusing on the criminalization of
street protests rarely connect it to the everyday and routine policing, surveillance, and
criminalization of the racialized poor.”53 In other words, the misrepresentation of the
social protests against mass incarceration and the police state fails to recognize the
struggles from below that attempted to undo it. AIM’s border town campaign best
illustrates this because it directly challenged pervasive police and vigilante violence
while also connecting to larger patterns of colonialism.
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Pervasive anti-AIM sentiment continues to exist, especially in places like South
Dakota where state politicians such as William Janklow have made political careers out
of arresting and demonizing Indigenous activists. The sentiment coincides with a stronger
sense of anti-Indianism and massive economic and political restructuring under
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is the process of extreme polarization of wealth that
happens when states defund and gut public education, transportation, healthcare, and
public sector employment. Most of these services, which are in other parts of the world
considered fundamental human rights, are then privatized or abandoned altogether. The
state’s role in the process, however, is not reduced, but rather increased. One defining
characteristic in the US has been the expansion of the military and prison. For example,
the prison population increased from about 200,000 in the late 1960s to the 2.4 million in
the 2000s, with a current population of 6.9 million adults either in jail or prison, or on
probation or parole. Prison populations are majority non-white and almost entirely made
up of poor. In South Dakota, incarceration rates are among the highest in the nation. With
an overall decrease in crime in the last two decades, South Dakota’s imprisonment rate is
ten times higher than the national average, growing over 500 percent since 1977 to 2012.
Native inmates make up over thirty percent of the total population while only constituting
about nine percent of the state’s population.54 The rise of incarceration directly correlates
with increased Native political activity in the 1970s. Mass incarceration is the new
elimination — by removing Natives from the land and imprisoning them — and a tool for
political repression. The solution for the “Indian Problem” came not in upholding of
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treaty rights — such access to healthcare, employment, education, and social welfare —
but in the form police and prisons.
For the US, it has been more realistic to increase incarceration and law
enforcement budgets than it has been to uphold the basic tenets of treaties —
international agreements — made with Indigenous nations. Despite the violent backlash,
AIM and Red Power turned its sights elsewhere, to the United Nations, to let the world
judge the US for its criminal behavior. But the legacy of AIM remains incomplete and
underappreciated to this day. In 1981 Nisqually activist Janet McCloud (Yet-Si-Blue)
cautioned against writing off the accomplishments of AIM for the next generation of
activists while also acknowledging the organization’s shortcomings:
The American Indian Movement is unique, for it is nationally organized
and internationally known. AIM’s brave and daring effort to uplift the lives of
their people, to challenge a powerfully hostile enemy, and to promote a better
social order for all Indian people, inspired not only their own people, but the
oppressed and downtrodden of the world. AIM became heroes for the North
Vietnamese, the IRA [Irish Republican Army] of Northern Ireland, the peasants
of Southern France, the aboriginal peoples of Australia and Africa. The greatest
beneficiaries of the American Indian Movement are the tribal council leaders who
are always quick to seize opportunities created by the Movement, and to claim
unwarranted credit for the positive social changes won for Indian people.
The tribal leaders and others who denounce AIM justify their actions by
pointing out the human weaknesses of individual AIM people, with never a
glance at their own. Individuals, unfortunately, do have weaknesses, but the
sovereignty and survival of Indian nations does not rest upon the shoulders of any
one man or woman, no matter how strong. Our future as a distinct people in
control of our destiny rests on the strength of our collective unity and common
purpose. Indian people can disagree ‘till doomsday about which defensive
strategy is best, or whether we should even resist. If we continue to disagree on
politics, policy, philosophy, and enter into destructive personality clashes, we will
all lose. Our enemies never rest. They are ever unified around the purpose of
achieving our total destruction.
Indian people with dedication and expertise are generally considered
threats by despotic tribal officials. If they do not silently walk the sacred
“program guidelines,” they soon find themselves standing in the long
unemployment lines. The potentially strong social service programs are
constipated by bureaucratic “white” tape from Washington, D.C….
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The beneficiaries of the young warriors of the Movement live in new
homes, drive new cars, live longer, have better health, are bettered educated, have
well-paid jobs, etc., while the real warriors lie unrecognized in their graves or in
prison cells… Neither AIM nor any other organized resistance movement of
Indian people begrudges any benefit their people receive; they rejoice at all
improvements, this is what they fight for…
It is time that Indian people, those who have received most from the
American Indian Movement, took some time to count their blessings, to give
credit where credit is due. Don’t forget the warriors, we may never see their like
again.55
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Chapter Six: Internationalism
The United States of America has continually violated the independent Native
Peoples of this continent by Executive Action, Legislative fiat[,] and Judicial
decision. By its actions the U.S. has denied all Native people their International
Treaty rights, Treaty lands[,] and basic human rights of freedom and
sovereignty… Sovereign people of varying cultures have the absolute right to live
in harmony with Mother Earth so long as they do not infringe upon this same
right of other peoples. The denial of this right to any sovereign people, such as the
Native American Indian Nations, must be challenged by truth and action. World
concern must focus on all colonial governments to the end that sovereign people
everywhere shall live as they choose, in peace with dignity and freedom. The
International Indian Treaty Conference hereby adopts this Declaration of
Continuing Independence of the Sovereign Native American Indian Nations. In
the course of these human events, we call upon the people of the world to support
this struggle for our sovereign rights and our treaty rights. We pledge our
assistance to all other sovereign people who seek their own independence… We
recognize that there is only one color of Mankind in the world who are not
represented in the United Nations; that is the indigenous Redman of the Western
Hemisphere. We recognize this lack of representation in the United Nation comes
from the genocidal policy of the colonial power of the United States.
— First International Indian Treaty Council, “Declaration of Continuing
Independence,” Standing Rock, 19741
As we came with this Pipe [as a symbol of peace], also we come with the Treaty,
the 1868 [Fort Laramie] Treaty. That Treaty is bloody. It was made over a
hundred years ago. It was our elders who told us that this was a good Treaty. But
somebody spilled blood on this Treaty. And they said, “You are going before the
world with your Pipe, and you will offer it to the world, the world community,
and if they accept, then together we can help to clean this Treaty.”
—Larry Red Shirt, Lakota Treaty Council, Palais de Nations, Geneva,
Switzerland, 19772
Too often are the North American Indigenous experiences viewed separately from
global histories of European colonialism. The long history of Indigenous anticolonial
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struggle against invasion from initial contact onwards profoundly challenges this view.
Yet, many still resist a simple truth: Native nations remain under US tutelage in an
unambiguous colonial relationship. From nineteenth century wars of extermination to the
mass relocation and flooding of lands by Pick-Sloan dams in the twentieth century, the
evidence is clear. For more than a century a foreign occupying power has attempted to
gut the political and cultural life of the Oceti Sakowin and other Indigenous nations to
seize land. It has imposed alien government and policies over Native lives, lands, and
destinies in which they have had little or no say.
To accomplish this feat, Indigenous peoples not only had to be physically
removed from their homelands, have their economies and livelihoods destroyed, and have
their lands taken. They also had to be denied independent nationhood, made into
“domestic dependent nations,” and placed squarely under the sole authority of the US.
These are textbook definitions of imperialism. Today, with little thought, many still refer
to Natives as domestic “minority populations,” a “race,” or an “ethnicity.” Because the
US labels those who it imposes foreign domination upon a minority, it begs the question:
what purpose does it serve to make Indigenous peoples a minority in their own lands
other than to legitimize conquest? Indigenous peoples are the original nations of this land.
Yet in the course of less than a century the “Indian problem” went from a foreign policy
“problem” to a domestic policy “problem.” We should be questioning and challenging —
not reproducing — the means by which the “Indian problem” was and continues to be
removed from the international realm and placed squarely under the sole authority of a
non-Indigenous, colonizing state. Such practices didn’t end in the nineteenth century, and
neither did the struggle for Native liberation.
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In the hot summer of 1974, a humble but historic gathering took place in Standing
Rock along the banks of the Missouri River. Five thousand people from more than 97
different Indigenous nations met from June 8-16, 1974. By the end of that week, the
International Indian Treaty Council was formed. The Treaty Council became the
international arm of the American Indian Movement (AIM) to gain international
recognition for Indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere at the United Nations. It
achieved consultative status with the Economic and Social Council in 1977, and used this
platform to advance Indigenous peoples’ rights under international law.
At its first meeting, the Treaty Council spelled out its strategy as one that placed
Indigenous nationhood and treaty rights as fundamental aspects of their collective
political identities. Its founding document, the “Declaration of Continuing
Independence,” stated: “We condemn the United States of America for its gross violation
of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty in militarily surrounding, killing, and starving the
citizens of the Independent Oglala Nation into exile.” It urged “conscionable nations to
join us in charging and prosecuting the United States of America for its genocidal
practices against the sovereign Native Nations; most recently illustrated by Wounded
Knee 1973 and the continued refusal to sign the United Nations 1948 Treaty on
Genocide.”3 After the 71-day siege on Wounded Knee in 1973, AIM leadership had been
arrested and tied up in courts. Then came the brutal repression under the infamous FBI
Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) that nearly destroyed Indigenous, Black,
and revolutionary movements in the US. The strategic turn to international human rights
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law largely saved the movement from utter collapse in this moment of intense state
repression.4
But it was not the first instance of the affirmation of what historian Daniel Cobb
calls a “global Indigenous identity.”5 The historical context of the Treaty Council matters,
as well as the long tradition of Indigenous internationalism it belonged to. Twentieth
century pan-Indigenous movements were a result of more than a decade of Red Power
organizing that began in the early 1960s, nearly a decade before the creation of AIM.
Before that, in the 1950s Flathead scholar and writer D’Arcy McNickle and the National
Congress of American Indians had explored a similar intellectual and political terrain of
internationalism. And before that, the Society of American Indians advocated for seat at
the table during the 1919 Paris peace talks and representation at the League of Nations. In
each instance, while different in important ways, the question was posed: if Indigenous
peoples are nations, why are they not afforded the right to self-determination?
Self-determination for oppressed nations has become ubiquitous expression in
progressive and left circles. It often is used to apply to other parts of the world and not
North America. Woodrow Wilson and V. I. Lenin represent two strands of this thinking
in dealing with the colonial question during World War I, the focus of the first section of
this chapter.6 Wilson argued for self-determination with a limited sets of rights without
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radically upsetting the colonial order. Lenin argued for full self-determination and
independence from colonial rule as part of a global communist revolution, an aspiration
that was widely received by many in Third World decolonization movements. While each
held their own merits for various strands of US left and progressive politics, the full
emancipation of Indigenous nations from foreign occupation has never been a major
priority in leftist circles. If anything it continues to be an afterthought if it is ever
considered at all. Rather than trying to understand and undo settler colonialism as the
fundamental relation of US power structures, decolonization is seen as a tack-on struggle
among many other struggles rather than the struggle. Part of the problem is pure
American exceptionalism: the US is no longer or has never been colonial, the thinking (or
forgetting) goes. But it begs the question, when did the US stop occupying Indigenous
lands? Twentieth century Indigenous movements began to see the limitations of wanting
to build a utopic society atop stolen lands. They began to see themselves as having more
in common with other colonized peoples within and beyond the US. Change within the
current system bent on your elimination also provided little relief.
The Treaty Council advocated Indigenous nationhood as part of this global
anticolonial movement. After decades of land loss, bare survival, attempts to work with
federal programs, filing court cases, defeating termination legislation, and facing mass
relocation, an assertion of Oceti Sakowin sovereignty went from ambition to prescription.
Few avenues remained other than pursuing treaty rights. Treaties made with the US were
proof of nationhood. But what legal institution would uphold this position if the US
refused to? If the goal was to reverse the unjust occupation of an entire continent, the
advancement of Indigenous rights through the very legal and political systems that
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justified that occupation in the first place proved limited in some cases and hopeless in
others. To survive, AIM and the Treaty Council had to look elsewhere to make their
case beyond the confines of the most powerful political construct in world history: the
nation-state. Their primary goal was the recognition of Indigenous peoples among the
family of nations at the UN. Other Indigenous groups seeking international recognition
looked to the North Atlantic states for allies, the traditional European imperial powers. In
contrast, the Treaty Council looked to the Global South, to the darker nations, where
decolonization bloomed. How they got there is important to this story.
The Treaty Council’s internationalism wasn’t particularly new. It simply built
upon what was already a vibrant political tradition. Prior to European contact Indigenous
nations had entered into relations with each other for alliance, kinship, war, peace, or
trade. As shown in previous chapters, agreements were not solely between human nations
but also included nonhuman nations as well, such as the buffalo and the land. Treaties —
even ones not made with the US or other European powers — were and are the basis of
international diplomacy and the very evidence of Indigenous nationhood prior to and
existing alongside the US. After all, one does not enter into treaties with domestic or
“internal” populations. The very basis of sovereignty is the power to negotiate
relationships between those who are seen as different — between other sovereigns and
nations. Two central concepts — “sovereignty” and “nation” — possess different
meanings for Indigenous peoples that are not always equal to their European
counterparts. And they don’t always mean what we think they mean. After all, ideas
don’t drop from the skies. The Red Power movement of the 1960s and its predecessors
popularized the language of sovereignty, nationhood, and self-determination through
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struggle and reinforced the multiple types of agreements that existed prior to US
colonization. We have these brave warriors and revolutionaries to thank for the
commonplace status these ideas hold in contemporary Indigenous vocabulary.
These words, however, were not anathema to Indigenous peoples prior to the Red
Power movement. But what do they mean? And where did they come from? While doing
important defensive work, on face value these concepts only partially reflect traditions of
Indigenous resistance. Struggles over their meaning were and are not benign. Nor are
they hollow or without history. By placing Indigenous nationhood in historical context, a
more robust understanding of sovereignty emerges. In most cases, sovereignty is linked
to bare survival — life and death struggles. Countless Indigenous peoples across North
America and the world have fought, died, and struggled to reclaim, restore, and redefine
these powerful ideas. The goal has been to take their proper place in the family of
nations.
From the beginning the Treaty Council set upon redefining and reclaiming
Indigenous peoples as part of the global project for emancipation. It was a drastic shift in
strategy from the more spectacular armed struggle to one of steady work towards
international recognition through solidarity with other colonized peoples and nations. But
had it not been for armed struggle, there would have been no Treaty Council. Had there
been no Treaty Council, it is doubtful there would have been the 2007 UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the hallmark achievement of the more than four
decades of international and UN work. But this story has deeper origins dating back to
more modest and untold beginnings.
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In this chapter, I explore the origins of Indigenous internationalism in the
twentieth century, studying what led to the formation of the Treaty Council and the
important political project it embarked upon making alliances with the Third World
movements and colonized peoples the world over. First, I trace the roots of Indigenous
internationalism in the work of Society of American Indians and its work with the 1868
Fort Laramie Treaty.

The Roots of Internationalism
Indigenous internationalism didn’t form in a vacuum, and the Treaty Council’s
assertion of a global Indigenous identity wasn’t particularly “new.” The Treaty Council
was simply the “next” generation — another iteration of traditions of Indigenous
resistance building on past experiences. It was part of a centuries-long tradition of
constructing and reconstructing the aspirations of nationhood, and imagining and
reimagining its meaning and possibilities. It should be no surprise, although it is to many,
that Indigenous peoples were nations prior to the European arrival who didn’t need the
company nor the recognition of Europeans to engage in international politics.
Prior to and during colonization, Indigenous nations had self-organized into
deliberate confederacies, alliances, and governments. The Nation of the Seven Council
Fires, or the Oceti Sakowin, for instance, is a confederacy of seven different nations of
Lakota-, Dakota-, and Nakota-speaking peoples in the Northern Plains and Western Great
Lakes. Yet they are hardly unique. In North America the Creek Confederacy in the
Southeast, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy of Six Nations in the Northeast, the Council
of Three Fires made up of Ojibwes, Odawas, and Potawatomis in the Great Lakes region,
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the United Indian Nations in the Ohio River Valley under the Shawnee leadership of
Tecumseh, the All Indian Pueblo Council of the Southwest, the Iron Confederacy of the
Northern Plains, and many more political confederacies flourished prior to, alongside,
and in spite of settler states.7 The international character of historic and contemporary
Indigenous political identity, however, didn’t just emerge from a primordial past. During
the colonial period, it arose from conditions not of its own making and was born in
struggle and resistance. More radical Indigenous internationalists frequently viewed
themselves not just in relation to the US but also in relation to other colonized peoples
and territories within and beyond the US.
Modern Oceti Sakowin internationalism, for instance, traces its origins to the
early twentieth century, an unlikely but rich place to begin this history. The Red Power
movement of the 1960s was not the first to use the language of anti-colonialism,
nationalism, and self-determination. Often the early 1900s are generally viewed as a low
point for Indigenous activism and resistance. An estimated pre-colonial population of
tens of millions Indigenous peoples in North America alone had been reduced to about
300,000, the survivors of centuries of genocidal policies, disease, warfare, removal,
imprisonment to reservations, and elimination by other means. For Flathead historian
D’Arcy McNickle writing in 1949, two processes contributed greatly to the decimation of
Indigenous nations: the institution of private property (and therefore private wealth and
political power) and the destruction of Indigenous governance that land held in common.
Indigenous nations in the time possessed little of either: property and political power.
Indigenous territory had been drastically diminished, and the reservation system had
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overthrown customary governments. If Indigenous peoples once constituted the tree of
the Americas whose roots deeply entwined in the land, it was “the growth from the
severed stump,” McNickle argued, that was the pivotal challenge of the twentieth
century.8 Physical extermination and the repression of Indigenous political power verified
genocidal intent but had not accomplished its purpose. And despite otherwise stated
pluralistic claims of inclusion, McNickle concluded that the US simply “can not tolerate a
nation within a nation.”9 If Natives were to be assimilated, they would be assimilated as
individuals and not as nations. In the popular imaginary, Natives disappeared into the
wilderness of history, were never truly nations, and had been overpowered by a superior
civilization. If they were nations, they were eclipsed and replaced by the real nation
— the US. Notwithstanding such erasure, vibrant Indigenous political traditions
persisted. But to the untrained eye, nothing was awry. From the severed stump began to
regrow the tree of resistance that would bloom revolt decades later.
From this era two Dakota activists and intellectuals stand out as forbearers to
current Indigenous internationalism but by no means the only ones. The first was
Ohiyesa, or Charles Eastman, a Mdewakantonwan medical doctor born and raised in
buffalo hide tipi in his Dakota homelands. At age four Eastman and his family fled to
Canada after the Dakotas were violently expelled from Minnesota Territory during the
1862 US-Dakota War. He later attended a Christian mission school, graduated from
Dartmouth College in 1887, and graduated from Boston University with a medical
degree. Dr. Eastman was among the first Natives to practice European medicine as a
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licensed physician and became a BIA physician who treated Lakota casualties of the
1890 Wounded Knee Massacre in Pine Ridge.10
The second prominent activist was Zitkala-Ša, née Gertrude Simmons, an
Ihanktonwan writer, musician, and activist born the same year as the Battle of Greasy
Grass along the Missouri River in the Yankton reservation. As a child Quaker
missionaries plucked Zitkala-Ša from the reservation and sent her to a Christian mission
school in Indiana. A product of government- and church-run boarding schools, Zitkala-Ša
became an instructor at Carlisle and also one of its staunchest critics. Her biting wit and
strident Indigenous nationalism launched her literary career and lifelong commitment to
restore her nation to its proper place in history. More so than her peers, including
Eastman, Zitkala-Ša advocated Indigenous cultural renewal and a radical form of political
self-determination, which made her, according to one biographer, “a forerunner of Red
Power.”11 Both were, however, unique products of their time: boarding school-educated
but firmly rooted in Indigenous history, culture, and politics.
Eastman and Zitkala-Ša joined the formally educated Natives known as “Red
Progressives,” the generation of the intellectuals and professionals who founded the
Society of American Indians (SAI) in 1911. Eastman was a founding member of SAI.
Zitkala-Ša later joined to serve as its secretary and editor of the SAI’s quarterly
newsletter, the American Indian Magazine. Although short-lived (officially disbanding in
1923), SAI became the first entirely American Indian-led, national professional
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organization and an ideological precursor to the National Congress of American Indians
founded in 1944. Like its Progressive Era contemporaries, such as the Black-led NAACP
founded two years earlier, SAI addressed what were viewed as domestic race relations
between Indigenous peoples and dominant US society. As such, Red Progressives
believed increased access to education and further incorporation into US society were
essential for viable future. To their minds, this didn’t disavow the possibility of a distinct
Indigenous nationhood. In fact, access to education was an aspect of many Indigenous
treaties.
The understanding of how to get free, however, differed among fellow race
progressives. Foremost among SAI’s goals was the abolition of the Indian Bureau, the
end of allotment, the upholding of treaty rights, and the granting of US citizenship to
Indigenous peoples. Each was contingent upon the other to foster the renewal of
Indigenous life and self-determination. The fulfilment of treaty obligations and US
citizenship didn’t — and still don’t — neatly fit within Black-white racial binaries. Often
overlooked are histories and contemporary realities of settler colonialism. To underscore
the difference, at the first SAI meeting Winnebago activist Arthur Hensley drew from the
example of Oceti Sakowin treaty rights: “[The Sioux] wanted to know why the negroes
have no bureau at Washington, while the Indians have [one]. Is it because the Indian has
land and the negro has none, and they do not care what becomes of him?” Central to
Indigenous freedom has always been the question of land — not just social equality. But
the Oceti Sakowin, Hensley continued, “say they never had any agreement, nor did they

222

understand that they were to be wards of anyone, nor have they ever been conquered.”12
The solution to this problem, he argued, required protected citizenship since the Indian
Bureau had failed at guardianship, and since guardianship was neither desired nor
welcomed in the first place.
Calls for citizenship and formal equality under the law could be viewed as
assimilationist — and in many cases they were. Some Indigenous nations, such as the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy, by contrast, asserted their sovereignty by flatly rejecting
settler citizenship in the US and in Canada. For others citizenship was not about complete
surrender to the nation-state. At its first annual meeting in 1912, SAI framed the “Indian
problem” this way:
Not only has the Indian been abruptly torn from his [sic] natural environment but
he has been thrust into a false environment inconsistent with the modern
conceptions of enlightened conditions. He is thus doubly wronged… held in the
grip of false conditions, neither able nor caring to assume his former condition nor
able to adjust himself to the normal conditions of modern society. He is neither
citizen nor a foreigner… One great law makes him a citizen and another denies
him the privilege of exercising the rights of such. Thrust upon a reservation he is
told that he is a nation and that the reservation is his country. Contracts made with
his “nation” are dignified with the title of “treaty,” yet he is unable to exercise the
rights of a nation or to enforce the provisions of the treaty.13
During the conference SAI members weighed in on treaties as both problem and
possibility: yes, under US law they possessed treaty rights as nations, but the status of
those rights were determined by an external power that often curtailed Indigenous
nationhood. Eastman scoffed at the absurdity of going from “an independent foreign
nation” to that of a “domestic dependent nation.” He preferred as a more accurate

12

Quoted in Society of American Indians, Report of the Executive Council on the Proceedings of
the First Annual Conference of the Society of American Indians (Washington, D.C.: Society of American
Indians, 1912), 150.
13
Ibid., 11.

223

description, a “perpetual inhabitant with diminutive rights,” citing Chief Justice John
Marshall’s ruling in the 1823 Johnson v. M’Intosh decision.14
Since the 1887 Dawes Act, US citizenship could only be achieved by individual
Natives if they privatized and, therefore, diminished collective treaty lands. Once
individual Natives proved “competence” through land stewardship and agriculture, they
were eligible for citizenship. Even then it was never a guarantee. Citizenship was a form
of elimination because it required individuals to relinquish collective rights, property, and
identity to become private landowners and citizens. As “perpetual inhabitants,” they were
not considered permanent members of nations in control of their own territory and
destinies. “After negotiating treaties as an equal,” Eastman commented, “[the Indian] was
strangely born again a child — incompetent, irresponsible, and unable to think for
himself.”15 Thomas Sloan, an Omaha lawyer, argued that Indigenous treaties, like all
treaties, “were made with the solemnity of international law.” But “within the judgement
of civilized government,” such as the US, “civilized nations made treaties with the Indians
as a matter of expediency” and not with the sincerity of equal partnership.16 Despite this
unequal position of ward to guardian, Eastman replied, “We must try the highest
obligation of all civilized nations; treaties; the highest obligation; the international law.”17
The failure of the US to uphold basic moral principles and the humanity of
Indigenous peoples was not lost on Eastman. “I have discovered after thirty-five years in
civilization,” he stated, “that there is no Christian civilization.” For Eastman, a Christian
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himself, Christianity possessed a universal morality. On the other hand, Western
civilization was about industrial progress that trampled Indigenous peoples and other
marginalized people underfoot. This led him to conclude that morality and the aspirations
of Western civilization were “irreconcilable.”18 “When I reduce civilization to its lowest
terms,” Eastman wrote, “it becomes a system of life based on trade. The dollar is the
measure of value and might still spells right; otherwise, why war?” Unlike many of his
contemporaries who often made a living by performing in “Indian pageants” for white
audiences, Eastman sternly declared his “chief objective” as a public intellectual and
advocate was “not to entertain.” His mission “was a campaign of education on the Indian
and his true place in American history.” The “barbarous and atrocious” characterizations
of Natives as backwards cultures when compared to the “commercialism of the white
man” had led to a “deep demoralization” of both Natives and whites.19 Thus, Eastman’s
mission was one of moral and spiritual redemption of both white and Indigenous
societies. To his mind, the sins of a settler nation could only be redeemed when
Indigenous peoples once again took their proper place in history and society. For this
occur, it had to be done on Indigenous peoples’ own terms.
This didn’t stop SAI from working within US racial politics, or what were
dubiously called “race relations.” Eastman had befriended Black intellectual and activist
W. E. B. Du Bois. There is no doubt Du Bois’ had an impact on Eastman and the early
direction of SAI, of which Du Bois was the only non-Native voting member.20 In 1911
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Eastman published The Soul of the Indian, adopting a similar title to Du Bois’ 1903 book
The Souls of Black Folk. While different in scope, each book shared a similar
commitment to creating a racial imaginary in which the souls of a white nation and those
who it excluded were at stake. “Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked
question,” Du Bois famously wrote in The Souls of Black Folk, “How does it feel to be a
problem?” The question cut to the bone of Black experience in the US under Jim Crow,
as something defined as a problem to be dealt with. This definition of the “Negro
problem” was a problem for Du Bois because it was set apart from what actually
constituted racism — the legacies of slavery, institutions of segregation, lynching, and
racial terror. His diagnosis of the “Negro problem” was one that led to Blacks developing
a “double consciousness,” “two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings” — one
“American” and the other “Negro.” This racial imaginary extended beyond the US. Du
Bois famously declared, “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the
color-line — the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in
America and the islands of the sea.”21
Du Bois looked to the South for a history of the color line. In his narrative he
navigates the “Black Belt” by train where he invites fellow travelers to witness US
history from the vantage of a segregated “Jim Crow Car.” The train cuts through the
“ancient land of the Cherokees — that brave Indian nation which strove so long for its
fatherland, until Fate and the United States Government drove them beyond the
Mississippi.” He goes on to condense the history of the Black Belt by referencing in
passing Hernando de Soto, the Georgia slave trade, the Creek Confederacy, the Haitian
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Revolution, and Cherokee presence and removal. According to Du Bois’ account of
southeastern Indigenous resistance, “the war-cry was hushed and the Indians glided back
into the west.”22 While perceptive of race in the binary, Du Bois could not make sense of
the vexed history of settler colonialism nor the continued existence of Indigenous nations
in the South and elsewhere.
The eclipsing of Native presence by making them a past or an “ancient” culture is
a popular convention in history and contemporary politics. To counter this, in The Soul of
an Indian, Eastman embraced “the human, not the ethnological standpoint.” He dismissed
ethnographies written by “strangers” that reduced complex Indigenous social systems to a
“matter of curiosity.” The salvage ethnography of the day held, similar to Du Bois’
description, that Indigenous peoples were the last vestiges of a dying race far removed
from their homelands and far removed from the modern world. During this time,
anthropologists flooded Indian reservations intent on preserving this “ancient” people
believed to always be on the brink of extinction. Knowledge of this vanishing race had to
be extracted through their stories and by digging up their remains, in what amounted to
little more than grave robbing under the guise of “archeology.” In contrast, Eastman
aimed “not to pile up more bones, but to clothe them with flesh and blood.” Put simply,
Indigenous peoples were humans with rights. Eastman desired to engage the world on
terms of cultural integrity and self-determination. He compared Native religion with
Christianity and emphasized the fallacy of Europe’s impulse to civilize, which was
merely the “lust for money, power[,] and conquest so characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon
race.” Under the moral authority “of their God,” the US made treaties with Indigenous
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nations that “were promptly and shamelessly broken.” Indigenous history could not be
simply grafted on Black-white racial dynamics. It missed what Eastman characterized as
“not only the anger, but contempt” for earlier crimes and ongoing colonialism.23
Such erasure, however, is not Du Bois’ alone and still persists today. White
supremacy, capitalism, and settler colonialism are not exclusive projects but, rather, work
together. In other words, Black history and Indigenous history cannot be told apart from
each other. For example, after the Civil War the US deployed federal troops to the South
to oversee Reconstruction. Once support for Black enfranchisement waned, the US army
didn’t just disappear into thin air. It moved West to crush Indigenous resistance. Indian
wars of the west set to take and secure land and resources and pull the nation out of a
recession. The end of Reconstruction, which brought sweeping reforms, such as public
education that benefited both poor white and Black southerners, coincided with the
abolition of the treaty making with Indigenous peoples in 1871 and a concerted military
effort to secure the western frontier. While education of recently freed slaves and poor
people in general was a significant achievement, militarized boarding schools were used
to destroy Indigenous families and, according to colonel Richard Pratt, the founder of
Carlisle Indian School, to “kill the Indian, save the man.”24
The US military, in this sense, was used to secure freedoms for some while
destroying the freedoms and existence of others. Federal troops were deployed to reign in
and crush Oceti Sakowin resistance and to secure US possession of the Black Hills,
where gold was discovered. In 1876 the Oceti Sakowin, with the Cheyennes and
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Arapahos, famously defeated the Seventh Cavalry, under the command of Custer, at the
Battle of Greasy Grass, the same year Reconstruction officially ended. In this sense, the
US went from crushing a domestic rebellion of elite slave-owning secessionists, to
providing the necessary force for Southern Reconstruction, to invading Indigenous lands
in the West to expand its empire. Despite popular myth, the 1898 Spanish-American War
was neither the first nor the last US imperial endeavor. The entire premise of the US was
founded upon the foreign invasion, occupation, and control of Indigenous lands. In this
way, settler colonialism is imperialism. Du Bois and his Red Progressive comrades such
as Eastman, however, lacked this insight.
As race progressives, Eastman and Du Bois didn’t confine their activism to just
US audiences. The same year SAI formed in 1911, Eastman was chosen to represent
American Indians at the Universal Races Congress in London July 26-29. Unlike other
colonized peoples from other continents, he was the only Indigenous person invited from
the Western Hemisphere. Accoring to conference proceedings, the gathering proposed to
address “the problem of the contact of European with other developed types of
civilization.” Most discussion, however, focused on East-West binaries. When
colonization and imperialism were mentioned, it happened everywhere other than North
America. The goal of the meeting was to foster understanding among nations and races
across the world under the banner of cultural pluralism. Elite Western intellectuals, such
as anthropologist Franz Boas, dominated the conference. They argued racial difference
was due to external factors not biology or racial inferiority. Difficult questions of history
and politics were almost ignored altogether. “The object of the Congress,” the organizers
advised, “will be to discuss, in the light of science and modern conscience, the general
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relations subsisting between the peoples of the West and those of the East, between socalled white and so-called coloured peoples, with a view to encouraging between them a
fuller understanding, the most friendly feelings, and a heartier co-operation.” The debates
pursued were ethical and barred any presentations of “a political character” or any
“particular scheme for reforms.”25
In London, Eastman presented during the same session as Du Bois. In his talk,
Eastman attempted to establish a racial identity for Natives as a way to be counted among
the minorities of the world. But he was quick to note the “pauperising effect” of the
reservation system as a “miserable prison existence.” The world could ignore the
imprisonment of Indigenous peoples while praising their culture, making them “like that
of a wild animal confined in a zoological garden.”26 His solution to the “Indian problem”
was not a return the past. Only US citizenship and the abolition of the Indian Bureau
prevented the fulfilment of treaty rights. Citizenship and equality, however, didn’t mean
sameness. Echoing the views of his SAI compatriots, Indigenous identity could be both
“American” and distinctly “Indian.” But that was as far as Eastman ever went. His was a
spiritual awakening, a reconciliation of the Native identity with the modern world.
Eastman admitted that he was an advocate “in this new line of defense of the native
American, not so much of his rights in the land as of his character and religion.”27
Eastman’s global appeals, however, didn’t stop there and others such as ZitkalaŠa had more robust and confrontational approaches. When the US entered the First World
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War in 1917, SAI began adopting more and more the language of nationalism,
internationalism, and anticolonialism. Natives volunteered for military service at rates far
surpassing any other group, while most were not considered US citizens. An astounding
25 percent of all adult Native men served in some capacity compared to 15 percent of the
US population. Most were drawn from the ranks of off-reservation boarding schools,
where pupils had been indoctrinated with military discipline and US patriotism.28 Because
of military service, SAI believed, wrongly, that the US would live up to its democratic
commitments to Indigenous peoples and help them attain a world forum alongside other
colonized peoples. In SAI’s quarterly publication, American Indian Magazine, Zitkala-Ša
wrote, “The sunbursts of democratic ideals cannot bring new hope and courage to the
small peoples of the earth without reaching the remotest corners within America’s own
bounds… As America has declared democracy abroad, so must we consistently practice
it at home.” The ultimate goal was nothing short of Native people attaining “their rightful
position among the peoples of the world.”29
For many in SAI, it was a turning point in the political direction of the
organization. War also meant the draft. How could a country conscript those not
considered citizens? Apache medical doctor Carlos Montezuma, a former SAI member
who left the organization as his politics became more radical, argued a Native draft was
morally “wrong.” Intensely suspicious of the Indian Office and the federal government,
Montezuma became a strident opponent of forced conscription. “The Indian Office keeps
us Indians from our rights,” Montezuma wrote in 1917, the year the Selective Service Act
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was passed, “It tells the country that we are competent soldiers, but are not competent
citizens… We are nothing but wards; we are not citizens and we are without a country in
this world… The wards are called upon to protect their Protectors!”30 His fiery rhetoric
and activism attracted the attention of the US Bureau of Investigation (which later
became the FBI). That same year the Espionage Act made antiwar activity a criminal
offense punishable by a prison sentence, while the 1918 Sedition Act did the same for
those using “disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language” toward US institutions
such as the Indian Bureau and national symbols such as the flag. Thousands of draft
resisters were either deported or imprisoned. Most famously, six-time socialist
presidential candidate Eugen V. Debs was charged in the summer of 1918 and swiftly
sentenced to prison. Perhaps fearing reprisals against its own members, SAI adopted a
nationalist approach to the war. One member went as far as to denounce the 1917 Green
Corn Rebellion in Oklahoma, which was a Native-led armed uprising of poor whites,
Blacks, Seminoles, and Muscogee Creeks against the Selective Service Act.31
In spite of its best efforts, however, the American Indian Magazine under the
leadership of Zitkala-Ša came under fire for subversive content. After US entry into the
war and during the same month of the October 1917 Bolshevik ascension to power during
the Russian Revolution, Zitkala-Ša’s opening editorial read, “BREAK THE SHACKLES
NOW, MAKE US FREE.” The special issue, called “The Sioux Number,” detailed the
horror the Oceti Sakowin endured during the brutal military campaigns after the 1862
US-Dakota War, at the 1890 Wounded Knee Massacre, and the legacy of the US’s
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broken promises contained in the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty. The editors of the
controversial issue also called for the abolition of the Indian Bureau, the creation of a
comprehensive program that allowed individual Indigenous nations to opt for or against
US citizenship, and the upholding of treaty rights, especially the validity of the 1868
Treaty. Once these bold demands were met could the US retain moral authority in the
world — or so they believed.32
Criticism also targeted US military aggression. A sarcastic play on the patriotic
anthem “My Country ‘Tis of Thee,” Zitkala-Ša penned a rebuke of US nationalism in her
poem “The Red Man’s America.” She changed the verse “Land where my fathers died/
Land of the pilgrims’ pride/ From ev’ry mountainside/ Let freedom ring!” to “Land
where OUR fathers died/ Whose offspring are denied/ The Franchise given wide/ Hark,
while I sing.”33 In another poem, “A Sioux Woman’s Love for Her Grandchild,” she
depicted the courage of grandmother who refuses to leave her grandchild behind as they
are overrun by US soldiers, noting the courage of the Oceti Sakowin and tyranny of the
military.34 Other contributors joined her in condemning militarism. “Why proclaim the
sacredness of a treaty, or cry ‘Shame!’ to the German invasion of Belgium?” Eastman
asked, attacking the hypocrisy of US military intervention in Europe.
In 1868 the United States Government guaranteed all of the Black Hills and the
Big Horn region to the Sioux. It was agreed that no white man should enter it
without the Indians’ consent. It was the only buffalo country left to them; upon it
depended their very subsistence! What happened? Gold was discovered in these
mountains only two years after the treaty was signed, and gold seekers invaded
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the country and took it by force. Did the press defend the Indians’ rights? Did any
of our Senators indulge in oratorical sentiment in their behalf? Not they.35
To soften what could be read as sedition, Oglala SAI member Chauncey Yellow Robe
qualified the strident criticism: “The Sioux are not picketing the White House in a
heckling campaign… Their finest men are picketing on the war front in France and
asking the world court if the defender of liberty is not entitled to its privileges.”36
Efforts to soften the rhetoric failed. Brutal honesty unnerved policymakers and
allies with “unmixed horror,” and the danger of government suppression was real. Critics
accused the American Indian Magazine editor Zitkala-Ša of becoming the “rankest
Bolshevekist” who had descended into “Apacheism,” a derogatory term for criminal
gangs. “If we were severe,” Zitkala-Ša reminded critics, “the faults we saw were still
more severe.”37 She clarified her position in a 1919 editorial titled “The Black Hills
Council.” She argued that if “[the Sioux] were good enough to fight and die for world
democracy,” then they were “worthy of full American citizenship and the protection of
the law under our constitution.”38 The eagerness of Congress to send non-citizens to war
but to ignore their legitimate grievances over treaty rights infuriated Zitkala-Ša. While
they sent their sons overseas to fight and die, Oceti Sakowin treaty council leaders — all
respected elders — went before Congress to plead their case; they drafted bills that would
allow them to take the Black Hills claim to court and hire their own legal counsel. “One
after another these bills failed passage by Congress,” she recalled, “while access to the
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Court of Claims to all other Americans was comparatively easy, types of men like the
I.W.W. [the Industrial Workers of the World] and the Bolsheveki [were] not excepted.”39
Clearly referencing the attacks on SAI and its magazine, Zitkala-Ša spoke a simple truth:
even the anarchists, socialists, communists, and draft resisters, all considered enemies of
the state, had their day in court and some protections under the law. Any talk of
Indigenous treaties, stolen land, genocide, the Black Hills, and citizenship, however, was
rejected as treasonous or simply ignored. Those issues could not even be entertained in a
court room because the US refused to recognize its own criminal behavior — and it
refused to recognize the Oceti Sakowin as neither citizens nor their own nation. “Small
wonder that Immortal Justice must be blindfolded upon her marble pedestal lest her
tranquility be marred by the Red Man’s dilemma!” Zitkala-Ša exclaimed in frustration.40
But SAI offered other possibilities beyond the US, as the promise of a new political order
arose at the conclusion of the Great War.
World wars are transformative events. Not only do they end lives but also
established orders — institutions, ideas, and norms. The First World War decimated
millions of lives and caused untold devastation. It also threw the stability of international
relations into crisis. In its wake, a world hoped for, and anticipated, a postwar future to be
entirely different from the past. Natives in the US were not different. The war and the rise
of President Woodrow Wilson’s internationalism provided a new avenue for Native
activism. In particular, Wilson’s Fourteen Points gave meaning to US involvement in the
war. He argued the sacrifice of US lives and resources and the creation of an international
body would prevent another world war. Among his principle visions were the right of
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national self-determination and the adjustment of colonial regimes. His position ran
against the strong isolationism of the US, and in the end Congress rejected membership
to the League of Nations.41
As peace approached, SAI members such as Eastman, Zitkala-Ša, and
Montezuma were undeterred by Congress’ stubbornnes and seized upon Wilson’s
principles to defend Native rights. In 1919, Zitkala-Ša optimistically exclaimed: “The
eyes of the world are upon the Peace Conference sitting in Paris. Under the new sun an
epoch is being staged. Little peoples are to be granted the right of self-determination!
Small nations and remnants of nations are to sit beside their great allies at the Peace
Table.” She declared support for the various US delegations, such as one led by Du
Bois.42 Montezuma was more critical. He wrote in a 1918 piece, provocatively titled
“Another Kaiser in America”:
If there will be a Peace Conference of all the nations after the war, the Society of
American Indians should delegate a representative from the Indian race. Why?
Because we Indians are nations. We Indians have never received justice from the
hands of the United States. We have been relegated to the outside realm of
humanity. There is no picture as black as the history of our race. You may speak
about abuses and mistreatment received by the Belgians, Bohemians, Poles,
Serbians and other nations of the old country, their griefs and wild kings are no
comparison to the treatment of the Indians at the hands of the American
Government. Five hundred years have rolled by and the Indians are not free yet.
Five hundred years since the invasion of the pale faced race on the domain of the
Indians and they do not enjoy the rights of human beings. This righteous war is a
mockery to the Indian race, if we are not allowed at the Peace Conference.43
“[T]he world’s after-council must establish a new international relationship,” Eastman
further pleaded echoing Zitkala-Ša’s concern. “And this new order must begin at home.”
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The scourge of wardship was an explicit colonial condition and thoroughly undemocratic.
It stunted the renewal of Indigenous autonomy and was counter to the Wilson’s principles
of self-determination. “The Indian Bureau, instead of being the servant of the people and
of the Indians in accordance with treaty stipulations, has grown into a petty autocracy,”
Eastman continued. “The whole system reminds of the story of Two-Face in the Sioux
legend. He stole a child to feed on his tender substance, sucking his blood while still
living, and if any one protested or aroused by the baby’s screams, attempted a rescue, he
would pat it tenderly and pretend to caress it.” A vampiric Indian Bureau, if not stopped,
would continue to wither away Indigenous life and land. But Eastman cautioned, “We do
not ask for territorial grant or separate government. We ask only to enjoy with Europe’s
sons the full privileges of American citizenship.”44
Despite their best efforts, Eastman, Zitkala-Ša, and SAI could not break the mold
that cast them. Conservative factions within prevented SAI from petitioning President
Wilson to attend the peace conference. Non-Native supporters viewed SAI as novelty and
not a serious political organization. Slowly, the organization descended into obscurity
and officially disbanded in 1923, a year before the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act, which
unilaterally imposed citizenship upon all individual Indigenous peoples without consent.
The criticism leveled at the Indian Bureau did, however, result in a sweeping
investigation and report of its practices. The publication of the 1928 The Problem of
Indian Administration, also known as the Merriam Report, was a massive indictment of
federal Indian policies of assimilation and allotment. As an intentional or unintentional
outcome, the report found, Natives lived in destitution, poverty, and misery and highly
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deficient education and health services. In spite of the far-reaching criticism, the Indian
Bureau remained but became the focus of a massive reform under the Indian New Deal,
which ended allotment and some bans on Native cultural and religious ceremonies. SAI’s
ideas, especially those of Zitkala-Ša of cultural and political renewal, were taken up by
John Collier, who is often credited with envisioning the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act.
Many elements of the IRA clearly drew inspiration from SAI, but none of its members
received credit. Indigenous women, such as Zitkala-Ša, though a serious community
organizer and strident nationalist, have largely been forgotten for their contributions and
daring visions.
Angered by Collier’s dismissal of her work and activism and concerned that the
IRA didn’t go far enough, Zitkala-Ša organized her nation, the Yankton reservation, to
oppose the IRA. Although Yankton accepted the IRA, they never adopted an IRA
constitution. Instead, Zitkala-Ša organized a council of Ihanktonwan traditionals and
drafted a different constitution, with a broader vision of sovereignty that granted voting
rights to off-reservation members, self-appointed tribal officials, and allowed the tribal
council full veto power over any federal decisions over tribal lands, jurisdiction, and
members. Effectively, the constitution virtually eliminated any influence of BIA and
federal government interference over internal tribal affairs. Of course, Collier and the
Secretary of Interior opposed the new constitution, which left the Yankton reservation
without a formally recognized council, a decision that had dire consequences when the
Army Corps flooded their lands in the 1950s.45 Even by today’s standards, Zitkala-Ša’s
visions for Indigenous nationhood and sovereignty are radical and beyond the
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imagination and will of most tribal governments. In spite of her monumental
contributions to traditions of Indigenous resistance, she died exhausted, poor, and
unrecognized. Her death certificate ingloriously read: “Gertrude Bonnin from South
Dakota — Housewife.”46
In the end, SAI never accomplished its major goals. What the organization
revealed, however, was an uninterrupted continuation of previous notions of Indigenous
nationhood and sovereignty. Within the larger scope of anticolonial movements at the
time, at best SAI’s internationalism was aspirational because it could not imagine itself
apart from the nation-state. On one hand, SAI’s nationalistic rhetoric was strategic given
the intense climate of surveillance and repression and the general ignorance of
Indigenous issues. On the other, it descended into blind patriotism. The political visions
of Zitkala-Ša and Eastman were nevertheless far-reaching. Treaty rights, human rights,
and governance continue to be central challenges facing Indigenous nations; and central
to each of these issues was failure of the US to live up its agreements in the 1868 Fort
Laramie Treaty and the international treaty relation. This captures what Kevin Bruyneel
calls the “third space of sovereignty.”47 Through court rulings and acts of Congress, the
US had transformed Indigenous people from “outside” nations to “inside” nations and
domestic populations. Indigenous activists such as Zitkala-Ša and Eastman used the space
in-between of inside and outside the US to assert political autonomy. They envisioned an
Indigenous sovereignty that existed alongside US state sovereignty but could at the same
time refuse US colonial rule because of a prior, and therefore superior, form of
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governance and authority. Those bold visions, however, would not come to fruition for
the Oceti Sakowin in the international arena until the 1970s, with the creation of the
International Indian Treaty Council.

The First Treaty Meeting
While the SAI didn’t accomplish the immediate goal of attending the 1919 Paris
peace talks and gaining recognition at the League of Nations, the legacy of
internationalism continued. In 1923, Haudenosaunee hereditary chief Deskaheh (Levi
General) took his nation’s grievances against the US and Canadian governments to the
League. Although unsuccessful, the Treaty Council picked up where Deskaheh and SAI
left off. They, too, attempted to transcend the colonial bureaucracy and assert treaty rights
to a wider world. After Wounded Knee 1973, AIM transposed the frontlines of struggle
from armed barracks, to the US courts, and finally to the international arena. AIM’s
commitment to a long-term human rights and Indigenous rights campaign is what saved
the movement from utter collapse after severe political and police repression.
In the aftermath of Wounded Knee 1973, many tribal governments wanted
nothing to do with the American Indian Movement. They could hardly go anywhere
without attracting negative attention. Nevertheless, the Standing Rock tribal council
unanimously passed a resolution inviting AIM to the reservation to form a treaty council
to take the treaty issue to the World Court and the United Nations Committee on
Colonialism. In clear language, Standing Rock spelled out its intentions: “the Great Sioux
Nation does not want money damages and is determined to enforce the Treaty of 1868 for
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all Sioux people.”48 The treaty meeting also had the blessing of the Oglala Treaty
Council, the same group traditional elders who invited AIM to Wounded Knee. The
Oglala Treaty Council demanded “total recognition of the treaty — nothing less” and the
remuneration of all lands and resources that had been taken either by the Pick-Sloan
flooding or goldmining in the Black Hills. Acts on behalf of the US subsequent the 1868
Treaty, the council determined, “did not diminish our inherent right to govern ourselves
as a sovereign nation. It is also our position that all actions taken by the US government
on the 1868 treaty has been illegal and contrary to the practices of international law and
the usual relationship between sovereign nations.”49 Furthermore, attendees also pushed
for the US to sign and ratify the 1948 Genocide Convention, so the In spite of its prior
hostility towards IRA governments, AIM now had the backing of the traditionalists, the
grassroots people, and now the Standing Rock tribal council.
The pairing of forces was truly historic, yet the June 1974 treaty meeting hardly
attracted any media attention. The lack of publicity, however, made the gathering no less
important for its five thousand attendees who represented ninety-eight different
Indigenous nations. To mark the historic occasion, Hunkpapa elder Evelyn Gabe, a direct
descendent of John Grass, the Hunkpapa chief who led the successful resistance against
allotment in 1887, welcomed AIM and thanked them for coming to Standing Rock. “We
have agreed to make a stand in unity with the most valid treaties, one of which is the
1868 treaty,” she told the crowd in attendance. “We know it is valid and that we are a
nation… We need the support of all nations.”50 As a result of Standing Rock’s support,
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the 1868 Treaty became the tip of the spear for the UN work. With this reminder of why
they had come, the first questions posed were: how was Indigenous law to be judged by a
court of non-Indigenous peers? Who were peers to Indigenous knowledge-keepers, the
law-makers, and the elders?
It was decided only other Indigenous peoples could determine their peers, and that
other colonized peoples could be their peers as well as any nation willing to recognize
them since the US wouldn’t. To get the UN to work for them, Jimmie Durham, who was
later appointed executive director of the Treaty Council, suggested following the lead of
African revolutionary Amilcar Cabral who he had befriended in Geneva. To get his
message across to the UN and to the European world, Cabral had “to make speeches and
use ‘white’ ideals and pretentions.”51 Those white ideals and pretentions included
speaking in the language of sovereignty, culture, and nationhood. Pressed by their legal
counsel that they would need “concrete evidence of sovereignty” at the UN, Santee AIM
member John Trudell responded, “The treaties are our evidence.”52
For Russell Means, Indigenous treaties and culture were only stepping stones to a
larger goal. Recognition, whether cultural or political, was pointless if it didn’t entail the
destruction of the colonial system itself and, above all, the restoration of treaty lands.
Although Means never knew Amilcar Cabral, they shared a similar vision of
decolonization. Throughout the Treaty Council documents, meeting notes, and
newsletters, Cabral’s thoughts and visions of anticolonial struggle were occasionally
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cited. Cabral, who founded the Marxist revolutionary party, the African Party for the
Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (or PAIGC), proposed colonized Africans
“return to the source.” That source was a distinct African culture that was preserved
primarily by those most oppressed by Portuguese colonialism, the villagers and the tribal
people not the urban elites. The source of their power was in their culture of resistance,
which had held at bay complete domination by a foreign culture. Revolution didn’t mean
becoming a European society or a European-style state. According to Cabral, it meant
becoming a society that reflected the culture and the values of the people most
marginalized. For Guinea-Bissau, these were the people who lived in the forests, the
tribal peoples, who were the majority of the population. Yet more than cultural resistance
was at stake. Because of harsh repression such as assimilation, native cultures became
petrified and static and were not allowed to continue to develop. Often times in this
process, culture takes on conservative and reactionary character. A return to the source
pulls that culture out of the past, out of the museums, out of the pageants, out of the
colonizer’s history books, and brings it to the present, makes it an active element for
revolution, and imagines what it will look like in the future free from colonial rule.
Cabral’s vision was a daring vision of freedom that wasn’t prescriptive or top-down. It
looked to Indigenous cultures as an example of horizontalism — free of arbitrary
hierarchy and full of self-rule. It reflected the conditions of the colonized, and
demonstrated that within native cultures are potential tools for making revolution. But
Cabral cautioned, however, “the ‘return to the source’ is of no historical importance
unless it brings not only real involvement in the struggle for independence, but also
complete and absolute identification with the hopes of the mass of people, who contest
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not only foreign culture but also foreign domination as a whole.”53 These ideas resonated
with Means, Durham, the Treaty Council, and many in the Third World.
On the last day of the Standing Rock Treaty Council meeting, Russel Means took
the microphone. Throughout the day, he had been reading various communiqués from the
Irish Republican Army, the Organization of African Unity, and several Arab nations in
support of the Standing Rock gathering. There was some tension about the direction the
Treaty Council would take. Most of AIM’s leadership was still tied up in the courts, so
how would the organization fight for recognition at the UN? Most importantly, people
who had no experience with international law or human rights were in charge of their
destinies but had no clue about the UN processes. The path ahead was daunting and
uncertain. The tenor of the meetings was serious and sober. There was clearly a departure
from the past one-off actions. Human rights work was going to be long and arduous.
Taking in the uncertainty that saturated the conference, Means stated that the Treaty
Council must look to all potential allies, “the United Nations, the Organization of
American States, the Organization of African Unity, the Arab countries, the communist
bloc and whatever is necessary for us to get our treaties in court and would give the world
forums a chance to hear us.” That was not all, he continued:
we must realize what we are into. What we are into is revolution, turning that
cycle of life always back. It is the sacred hoop that we are talking about. In that
revolution that we are trying to perpetuate, and in every revolution in the history
of the (and we do have to look at the history of the world, because we are
members of that international community) — in the history of the world, the
successful struggles for independence and the struggles which are still going on
for independence all involve land, all involve land — whether it’s in Africa or
Asia or Southeast Asia or the [Mediterranean], or in the Middle East, or in Ireland
and the United States or Canada or South America or Central America, or
Micronesia or Puerto Rico. Wherever you go that there’s a struggle for
53
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independence, it always involves land. This of course is our issue. Our ancestor
have died for their belief, and our belief, in the sacred Mother Earth and their
right to be respected and to [be] taken care of, and their right and the right of all
ourselves to live in peace… When you look at the struggles for independence of
peoples across this world, it has not taken a year, it has not taken a couple of
years. It has taken dona [many] years. For their independence sometimes it has
taken centuries for people to reach their independence and regain their land… We
know that we cannot militarily defeat, nor do we even want to engage, the United
States of America ever again… [Our ancestors] could not enlist the aid of other
countries. They could not even enlist the aid of other people inside the United
States of America… If we are going to struggle for our land, it can’t be just with
words, just with paper. It has to be with our lives.54
The outcome of the conference was the “Declaration of Continuing
Independence,” which was framed by Phyllis Young. The Declaration charged: 1) the
US’s violation of Indigenous treaties; 2) the “inviolate international relationship”
between Native Nations and the US; 3) the restoration of treaty land; 4) the eschewing of
violence, except in self defense; 5) the rejection of all legislative and executive acts since
1871; and 6) the entering into international diplomatic relations with the US and colonial
states through UN recognition and membership. Above all, the 1974 Declaration cited
violations arising from the failure of the US and other colonial states to adhere to
international human rights standards, which had not yet been adequately extended to
Indigenous peoples, and to the Convention on the Prevention and Crime of Genocide.
While these were bold statements, AIM leadership was still hamstrung by the
courts. Hundreds of cases still had to be resolved. The traditional leadership suggested
near the conclusion of the treaty meeting at Standing Rock that the cases be resolved
before moving on with the international work. There was more, however. Not only
should these cases be resolved, AIM should try one last time to get the federal courts to
recognize Oceti Sakowin sovereignty.
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The Treaty Hearing
With its high-risk, attention-grabbing protests such as the siege at Wounded Knee
in 1973, AIM had won the court of public opinion or at least held its attention. But the
movement soon found itself and its aspirations for freedom on trial in the courts of the
conquerors, a situation that immobilized an organization sustained by constant action. By
the end of the 1973 in the aftermath of the 71-day armed takeover at Wounded Knee,
most of AIM leadership was tied up in federal and state courts for months, and even
years. For example, the case against Dennis Banks and Russell Means in the Wounded
Knee leadership trials was one of the longest criminal trials in US history. After a ninemonth trial, federal judge Fred Nichols threw out all charges against Means and Banks on
the grounds of government misconduct. After the tanks rolled away from Wounded Knee,
a team of volunteer lawyers rolled in forming the Wounded Knee Defense/Offense
Committee led by attorney Ken Tilsen to represent to the hundred-plus AIM members.
Five defendants initially cooperated with federal prosecutors agreeing to plead guilty in
exchange for the dismissal of the other hundred-plus cases. The Justice Department
would have none of it, and the trials continued on for nearly two years. The US lawyers
came down heavy. For their efforts only two of the five AIM members who offered the
plea deal served any jail time. Because of a committed legal defense and the weak nature
of the charges, most of the other cases were thrown out.55
In one more well-known case, some sixty-five AIM defendants argued that the
US lacked criminal jurisdiction in Oceti Sakowin territory protected under the 1868 Fort
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Laramie Treaty. Because they were charged with alleged criminal acts in the Pine Ridge
Reservation and were within the 1868 Treaty boundaries, they moved for dismissal. The
Lakota patriots and their allies who made their stand at Wounded Knee had also asserted
sovereignty based on the 1868 Treaty. “I went to Wounded Knee only because of that
Treaty,” declared AIM leader Russell Means. “The first night we were in there, we [sent]
out a copy of the 1868 Sioux Treaty to the FBI and said that was why we were at
Wounded Knee… People have died for that Treaty — before, after[,] and today.”56
The hearing became known as the “Sioux Treaty Hearing.” Vine Deloria, Jr.,
along with lead defense attorney John Thorne, engineered the treaty defense. Deloria
cited the accuracy of oral tradition as the basis for the Oceti Sakowin’s understanding of
treaties. When compared to US records of treaty proceedings and the very treaties
themselves, Indigenous oral histories were just as accurate and provided a point of view
often overlooked. After all, treaties are agreements between two or more parties, even
though the US has monopolized their interpretation and has purposefully distorted their
meaning. Deloria summarized the defense’s position:
you can’t imply that the Sioux[,] in signing any treaty, ever thought that they were
submitting to a process whereby they would someday be in a federal court with
endless appeals leading up the United States Supreme Court. Insofar as the United
States has never legally and specifically changed this understanding with the
consent and understanding of the Sioux, and insofar as the United States cannot
point to a specific treaty proceeding hearing, or other form of consent in which
the Indians understand that they will now be involved in the United States Court
system, we cannot say that the United States has ever legally taken jurisdiction
over the Sioux Nation of Indians.57
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For the defense, the 1868 Treaty was undeniable evidence of Oceti Sakowin sovereignty
and nationhood, not only because Natives said so but also because the US itself said so.
Nothing could be more clear than Article 6 of the US Constitution, which unequivocally
states, “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”58 If the US had abrogated its responsibility
or changed the terms of the Treaty, Deloria reasoned, it had done so without the consent
of the Oceti Sakowin which was beyond the original intent of the agreement. Treaty
signing was also not an acquiescence to a superior sovereign. The US has interpreted it
that way despite the mountain of evidence to the contrary. The treaty defense was a bold
and controversial claim with little chance of success.
Questions of Indigenous survival were of pressing concern during the thirteen-day
hearing. In December 1974 in a Lincoln, Nebraska courthouse, federal Judge Warren
Urbom listened attentively to the testimony from Lakota and Dakota elders, scholars, and
activists. The hearing was unique and historic. The defense’s witness list included fortynine “expert witnesses” that included historians, anthropologists, activists, and
Indigenous elders and traditionalists. The list was the who’s who of not just AIM but of
the Indigenous movement and its organic and new intellectuals, including: Leonard Crow
Dog, Vine Deloria, Jr., Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Russell Means, Dennis Banks, Edith Bull
Bear, Beatrice Medicine, Irma Bear Stops, Severt Young Bear, Alex Chasing Hawk,
Evelyn Gabe, Francis He Crow, Gladys Bissonnette, Robert Yellow Bird, Frank Kills
Enemy, Ted Means, Nellie Red Owl, Faith Traversie, Matthew King, and many more.
Breaking with tradition, if they chose so each witness swore to the truth over the Canupa,
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a Lakota ceremonial pipe, rather than the Bible. Because the hearing didn’t require a jury,
Lakota and Dakota elders and traditionalists filled the empty jury box. For the first time
in the US court of law, as Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz contends, “it was the Great Sioux
Nation sitting in judgment on America, not the reverse.”59 The issues presented — treaty
rights, sovereignty, colonialism, and genocide — were matters of survival for all
Indigenous peoples, not just the Oceti Sakowin.
While a sympathetic US public expressed concern for the abuse of Native peoples
and the heroic patriots of Wounded Knee 1973, they tended to — and, to a large extent,
still do — view Indigenous issues as just another civil rights movement. But the hearing
tested simple questions of civil rights. The testimony threw into question the very
legitimacy of the US’s control of the continent. Framed this way the assertion of
sovereignty positioned the Oceti Sakowin and, by default, all Indigenous peoples as
aligned with other colonized and formerly colonized peoples the world over unjustly
subjected to US and European colonialism, by proclaiming with humble truth a prior
existing and separate Indigenous nationhood.
The treaty hearing was a longshot. Everyone knew it. In the end Judge Urbom
ruled against the defendants’ dismissal. The Oceti Sakowin, Urbom decided, “were once
fully sovereign people. They are not now and have not been for a long time. Whether
they ever will be again is dependent upon actions of the Congress and the President of the
United States and not of the courts.”60 While not the desired outcome, the hearing forced
Urbom to confront the inherent conservative nature of his profession, especially when it
came to Indigenous peoples. US law, and the entire western legal tradition for that matter,
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is conservative and not in the binary political sense of liberal-conservative. Western court
law is conservative because, in the absence of “good” legislation, it frequently draws
from crude and archaic expressions of its own past to determine “justice” in the present,
and therefore setting precedent for future cases. Only congressional or executive action
can redirect the course of law away from its inherent conservativism, an avenue that has
provided little relief for Indigenous peoples. Otherwise, as is the case for major Indian
court decisions, a “bad” decision becomes doctrine. By following its own legal traditions,
the arc of the Western moral universe never bends toward Indigenous justice. At best, it
ignores it. At worst, it attempts to annihilate it.
To justify conquest, enslavement, and genocide, under European law, Indigenous
peoples, and their dark brethren, have been categorically excluded from the realm of
humanity, a principle that has been so little challenged.61 For example, in his ruling
Urbom questioned, but reaffirmed, the basis of federal Indian law as defined by Chief
Justice John Marshall in the early nineteenth century, when the US was a fledgling
nation. Urbom argued, “every lower federal court is bound” by Marshall’s assertion in
the 1823 Johnson v. McIntosh decision. In that decision Marshall held that under US law
Indigenous nations cannot be considered fully sovereign. Prior to European contact,
Marshall wrote and Urbom cited, Indigenous peoples were “fierce savages, whose
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave
them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness.”62 According
to Marshall, Indigenous nations were not “civilized” and therefore not fully sovereign.
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And had they been left alone, they would not have achieved “civilization.” Such logic
virtually mandates settler colonialism to “civilize” otherwise “fierce savages” and their
“wilderness” landscape. Every court is expected to uphold this view, even if it has never
been factually true, and even if in our present moment or sometime in the future the
world no longer views this as historical truth. Thus, Urbom’s view was not exceptional or
unsurprising to the defense. He merely kept with tradition.
All was not lost, however. The defense viewed the decision as a partial, if not a
significant, victory. While he dismissed the main jurisdiction claim, Urbom agreed the
1868 Treaty was proof of an international relationship between the Oceti Sakowin and
the US, a relationship no US court had the authority to resolve. “[R]elations with
American Indians,” he opined, “are rooted in international relations (and would pointedly
be so governed if the defendants’ position were adopted), including the laws of conquest
and of treaties developed over centuries, not by courts, but by executive heads of nations
through negotiations.”63 To the casual observer, this may not seem important. But it was.
It is why AIM members risked their lives at Wounded Knee taking up arms against the
US government. It is why North America’s poorest people faced off with the greatest
military power the world had ever known. In his fiery closing statement, defense attorney
John Thorne compared the Oceti Sakowin’s aspiration for international recognition, as
they often compared themselves, to other oppressed nations:
We have the Palestine Liberation Organization appearing before the United
Nations, saying, they have right to exist. And we have Ireland where we are told
it’s a battle between the Catholics and the Protestants, but that isn’t what the fight
is all about… We look at South Africa with the apartheid policy it has, and we
still do business there… We look here in the United States and we see
organizations like the American Indian Movement and the Black Panther Party,
La Raza, and the United Farm Workers. They talk about oppression, and they talk
63
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about a better life. They move and they act. In response, we build bigger and
better prisons, appoint more and more judges, more police officers, and make
more arrests… I want you [Judge Urbom] to be bound by moral law.
Urbom interrupted, “Whence comes my authority? I’m serious. Whence comes my
authority?” “To do what?” Thorne asked. “To do anything. I am a judge. Where did I get
my authority? Whence cometh it?” Urbom shot back. “Exactly the same place that the
[1868] Treaty between the United States and the Sioux Nation gained its status as a
solemn agreement,” Thorne reminded the court.64 But morality and legality don’t often
meet in the court of law. “Feeling what was wrong does not describe what is right,”
Urbom reasoned lamenting the past not the ongoing colonial reality. “Anguish about
yesterday does not alone make wise answers for tomorrow.”65 It was as if the Indigenous
elders who had for two weeks stood before the judge sharing the stories of their lived
colonial reality walked out of a history book. Nevertheless, the defendants had gotten
what they came for: admission that Indigenous treaties were rooted in international law.
The next step was to take the struggle to the world.

Likely Alliances
Indigenous nationhood is often misunderstood as an exclusive project, the sole
aspiration of just Indigenous peoples, or confined within narrow definitions of the nationstate. This is similar to how the “Indian Problem” is treated as solely an Indian problem.
According to International Indian Treaty Council that first met at the Standing Rock
Indian Reservation in 1974 and drafted the “Declaration of Continuing Independence,”
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the problem was not Indigenous peoples. The problem was, and always has been,
imperialism. The aspiration for nationhood defined within this global context gave rise to
a new iteration of Indigenous internationalism that openly identified itself with the
colonized world. What made it different from other Red Power movements was that it
didn’t align its visions of freedom with the nation-state as the horizon of struggle. It
looked to the Global South, to the darker nations. The Treaty Council made common
cause with Third World movements within and beyond the US to gain recognition for
Indigenous peoples at the United Nation. By contrast, in response to more than a decade
Red Power protests in the 1960s, in the 1970s President Nixon authorized Indian selfdetermination as domestic policy, ending termination and the granting of more powers to
tribal councils to manage their own affairs and to increase “nation-to-nation” relations.
The Treaty Council had bigger dreams.
In its early days the Treaty Council’s faced several obstacles. The first was the
lack of media publicity in the US. While they maintained strong connections with
grassroots communities, its base, and some tribal councils, the broader public was largely
unaware of their historic work. Second, according to its “Declaration,” the Treaty
Council was a national liberation organization that desired full representation at the UN.
The Indigenous nations the Treaty Council represented, however, were not considered or
recognized as independent sovereign states by the world community, a prerequisite for
entry into the UN. Yet it filed for Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) status first
with the UN Economic and Social Council, and gained consultative status in 1977. To
some this seemed like a contradiction, the channeling of energy into an NGO, an
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arguably non-revolutionary and non-sovereign entity.66 A 1977 Treaty Council
communiqué titled, “Decolonization, Liberation and the International Community,”
explained the NGO strategy: “Decolonization, or a better term, liberation, is a slow,
painstaking process. What the colonialists accomplished over the past four centuries
cannot be overcome easily.”67
International recognition faced two problems on this front. First, the US simply
could not tolerate Indigenous rights, let alone sovereign Indigenous nations, and it did
everything in its power to thwart the Treaty Council’s efforts. Second, the very internal
mechanisms of the UN prevented a full delivery of Indigenous sovereignty on par with
states. Only by winning over world opinion and gaining important allies could
international recognition be won. The formal process of decolonization, outlined in UN
decolonization charters, didn’t account for nor recognize Indigenous peoples as potential
nations. Typically, colonized nations gained their independence through combined
means: armed struggle and international work. After Wounded Knee, AIM had largely
eschewed violence and chose instead to work solely within the realm of international
legal frameworks. At first those frameworks proved inadequate. Allies had to be sought
and maintained.
Immediately following the 1974 Treaty Council meeting, two offices were set up
— one in San Francisco and one across the street from the UN in New York City. The
slow process of gaining international recognition began. A Treaty Council delegation
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attended the First International Congress on the Independence for Puerto Rico in Havana,
Cuba, at the invitation of the Cuban government. There the Treaty Council was
recognized with 76 other nations and 14 liberation movements from around the world.
Close collaboration with Third World independence movements and socialist countries
began. Soon Treaty Council delegations visited countries socialist countries in the
Eastern Bloc and countries of the Global South in North Africa, South America, and the
Middle East to garner support. At their second gathering in the Yankton reservation in
June 1976, the Treaty Council drafted a “Red Paper” condemning the US for ongoing
practices of genocide and imperialist intervention across the globe. International
delegations were directed to make friendly relations with other countries and to ask them
to recognize the 1868 Fort Laramie.68
The delegations were well-received by their hosts, especially in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Bloc countries, who were eager to not only support Indigenous causes but to
also point out the hypocrisy of US “humanitarian” intervention throughout the world
while it denied freedom to its own people. During a 1977 visit to the Soviet Union,
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and West Germany, Treaty Council representatives — Allene
Goddard, Bill Means, Greg Zephier, and Bill Wapepah — met with Iraqi, Algerian, and
Namibian delegations. Wapepah summed up the meetings, “I think because we got to
know our brothers from the south better on these tours, we understand more than before
that we are one people.”69 Another youth delegation by Sherry Means, the fifteen-yearold daughter of Russell Means, compared her experiences to those of the US, “these
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countries believe strongly in human rights.”70 During the tours, many of the delegations
the Treaty Council encountered were simply shocked that Indians had survived the US
genocide. Many had a better grasp on US history than most US citizens. More
importantly, where Indigenous peoples found a hostile audience in North America about
their issues, they found a welcoming audience abroad, especially with other colonized
peoples.
The delegations were frequent but not superficial. The relationship were lasting.
For example, in 1979 when the Iranian Revolution broke out, revolutionary students took
hostage fifty-two US diplomats and citizens at the US embassy. The hostages were held
for 444 days. Nearly forgotten, however, is the Treaty Council’s role in helping to
peacefully end the situation and the mail exchange program they ran for the hostages. In
his autobiography, Russell Means recounts the situation,
Because of our [1977] Geneva conference and our friendly ties to the Palestine
Liberation Organization, AIM had some credibility in that part of the world. Like
the PLO, we are vitally interested in the regaining of our country and sovereignty.
John Thomas, known as John T., a witty, lovable guy who gets along with
everybody, served as our roving ambassador, visiting Lebanon, Iran, and Egypt.
When the Revolutionary Guards took as hostages everyone in the U.S. embassy in
Tehran, we sent John T. there to see what he could do. We didn’t trust the phones
— I’m sure the CIA and the Iranians listened to every call — so he flew back to
New York to confer with Bill [Means] and me. “They’ll allow the hostages to
send letters and packages home through us,” he said. “But we must deliver each
one ourselves — we can’t just drop them in a mailbox.71
For their efforts Bill Means, John Thomas, and the Treaty Council received a formal
“thank you” from the UN Secretary-General for the mail exchange that helped “the
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negotiation of a peaceful settlement.”72 The Treaty Council’s central role in the mail
exchange didn’t receive any publicity in the US.
By this time the Treaty Council regularly visited and held council with various
national liberation organizations, frequently sending delegations abroad. Likewise,
delegations were often guests of Indigenous nations in the US. Palestinian and
Indigenous solidarity was particularly strong and visible. Both Palestinians and American
Indians were unrecognized nations, stateless peoples, fighting settler colonial regimes. At
nearly every major Treaty Council event there were Palestinians. But it wasn’t just
political meetings that Palestinians attended. Elizabeth Cook-Lynn recalls attending
powwows in the 1970s and 1980s where Palestinians would sometimes run military drills
alongside AIM leaders throughout the day. “Groups of thirty, forty, fifty Palestinians
with their guns, with their uniforms, came after the prayers in the morning, after and
before the grand entry, and when people could go to breakfast and getting organized, the
Palestinians were out on that tarmac doing military maneuvers,” she recalls. “They were
invited there by our tribes. There was not much discussion of it anywhere. It didn’t’
appear in the newspapers… AIM didn’t even talk about it.”73
While American Indians sometimes referred themselves as the Palestinians of
North America, who were invaded and being replaced by foreign occupying power, not
all Palestinians saw themselves as American Indians. To some, American Indians were a
fait accompli — a lesson to Palestinians that they could end up stateless, unrecognized, in
exile, or permanently placed on reservations if they did not resist invasion. In the 1980s
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Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was asked how he
felt about the comparison of Palestinians to American Indians. He answered, “this is one
part of our struggle — to ensure that we do not suffer the same fate of the American
Indians at the hands of the Yankees.”74 The tension was not so much that Indigenous
struggles were beneath Palestinians. Palestine and Turtle Island (what most Native people
call North America) have different historical contexts and different stages of settler
colonialism. From 1516 to 1918, Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1920 it
was placed under British authority as part of the League of Nations mandate system that
allowed primarily European states to administer overseas territory. In 1948 Israel became
a “Jewish homeland.” The expulsion of more than 700,000 Palestinians (around 85
percent of the Arab population) from their homes became known as the Nakba, the
“catastrophe.” Israle soon attacked surrounding Arab states, leading to three major wars
in 1956, 1967, and 1973, which led to Israel occupying eastern Jerusalem, the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights. In other words, Palestinians were still
engaged in direct combat with Israeli settlers at this time, much in the same way the Oceti
Sakowin had been repelling settler invasion a century earlier. Nevertheless, each
occupation was about the land, and today there are around 6 million Palestinian refugees
who do not have the right of return to their homelands.
Palestine, with a landmass the size of New Jersey, a territory smaller than some
Indian reservations, was like a microcosm of nineteenth century the settler colonialism in
North America. So, in many ways Arafat was correct: Indigenous peoples of North
America were the evidence of the advance stages of settler colonialism, making up less
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than one percent of the total population and possessing less than three percent of their
original land. Yet Palestinians had something American Indians didn’t have in the
nineteenth century. They had access to the UN, an international body founded in 1945
partly to end colonialism where they could attempt to change world opinion. Indigenous
peoples didn’t have an international institution to bring their grievances at the height of
physical elimination and removal. They couldn’t even enlist the aid of the citizens of the
US, who were benefitting and actively participating their elimination.
This close affinity of the Indigenous movement with the Palestine has not always
been seamless among Indigenous activists. A common trope used to explain the existence
of Indigenous peoples in the Americas, since the Bible made no mention of them, was
that they were a lost tribe of Israel. Many Indigenous peoples, having been indoctrinated
into Christianity, accepted as a matter of biblical doctrine the legitimacy of the state of
Israel as a “Jewish homeland” much in the same manner the US has commonly called
itself a “Christian nation.” Vine Deloria, Jr., stands out during this time as promoting this
view of Zionism, an ideology on par with Manifest Destiny that believed in the reestablishment and the protection of a Jewish nation, Israel. Deloria, a powerhouse of
American Indian studies and law, wrote a book in 1974 called Behind the Trail of Broken
Treaties, where he predicted the rise of the international Indigenous movement. His basic
argument is that full Indigenous sovereignty and autonomy wouldn’t radically threaten
the political and territorial sovereignty of the US. Deloria cites Israel and Zionism as the
prime example for the “dramatic vindication of the validity of traditional, historical
claims to specific territory as the sovereign heritage of a particular people. Israel’s victory
is a great tribute to the strength of a culture and the tenacity of a people in pursuit of a
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homeland.” Moreover, he writes, “If the U.S. is capable of recognizing Jewish rights to
sovereign land in Israel, it must be capable of acknowledging a similar right for
American Indians in the U.S.”75 The opposite was true, however. Palestinian American
scholar Steven Salaita argues that the Israeli Zionist project was not so much a departure
from the US project of Manifest Destiny than an extension of it. Both were different
versions of what he calls a “holy land in transit,” using biblical references to map the “old
world” Europe onto the “new world” of Turtle Island and Palestine, erasing the histories
and presence of native peoples.76
Israel may have been seemingly sympathetic to Indigenous causes, but, like the
US at this time, it had sided with the white supremacist South African apartheid regime
when the rest of the world morally condemned it. Israel had also adopted similar US
settler colonial tactics to expel, remove, contain, and ultimately eliminate Palestinians.
More importantly, the US has politically, economically, and culturally backed the Israeli
occupation of Palestine, effectively making the colonization project an extension of US
domestic and foreign policy and intervention in the Middle East. To confront Israeli
settler colonialism is to confront US settler colonialism, and vice versa. This is not
because activists say so, but because these two colonial states have tied their destinies to
each other, making them part and parcel to a similar settler project. Treaty Council
activists and those in the Palestinian movement knew the full realization of American
Indian and Palestinian self-determination in the US threatens the legitimacy of
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occupation and the theft of lands in Turtle Island and in Palestine. Therefore, each
struggle was bound to the other.
This view wasn’t unique to American Indians, but also other colonized peoples.
Historian Alex Lubin calls, this imagining of interlinked struggles as “geographies of
liberation,” such as the Black Panther Party’s concept of intercommunulism.
Intercommunalism, much like Indigenous internationalism, directed struggle away from
seeking equality within the nation-state to one that embraced anti-imperialism and
decolonization. Furthermore, as exiles, whether African Americans or American Indians
in the US or Palestinians in Palestine or as refugees abroad, Lubin argues, these disparate
struggles reimagined a world not as it was, according class, race, national, and colonial
hierarchies, but as it ought to be — free from oppressive institutions across different
geographies or wherever they may arise.77 In its publication Oyate Wicaho, or Voice of
the People, Dakota AIM often published interviews, short stories, poetry, and reports
from Palestinians resisting Israeli occupation, and even referred to Palestinians as
“relatives.” Indigenous internationalism, as Means spelled out in his 1974 speech at the
first Treaty Council meeting, was bound to the struggles of those fighting for the
emancipation of their lands. Indigenous relationality, in this way, was a form of
internationalism that moved beyond the framework of the nation-state and wasn’t just
about relationships with nonhumans and other Indigenous peoples. Above all, it was
about relationships with other colonized peoples fighting for the land, the earth. It was
also the alliance with the Global South and national liberation organizations — each in
their own way relatives to the Indigenous cause — such as those in Northern Ireland, the
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Middle East, and South Africa, that proved the most useful to the Treaty Council. When
the world turned its back on AIM after Wounded Knee, the world’s colonized reached
out and helped launch Indigenous peoples’ rights to the international level. We should
remember these likely alliances for all their successes and flaws. Although historic, the
US and western media, in general, largely ignored them.
In fact, one of the major challenges the Treaty Council faced at home, besides the
FBI’s ongoing dirty war, was the media blackout. Even sympathetic journalists, such as
Jack Anderson, who had covered the rise of AIM, by this point had denounced AIM
specifically for its international work. On the September 17, 1976 broadcast of ABC’s
Good Morning America, told his audience:
[A]s a friend to the American Indian Movement it’s my unpleasant duty report on
some unpublished documents and sworn testimony that’s reached my office.
These documents contain proof that leaders of the American Indian Movement
have been in touch with world terrorists. They’ve had dealings with the Palestine
Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army, the Cuban Communists[,]
and various other Trotskyites, militants[,] and crazies.78
His description of AIM’s new international direction wasn’t exactly off-the-mark, but it
did point to the limits of tolerance liberal pundits were willing to grant “their Indians.”
By this point, AIM itself had been treated and labeled as a “terrorist” organization. The
very notion that the Treaty Council met with Third World and socialist regimes offended
even some of their Indigenous and non-Indigenous allies, especially in the UN work.
Pragmatically and ideologically, the alliance made sense. The Treaty Council’s politics
aligned geographically south and politically to the left with the majority of the world,
whereas others looked to ally themselves with the North Atlantic powers, the “old
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empires,” where a minority ruled the world. Part of this criticism also centered on
funding. The Treaty Council depended mostly on donations from church groups and had
eschewed any funding from any government. The goal was the Treaty Council would
only be beholden to the grassroots people and not its financial backers, whether a private
donor or a government. The independence from these institutions allowed Indigenous
peoples to decide for themselves who they were and what they wanted to be. The Treaty
Council faced another yet another challenge: there were no working appropriate
definitions of Indigenous peoples under international law.
Until then, the UN categorized Indigenous peoples as internal “populations.” At
the urging of Indigenous activists, “indigenous peoples” was included as a category in the
UN Decade to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, and Apartheid which began in
1974. While also including Indigenous peoples, the Decade also called South African
apartheid and Israeli Zionism as forms of racism.79 US presidents from Jimmy Carter to
George W. Bush boycotted the UN programs on racism, most likely over the questions of
apartheid South Africa and Palestine. This boycott extended to the two UN decades to
combat racism and apartheid from 1974-1993. Nevertheless, the connections between the
South African anti-apartheid movement, Palestinian rights, and Indigenous rights cannot
be ignored or dismissed. Without this solidarity, Indigenous peoples would not have
made such historic gains such as international recognition.
The crucial event, however, was the 1977 International Non-Governmental
Organizations Conference on Indians of the Americas at the UN headquarters in Geneva,
Switzerland September 20-23. The Treaty Council initiated the conference and the NGO
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Sub-Committee on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid, and Colonialism organized
it. At the invitation of the Treaty Council, more than one hundred Indigenous
representatives from across the hemisphere attended. Indigenous delegates came from
Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Venezuela, and the US. In addition to these countries, in
attendance were representatives from Australia, Columbia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, France, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Israel,
Jamaica, Mauritania, Morocco, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Norway, Syria, and Yemen.
Notable NGOs, professional bodies, associations, and international organizations
included Amnesty International, the World Alliance of YMCAs, the International
Organization of Journalists, the Union of Arab Jurists, the International Council of
Women, the Muslim World League, the National Indian Brotherhood, the Palestine
Liberation Organization, and many more.80
The conference was a monumental achievement and was covered widely by the
international press — unsurprisingly, the US press boycotted the entire affair. Geneva
and the UN had not seen anything like it before, and probably ever since. To start the
conference, en masse the Indigenous delegations marched to through Geneva. Russell
Means describes the historic scene:
We started [marching] from across town, our elders leading the way — Phillip
[Deere] carrying the pipe, Leon and Audrey Shenandoah from the Six Nations,
David Monogye, a Hopi who had seen more than one hundred winters, and
several elders from South and Central America. Right behind them came the
drum. We sang the AIM song. As they always did, Indian people flocked to it,
filled with pride and spirituality, infused with courage and the feeling of
sovereignty, 120 marchers representing the aspirations of a hundred million
oppressed but resolute souls… UN security people opened the double doors, and
80
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we marched up the stairs with the drum, singing all the way to a second-floor
conference room where world leaders have met for more than a century.
Having achieved consultative status, the Treaty Council had brought Indigenous
peoples to the UN as it promised. In all-night sessions, the Indigenous leaders hammered
out a collective document, called the “Draft Declaration of Principles for the Defense of
the Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere.” It contained thirteen
principles, explicit statements on Indigenous rights worth quoting in their entirety:
1. Recognition of Indigenous Nations: Indigenous people shall be accorded
recognition as nations, and proper subjects of international law, provided the
people concerned desire to be recognized as a nation and meet the
fundamental requirement of nationhood, namely: (a) having a permanent
population; (b) having a defined territory; (c) having a government; (d) having
the ability to enter into relations with other states.
2. Subjects of International Law: Indigenous groups not meeting the
requirements of nationhood are hereby declared to be subjects of international
law and are entitled to the protection of this Declaration, provided they are
identifiable groups having bonds of language, heritage, tradition, or common
identity.
3. Guarantee of Rights: No indigenous nation or group shall be deemed to have
fewer rights or lesse staus for the sole reason that the nation or group has not
entered into recorded treaties or agreements with any state.
4. Accordance of Independence: Indigenous nations or groups shall be accorded
such a degree of independence as they may desire in accordance with
international law.
5. Treaties and Agreements: Treaties and other agreements entered into by
indigenous nations or groups with other states, whether denominated as
treaties or otherwise, shall be recognized and applied in the same manner and
according to the same international laws and principles as the treaties and
agreements entered into by other states.
6. Abrogation of Treaties and Other Rights: Treaties and agreements made with
indigenous nations or groups shall not be subject to unilateral abrogation. In
no event may the municipal laws of any state serve as a defense to the failure
to adhere to and perform the terms of treaties and agreements made with
indigenous nations or groups. Nor shall any state refuse to recognize and
adhere to treaties or other agreements due to changed circumstances where the
change in circumstance has been substantially caused by the state asserting
that such change has occurred.
7. Jurisdiction: No state shall assert or claim to exercise any right of jurisdiction
over any indigenous nation or group or the territory of such indigenous nation
or group unless pursuant to a valid treaty or other agreement freely made with
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the lawful representatives of the indigenous nation or group concerned. All
actions on the part of any state which derogate from the indigenous nations’ or
groups’ right to exercise self-determination shall be the proper concern of
existing international bodies.
8. Claims to Territory: No state shall claim or retain, by right of discovery or
otherwise, the territories of an indigenous nation or group, except such lands
as may have been lawfully acquired by valid treaty or other cessation freely
made.
9. Settlement of Disputes: All states in the Western Hemisphere shall establish
through negotiations or other appropriate means a procedure for the binding
settlement of disputes, claims, or other matters relating to indigenous nations
or groups. Such procedures shall be mutually acceptable to the parties,
fundamentally fair, and consistent with international law. All procedures
presently in existence which do not have the endorsement of the indigenous
nations or groups concerned, shall be ended, and new procedures shall be
instituted consistent with this Declaration.
10. National and Cultural Integrity: It shall be unlawful for any state to take or
permit any action or course of conduct with respect to an indigenous nation or
group or otherwise threaten the national or cultural integrity of such nation or
group, including, but not limited to, the imposition and support of illegitimate
governments and the introduction of non-indigenous religions to indigenous
peoples by non-indigenous missionaries.
11. Environmental Protection: It shall be unlawful for any state to make or permit
any action or course of conduct with respect to the territories of an indigenous
nation or group which will directly or indirectly result in the destruction or
deterioration of an indigenous nation or group through the effects of pollution
of earth, air, water, or which in any way depletes, displaces or destroys any
natural resource or other resources under the dominion of, or vital to the
livelihood of an indigenous nation or group.
12. Indigenous Membership: No state, through legislation, regulation, or other
means, shall take actions that interfere with the sovereign power of an
indigenous nation or group to determine its own membership.
13. Conclusion: All the rights and obligations declared herein shall be in addition
to all rights and obligations existing under international law.81
The points raised in the Draft Declaration built upon the Twenty Points of the
1972 Trail of Broken Treaties. The Indigenous movement came full circle once again.
Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz argues that the Draft Declaration may be “the fundamental
political document of the international Indigenous movement.”82 But it wouldn’t be until
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exactly four decades later in 2007 that the UN adopted the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples. Four member states of the UN assembly voted against the 2007
Declaration — all of them Anglo-settler states, the US, Canada, New Zealand, and
Australia, with Israel abstaining.83

A Sorry State
At the heart of the twentieth century international Indigenous movement — from
the Society of American Indians to the Treaty Council — was the 1868 Fort Laramie
Treaty. It was the working document in 1977 and for many studies. In 1987, as a mandate
by the UN human rights framework, Cuban special rapporteur Miguel Alfonso Martinez
led a ten-year investigation into the status of the treaties and agreements. He concluded,
colonial powers such as the US, by virtue of treaties such as the 1868 Treaty, have
unjustly claimed authority over Indigenous nations and lands. Martinez calls this the
“domestication” process, whereby Indigenous nations were “removed from the sphere of
international law and placed squarely under the exclusive competence and internal
jurisdiction” settler states.84 In spite of continued US aggression towards Indigenous
nations, Martinez argues that treaty rights have ongoing effective status under both
domestic and international law. Some legal decisions have even come down on the side
of the Oceti Sakowin.
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In 1980, the US Supreme Court confirmed the Oceti Sakowin’s claim that the
Black Hills had indeed been stolen. “A more ripe and rank case of dishonorable dealing
will never, in all probability, be found in our history,” the court opined.85 As a result, the
court awarded a $106 million settlement to which the Oceti Sakowin nearly unanimously
responded: “The Black Hills are not for sale!” In the spirit of Standing Rock and the
Treaty Council’s original 1974 contention, a monetary settlement is out of the question.
A full restoration of the illegally taken lands is the only just solution, many Indigenous
peoples argue. The question of restoration gets to the heart of the matter and reveals
deep-seated prejudices still levied at Indigenous peoples in their own homelands. It’s not
about reparations, apologies, or reconciliation. Yet, many cannot imagine the return of
lands or, for that matter, future peaceful coexistence of more than 500 distinct Indigenous
nations. While many will agree that colonialism is bad, they cannot imagine a future
without it.
For example, in a 1999 civil rights commission hearing in Rapid City, South
Dakota, renowned Lakota environmentalist Charmaine White Face testified:
In 1980, when the U.S. Supreme Court verified what the Lakota people have been
saying for more than a century, that the 1868 Treaty was violated, many nonIndian people of [South Dakota] became afraid of losing their homes, businesses,
and livelihoods. Are they remembering the fashion in which many of their
ancestors forced the loss of the homes and livelihoods of Lakota people and think
the same will happen to them, or are they afraid that the federal government will
turn on them also as it has turned on Lakota people?86
Implied in White Face’s testimony is an implicit admission from non-Natives that indeed
this land was stolen by force and coercion. This also implies a limit to Native justice.
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There can be an admission of wrongdoing, but there can never be a reordering of the
world or the redistribution of material wealth such as land back to its rightful owners. It is
believed that somehow Indigenous peoples will do to settlers what they did to them. But
the opposite is true. The examples of the Black Hills Alliance in the previous chapter
demonstrates that when Indigenous and poor settlers organize around treaty rights, they
can beat multinational energy corporations and take control of their lives. The same
happened during the 2013 protests to stop the Keystone XL pipeline and the efforts at
Standing Rock to defeat the Dakota Access pipeline. Although both projects are still on
the table, they have been significantly thwarted by a diversity of forces from
environmentalist groups, to farmers and ranchers, to labor unions, etc. — what Zoltán
Grossman calls “unlikely alliances.”87
Walter Echo-Hawk sees contemporary Native Nations as “simply coasting under
the Indian Self-Determination Policy initiated by President Nixon in 1970” and that they
have inadequately addressed “indigenous conditions, problems, or rights in over thirtyfive years.”88 Although this may be the case, the much lauded accomplishment of the
2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is
testament to Indigenous internationalism’s commitment to seeking self-determination
beyond nation-state solutions. Even though the US, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia
voted against UNDRIP’s passage, all three states have reversed their decisions. In fact,
many of these countries did so because of the “non-binding” aspect of UN declarations.
More troubling, however, was what accompanied the US’s 2010 decision to reverse its
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vote against UNDRIP — an official apology resolution as part of the 2010 Defense
Appropriations Bill.
In 2009, Congress approved the largest and most expansive defense
appropriations bill in world history. Defense expenditures totaled $683.7 billion for fiscal
year 2010. This exorbitant sum has served as a benchmark that continues to justify the
US-led “war on terror,” which extends covert military actions abroad and increased
national security and surveillance programs. As part of the larger 2010 National Defense
Authorization Act, Public Law 111-118 also created the 2010 Department of Defense
Appropriations Act. Buried deeply within this 161 page tome, Sec . 8113(a) quietly
announced an official “Apology to Native Peoples of the United States.”89
Uncharacteristic of previous “official apologies,” no separate bill committed sole
attention nor pomp and circumstance to its official “deep regret” or “apology” to Native
people. Instead, President Obama signed into law what remains “the world’s quietest
apology.”90 More importantly, the Apology stipulated that “Nothing in this section (1)
authorizes or supports any claim against the United States; or (2) serves as a settlement of
any claim against the United States.”91 Within the same bill, the US committed hundreds
of billions of dollars to expanding its military operations across the globe while
committing nothing but a non-binding apology to the very people who had been that
military’s first victims. Billions of dollars could be spent policing the world, but nothing
would go towards upholding the original treaties, the original promises, made with North
America’s first nations.
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In a 2012 report, The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in the United States of
America, UN special rapporteur on Indigenous People, James Anaya, discusses the
general lack of awareness about the 2010 Apology resolution. Moreover, Anaya
examines the lack of concrete action on outstanding Indigenous land claims and
devastating social realities — such as poverty, domestic and family violence, violence
against Indigenous women, unemployment, youth suicide, lack of access to appropriate
education, lack of adequate healthcare, etc. Chief among the Oceti Sakowin’s claims, and
other Indigenous nations, however, still remains the Black Hills claim and the 1868 Fort
Laramie Treaty as the “emblematic” and “visible reminder of their loss.”92 But the
continued theft and unlawful occupation of Indigenous land is not just a US problem, it’s
a global problem.
The taking of Indigenous lands and the subduing of Indigenous nations is not
separate from global imperialism but rather essential to it. The all-too-common reading of
Indigenous history as a branch of US history fundamentally ignores this process. US
history is a branch that grows from the tree of Indigenous history, not the other way
around. US history is the covetous branch that thinks it’s the tree. To say otherwise is to
make it appear as if US settler colonialism and the genocide and the conquest of
Indigenous peoples was inevitable, if not necessary, to eventually incorporate them and
their prior histories and political formations within the nation-state. This approach takes
the US nation-state as given, as if it has always existed with its current borders and
notions of belonging throughout time. Ignored are the processes by which the US rapidly
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expanded its territory from its fledgling thirteen colonies hugging the eastern seaboard to
the violent annexation of nearly two billion acres of Indigenous territory and hundreds of
Indigenous nations in less than a century.
Quietly, and often behind the scenes, the international Indigenous movement plots
along today. Past generations have thoroughly exposed the limitations of state-centered
solutions. Not only has the US failed to live up to original agreements with the original
peoples, it has used the resources and wealth it has stolen from the land to carryout
endless war-making across the world. The Indian wars have never truly ended. The
Treaty Council saw its sacred duty as ending imperialism abroad by ending it at home.
Therefore, anti-imperialism has become a signature characteristic of traditions of
Indigenous resistance.
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Chapter Seven: Liberation
This is the epitome of Indian Country — what it’s like to be here. We’re in a
modern day Indian War.
— Allison Renvill (Dakota) 20171
Carloads trickled into the #NoDAPL camps to celebrate the Thanksgiving
weekend in late November 2016, during the annual US holiday that commemorates a
fictional feast between settlers and Natives. The camps swelled beyond ten thousand,
marking a highpoint. Because of weather conditions, many of the caravans were stranded
in backwater places like Wyoming and missed the large feasts, what was billed as an
“anti-Thanksgiving.”
The harsh freeze of snow and ice reflected conditions in the camps. Things were
at a standstill, and law enforcement, encircling the camp, was in a holding pattern.
Because of the violent police crackdown on protests such as the infamous October 27 raid
on 1851 Treaty Camp a month earlier, a hiatus was placed on direct actions. The
competing visions of resistance — whether to continue direct actions or await legal
recourse — incited tensions and cleaved divisions within the leadership of the #NoDAPL
movement. TigerSwan, a private security contractor hired by the Dakota Access Pipeline
(DAPL) to assist North Dakota law enforcement, exploited the divisions and fueled the
growing sense of paranoia and suspicion that festers when people are under militarized
occupation. The security company led a blitzkrieg media campaign planting rumors and
false reports on social media about the Water Protectors, comparing them to jihadist
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insurgents, and infiltrating the camps to discredit individuals and organizations, tactics
eerily reminiscent of the COINTELPRO programs of previous generations. In documents
released by The Intercept, TigerSwan characterized the #NoDAPL movement as “an
ideologically driven insurgency with a strong religious component.”2 Now completely
contained by miles of concertina wire, road blocks, heavily armed private security and
law enforcement, and 24-hour aerial surveillance, prospects of physically halting the
pipeline construction seemed grim as DAPL awaited the final easement to begin drilling
under the Missouri River.
The day after Thanksgiving, a warm sun melted the snow, and the roads opened
up. In Bismarck, North Dakota, holiday shoppers flooded the Kirkwood Mall for Black
Friday, an annual consumer holiday. Bismarck police guarded the mall’s entrances, clad
in full tactical gear and carrying AR-15s. They were dressed for war. The mostly white
shoppers seemed at ease, eager to cash-in on holiday discounts and even more eager to
forget their sense of ease came at the expense of Indigenous peoples. At the protest of
white citizens in 2014, DAPL was rerouted from its original course upriver from
Bismarck over fears of water contamination. The downriver Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
would have deal with the consequences white North Dakotans knew were real and
refused to face.3 That Black Friday, hundreds of militarized police, spanning the length of
nearly seventy miles between the camps and Bismarck, were on high alert to protect the
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sanctity of Bismarck and the pipeline that trespassed through unceded Oceti Sakowin
treaty territory. Hundreds of Water Protectors planned a rogue action, a prayer circle in
the middle of the mall, to disrupt the shopping holiday and to bring attention the yet
incomplete pipeline construction. It seemed like a desperate act. In disguise and under
heavy surveillance, they slipped pass the roadside security checkpoints and infiltrated the
mall. At this point, more than six hundred had already been arrested in protest-related
actions; many were arrested multiple times; and some faced serious felony charges. The
dangers were real.
Water Protectors, disguised in “normal” attire, different from the signature camp
gear of Carhartt overalls and hoodies, bandanas, and a patchwork of camouflage shirts,
pants, and jackets, began filtering through the entrances avoiding proximity to the armed
guards. While their dress disguised their identities, police began arresting anyone who
“smelled like campfire.” Surrounded by white families, the cops couldn’t barrage Water
Protectors with their chemical irritants, the familiar tear gas and pepper spray. Prayer
songs drowned out the screams and cries of white women and children who looked
confused: should they be scared of the Water Protectors or the police? Cops violently
tackled, beat, and arrested more than fifty Water Protectors, dragging one woman by her
hair and tackling a man on crutches. Insults and calls to “go back to the reservation!”
were hurled by white men who joined the police in holding and beating anyone who
smelled like campfire. When not in camp, the smell of campfire was a dead giveaway of
one’s political orientation and was cause to profile, harass, and refuse service to those
“off the reservation.”
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While horrific and indicative of the levels of violence and discrimination imposed
on Water Protectors, the smell of campfire was also one of familiarity, comfort, and
revolution. Each morning, a low cloud of blue smoke hovered above the hundreds of tipis
and tents. It was a protective barrier that demarcated the liberated treaty territory on land
claimed by the Army Corps of Engineers, after it was seized to be flooded by the PickSloan Dams in the 1950s and 1960s. The stories and the prophetic visions of a better
world that were told around campfires during the twilight hours mixed with the smoke
saturating layers of clothes, skin, and hair. It takes many washes to remove the smell of
history that permeates every crevasse of clothing and body part. Mixed in with the smoke
are also layers of teargas and pepper spray, the choking chemicals of warfare literally
designed to arrest the sense of smell and breath. A single chemical attack dulls the sense
of smell for days, sometimes weeks. It has a disorienting effect that can build up over
time if not properly treated or washed out.
In the aftermath the October 27 raid on the 1851 Treaty Camp, another smell
permeated the camps. Police and private security heaped the camp’s remnants
— ceremonial items, such as eagle feathers, pipes, medicine bundles, and staffs, and
cutup tents, sleeping bags, clothing, and tipis — into a large pile that was dumped near
the entrance of Oceti Sakowin Camp. The pile reeked a nauseating urine smell that
wafted over the camp. Cops and private security pissed on the items before returning
them.
One night, after it was decided to ceremonially burn the urine-soaked remnants,
an Ihanktonwan elder gathered young Water Protectors around a fire. She was dressed in
the regalia she wore the day police raided the treaty camp. Hundreds of copper pennies
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hung by red ribbons from her dark blue trade cloth dress. She told the story of her
ancestors who were killed during the 1862 US-Dakota War. Evicted from their
homelands, they fled to present-day Standing Rock, crossing the Missouri River not too
far from the location of Oceti Sakowin Camp after US cavalrymen surrounded and
massacred Dakotas and Lakotas in buffalo hunt camp at Whitestone Hill on September 3,
1863 one-hundred and fifty years earlier to the date that DAPL private security used to
attack dogs on unarmed Water Protectors at a pipeline construction site. The day after
Christmas in 1862, soldiers gathered up 38 Dakota men and boys imprisoned at Fort
Snelling in Mankato, Minnesota. Their medicine bundles were confiscated, heaped in a
large pile, and burned as they sang their death songs and were led to the gallows to hang
for the crime of defending their nation and homelands. The same week President
Abraham Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation freeing Black slaves, he signed
the death sentences of the 38 Dakota patriots. The copper pennies hanging from the
elder’s regalia had holes drilled into Lincoln’s ears with red ribbon threaded through. “He
didn’t listen,” she said of the Great Emancipator, “so we opened his ears.” After the 1876
Battle of Greasy Grass, Lakota women used awls to carve holes in Custer’s ears so he
would hear better in the afterlife. This time it was President Barack Obama, North Dakota
Governor Jack Dalrymple, and Morton County sheriff Kyle Kirchmeier who refused to
listen. As singers began a prayer song, the elder reminded the younger ones that the tears
flowing from their eyes were their “ancestors speaking through them,” and that they were
not tears of trauma but of liberation. “We survived genocide after genocide,” she
reminded them. Then she danced, and the pennies swayed with the flicks of fire and
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smoke billowing upwards. Behind her stood armed police half-a-mile away on a hill in
front of bright floodlights blaring down on the camp. History was hardly the past.
On December 5, 2016, after months of bitter struggle, the Army Corps stood
down, denying the easement needed by the DAPL to drill under Lake Oahe on the
Missouri River. With the denial of the easement, the Army Corps committed to
conducting a full environmental impact study. The news was hailed as a significant
victory. Yet, with a Trump presidency just over a month away, final victory appeared
fleeting. As expected, President Trump signed executive orders fast-tracking the review
and approval of both the Dakota Access and Keystone XL pipelines. Breaking its original
commitment to conduct an environmental impact study, the Army Corps granted the
easement, which prompted Dakota Access to finalize and begin transporting oil within
months of the decision. Despite the setbacks, Water protectors focused on other actions
such as bank divestments from fossil fuel companies like Dakota Access and Energy
Transfer Partners while others vowed to remain in the camps, ignoring calls by the
Standing Rock Tribal Council to leave after the December 5 decision. The Standing Rock
Council, meanwhile, continued its battle in court and in Washington, D.C., to little or no
avail. Political winds have shifted far to the right. As the harsh winter set in, bitter
divisions between the camps and the Standing Rock Council and a growing sense of
hopelessness intensified. At the end of February 2017, law enforcement evicted the
remaining Water Protectors at the Oceti Sakowin and Sacred Stone camps.
Beyond the Dakota Access Pipeline, a growing international movement has
intensified to continue fighting the growing network of pipelines across North America.
Each flashpoint of struggle indicates a growing anti-colonial resistance led by Indigenous
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peoples against settler colonialism and extractive capitalism. The broad array of current
and proposed pipeline infrastructure sprawls across the continent like a giant spider web.
When one pipeline is defeated, such as the Keystone XL, it can be revived or another
rises to take its place. In one sense the pipelines appear like the many-headed hydra in
Greek and Roman mythology. Geographer Katie Mazer, invoking the work of radical
historians Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, argues that it is not so much pipelines
that are hydra-like — chop off one head and another takes its place; but rather, the
globalizing networks of pipeline infrastructure connects disparate communities of the
exploited and dispossessed. The growing geography of fossil fuel infrastructure expands
and unites in common cause a “seemingly mutable mass variously dispossessed peoples”
nearly impossible to defeat.4 Mazer also argues that, like all oil pipelines, DAPL is not an
isolated, issue-based struggle. Each pipeline exists in relation to other pipelines, whether
or not they are defeated or built. DAPL is a transnational project, refracting back the
transnational and international realities of Indigenous resistance. Pipelines not only ship
oil to a global market and cross settler state boundaries, but they trespass through
Indigenous territory and in opposition to Indigenous assertions of sovereignty that exist
prior to and alongside US and Canada, a sovereignty that exceeds settler sovereignty.5
Evidence of the hydra-effect can be seen in the vast array of solidarity networks
that supported the #NoDAPL struggle. Black Lives Matter, Palestinian justice
organizations, religious groups, military veterans, and many more from other social
locations and movements galvanized support for the Indigenous-led resistance movement
beyond the physical geography of the Standing Rock Indian Reservation. From the camps
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sprang to life the flame of Indigenous resistance that fanned out across the continent. But
solidarity isn’t a fleeting moment that springs up only in moments of crises and dissipates
in the interlude. As was shown throughout this dissertation, the steady accretion of
traditions of Indigenous resistance accumulated over centuries, not mere moments. Those
traditions drew upon other allied struggles such as in the case of the International Indian
Treaty Council and Indigenous internationalist movements of the twentieth century. As
much as the settler colonialism built its own physical infrastructure (such as trade routes,
railroads, dams, and oil pipelines), the infrastructure of a collective cohesion of ideas and
practices have formed around the techniques of Indigenous resistance.

Mni Wiconi
#NoDAPL could be called an Indigenous sovereignty movement; but Indigenous
sovereignty is typically understood as the so-called “nation-to-nation” relationship with
the occupying power of the United States. This state centric framework of Indigenous
sovereignty has colonized the whole space of Indigenous liberation. It has limited the
field of maneuver and thinking within the colonial, Westphalian state model.
If the western frontier of US expansion closed in 1890 as Frederick Jackson
Turner proscribed, the nineteenth century Indian Wars fought and won, Indian citizenship
imposed in 1924, a formal apology issued in 2010, the Era of tribal Self-Determination
inaugurated by Nixon in 1970, the “settlement” of past wrongs under the recent Cobell
lawsuit, and increase of “nation-to-nation” rhetoric and policies under Obama and the key
placement of Indigenous leaders within his administration, why would we need to create
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new movement? More importantly, why would need to create a new movement if
Indigenous life improved in the Obama Era?
We can look to the important political work of a movement marching under the
banner of “Black Lives Matter” and why it arose under the Obama administration.
Obviously, anti-Black police violence didn’t profoundly increase under Obama’s
presidency, but nor did it dramatically decrease. But the movement gestured toward the
limits of racial inclusion under the rule of liberalism and capitalism. The 2015 Baltimore
police murder of Freddie Gray best illustrates the movement’s primary contention and
challenge. Freddie Gray was murdered by Black police officers; a Black District
Attorney, a Black Mayor, and a Black President could not save Black Lives. Put simply,
the current political system, no matter who’s in charge, cannot save Black Lives.6 The
same could be said of Indigenous peoples and the planet. Obama’s 2010 “new energy
security plan,” which has now been maximized and increased und Trump, incentivized
and dramatically increased domestic oil and gas production, opening up previously
protected federal lands managed under the Department of Interior. The oil boom
demonstrates the current system’s inability to save Indigenous live and lands — it’s too
much of a departure of business as usual.
The continuing legacy of the Pick-Sloan dams thwart the possibility of liveable
future for the Oceti Sakowin and the millions of people who depend the Missouri River
for life. The dams personify settler colonialism. Poured concrete and rolled rock and dirt
were endowed with the will to disrupt, flood, dispossess, remove, and ultimately
eliminate Native society to be replaced by settler society. The Dakota Access Pipeline
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mirrored this process. The full force of the settler state carried out the will of Energy
Transfer Partners, the multibillion dollar corporation building the $3.7 billion pipeline
that would tunnel under the Missouri River twice, the Mississippi River once, and cross
four states (South Dakota, North Dakota, Iowa, and Illinois). Attack dogs, handcuffs, flex
cuffs, stress positions, fists, feet, assault rifles, arrest warrants, rural county jails, felonies,
misdemeanors, private property, body armor, armed drones, private security, teargas,
mace, armored Humvees, the intentional defilement of gravesites, the North Dakota
National Guard, the North Dakota State Patrol, Border Patrol riot shields, billy clubs,
concrete barricades, airplanes, Blackhawk helicopters, Caterpillar earthmovers, and
media censorship and harassment all are instruments deployed to uphold and carry out
the will of Energy Transfer Partners and its financial investors to secure the trespass of
the DAPL through Oceti Sakowin treaty territory. When viewed this way, we can begin
to understand that Water Protectors draw from the history of past Water Protectors who
fought to protect the life of their relative, Mni Sose. While corporations take on legal
personhood, Water Protectors personify water and enact kinship to the water, and the
river. If the water, a relative, is not protected and the river is not free, its people will not
be free. The stubborn persistence of Indigenous life, however, will be a constant reminder
that the water and its people still refuse death.
Mni Wiconi, as much as it reaches into the past, is a future-oriented project. It
forces some to confront their own unbelonging to the land and the river. How does settler
society — which possesses no fundamental ethical relationship to the land or its original
people — begin to imagine a future premised on justice? There is no simple an answer to
that question. What we can begin to imagine, however, is Indigenous futures, futures that
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were under construction at the #NoDAPL camps, where Indigenous peoples do not
merely survive, but thrive. #NoDAPL offered a brief vision of what a future premised on
Indigenous just would look like. With all its faults, there is something to be learned from
the treaty camps at the confluence of the Missouri and Cannon Ball rivers. Free food, free
education, free health care, free legal aid, a strong sense of community, community
security, etc. — while not perfect — were guaranteed to all. Most reservation
communities in the US don’t have access to these services, and most poor communities
don’t have access to these services. Yet, in the absence of empire with the governing
structures in the camps, people came together to help each other, to care for one another.
A radical form of relationality was the law.
Perhaps the answers lie within kinship relations — between each other and the
lands we both inhabit. Dakota scholar Kim Tallbear asks us think beyond Indigenous
sovereignty towards some kind of just kinship or radical relationality. She writes,
while the language of sovereignty does important defensive work for us it is a
partial reflection of indigenous peoples’ relations with non-indigenous people and
with each other. The language of kinship may also be a partial and productive tool
to help us forge alternatives to the settler-colonial state. Making kin is to make
people into familiars in order to relate. This seems fundamentally different from
negotiating relations between those who are seen as different — between
‘sovereigns’ or ‘nations’ — especially when one of those nations is a militarized
and white supremacist empire.7
How can we begin to imagine a just and peaceful future if the structures that
destroy our lands continue to carry out the will of that militarized and white supremacist
empire? Settler society has a failed kinship with Mni Sose, and perhaps water, the planet,
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and the nonhuman world in general. Settler colonialism must be undone if there is to be a
livable future, not just in Turtle Island but for the entire world.
Past revolutionary struggles have sought to emancipate labor from the rule of
capital. In our current moment of catastrophic and irreversible climate change, we must
begin to ask not what capital or liberal settler states want from us. We already know what
they want. They want inclusion and the sustainability of the status quo. Water protectors
ask us to consider, what does water want from us? In this sense, Mni Wiconi — water is
life — exists not only outside the logic of capital, it also exists outside the logic of
liberalism. With this in mind, we are challenged not just to imagine, but to demand the
emancipation of earth from capital — for Indigenous Nations and our human and
nonhuman relations to live.
Hecetu welo!
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